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    “I can see myself sitting on my dust heap
    making a world in my mind as surely as God 
    created this one. But God saw his world. I’ll 
    never see mine except––this way.”
     – Samuel Hamilton in East of Eden 
      (John Steinbeck)
    
    “‘For God’s sake,’ the dog is saying, ‘open 
    the universe a little more!’” 
     – Albert Corde in The Dean’s 
     December (Saul Bellow)
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Introduction: Why This World?
“Now what I want is Facts. Teach these boys and girls nothing but Facts.” Thus speaks Thomas 
Gradgrind at the beginning of Charles Dickens’s Hard Times, a statement that signals not only 
the novel’s thematic interests in education but also Dickens’s broader ambition to construct a 
world like his own (albeit one with an allowance for Dickensian caricature).  By contrast, the first 
page or so of most editions of J.R.R. Tolkien’s The Hobbit presents a map of a fabricated land, 
and the jacket summary in my edition begins, “Bilbo Baggins was a hobbit who wanted to be left 
alone in quiet comfort. But the wizard Gandalf came along with a band of homeless dwarves.” 
It’s clear at this prefatory outset that Tolkien’s world radically departs from reality. Squirming 
somewhere in the middle is Franz Kafka’s Gregor Samsa, awakened as a bug in a world 
otherwise unchanged and ordinary; it can’t be our world that permits such a metamorphosis, but 
Kafka purports it to be. As these examples suggest, fiction has the powerful capacity to imitate 
reality, to deviate from it, and to alter particulars as authors please, by turn offering the reader an 
interaction with a fictional world either similar to or different from the world in which she sits 
with the book. 
 Narrative, by any reasonable definition, entails at least one event, or “something that 
happens or takes place” (OED3). Event, by any possible definition, poses two requirements: a 
stretch of time during which to occur and a space through which to unfold. The second 
requirement provides the motivation for the present study––namely that the world in which to set 
a story must be among the first creative decisions an author makes, and, as such, these decisions 
can serve to productively differentiate fictions and partly account for the unique experiences that 
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different narratives afford. In the three chapters and conclusion that follow this introduction, I 
unpack a variety of world-building decisions and their consequences for readerly experience. 
 Because of its attention to the aesthetic, affective, ethical, and cognitive features of the 
reading experience, I situate my approach within what James Phelan calls a “rhetorical poetics of 
narrative.” The default rhetorical definition of narrative, “somebody telling somebody else on 
some occasion for some purpose(s) that something happened,” can be distilled down to the 
notion that narrative is “a multidimensional purposive communication from a teller to an 
audience”––or, even further, that a teller designs a story in order to persuade an audience into 
taking up a certain position. That design consists of what Phelan calls resources, which include 
(for example) style, character, and plot dynamics. Rhetorical theory posits, moreover, that the 
narrative act develops in a recursive “feedback loop” among authorial agency, textual 
phenomena, and reader response (STSE 3-5). What this means is that an author designs a set of 
textual phenomena that a reader experiences and interprets and then uses to make a judgment of 
the author’s design; in turn, the way readers respond or are expected to respond strongly 
influences authors’ decisions with their designs. Because each part of the loop both affects and is 
affected by the other two parts, an analysis of a given story can begin with the text, the author, or 
the reader and move forward from there. The goal of rhetorical reading is to do as much justice 
as possible to the complex relations among authors, resources, audiences, and communicative 
purposes. 
 My investigation here takes as its starting point a particular textual phenomenon, 
storyworlds, or the worlds evoked by narratives. More specifically, I’m interested in what role(s) 
storyworld-building plays in the rhetorical construction of narrative communication. Thus I ask: 
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[1] what is it like to read a story set in one kind of world as opposed to another?; and [2] for what 
purpose might an author choose to build one kind of world, and thereby provide one kind of 
experience, as opposed to another kind of world and another kind of experience? The first step 
toward answering these questions is to articulate how worlds vary across stories, a variation I 
define based on storyworlds’ difference from or similarity to the actual world.  All storyworlds, I 
contend, can be placed on a line strung through three points: at one end, a primary world is a 
storyworld that matches the actual world in every important way; at the other end, a secondary 
world shows significant difference from the actual world by containing a substantial number or 
degree of impossible or extraordinary phenomena; between the two lies the hybrid world, which 
resembles a primary world except that it contains one or few impossible or extraordinary 
phenomena. Rather than claim that every storyworld fits neatly into one of these three categories, 
I propose a continuum running from primary to secondary (say, from historical fiction to hard 
fantasy) on which every world can be placed. Furthermore, the continuum continues infinitely in 
either direction so that storyworlds can become more and more and less and less like the actual 
world both as we consider more narratives in terms of their worlds and as authors continue to 
push the limits of world-building mechanics (though it’s possible that at some point a primary 
world would become nonfictional and a secondary world would cease to be recognizable as a 
world). Our way in, then, is to apply the research questions above to multiple points on the 
continuum in hopes of determining whether different storyworlds provide qualitatively different 
reading experiences and/or invite significantly different interpretive stances simply by positing 
such worlds. The general hypothesis I take to this inquiry is that authors build storyworlds to 
guide the experiential and interpretive responses of their readers. 
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 But before I begin asking these questions about individual texts I need to assemble an 
apparatus of terms and systems that allows me to track, examine, and interpret various aspects of 
the reading experience. I spend chapter one in a dialogue with a number of theorists, among them 
Phelan, Wayne Booth, David Herman, and Peter Rabinowitz, in an effort to more fully define 
authors, readers, and storyworlds and the interactions that transpire between them. The sketch 
with which I emerge forms the basis of my analytical method, the key points of which are that 
[1] the reader is split into two parts, the authorial consciousness (committed to the laws and 
norms of the actual world) and the narrative consciousness (committed to the laws and norms of 
the storyworld), and [2] the accordance or discordance between the narrative consciousness’s 
observations and the authorial consciousness’s beliefs can alter the relationship between the 
consciousnesses and thereby affect the reading experience. 
 In chapter two I turn to case studies of the primary- and secondary-world ends of the 
continuum; I approach these studies in the spirit of what Phelan and Rabinowitz call “theory-
practice,” or “inquiries in which theory aids the work of interpretation even as that work allows 
for further developments in theory” (STSE 4). In other words, my goal is to perform interpretive 
readings of individual texts that simultaneously allow me to test, revise, and put forth broadly 
applicable theoretical principles. I begin with Zadie Smith’s White Teeth, first defining realism in 
terms of a relation between storyworld and actual world then examining the ways in which Smith 
establishes a clear and certain accordance with the actual world and thereby builds a primary 
world. After assessing the qualities of primary-world reading and the particular communicative 
purpose that Smith’s storyworld serves, I move on to Salman Rushdie’s secondary-world novel 
Haroun and the Sea of Stories. My elucidation of Haroun is often comparative, which lets the 
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experiential differences between primary and secondary worlds surface naturally: whereas 
Smith’s realism urges us to apply our actual-world understanding to every element of the 
narrative, Rushdie’s fantasy directs us past the particulars to the general, even universal 
thematics dealt with in the story.
 Theory-practice continues in chapter three as I move to the center of the continuum with 
F. Scott Fitzgerald’s “The Curious Case of Benjamin Button.” This chapter pulls from the 
principles established in relation to Smith and Rushdie to gauge what occurs when a narrative 
offers the reader aspects of both the realist and the fantastical. I spend the most time here, with 
the hybrid world, because in some ways it both provides a more complex experience and serves a 
more complex rhetorical purpose than do either the primary or the secondary world. By situating 
a single unresolvable extraordinary instability within an otherwise insistently ordinary world, 
Fitzgerald places the reader in what feels like a destabilized reality, forcing her to see freshly and 
perhaps reevaluate that foundational assumption which the extraordinary phenomenon violates. 
As a result of this arrangement, hybrid-world narratives exercise a uniquely acute capacity for 
challenging what we know, think, believe, and value about the world: hybrid worlds have 
provocation and stimulation inherent in the very structure of their storyworld.
 In conclusion I briefly survey how the three modes dealt with throughout the paper––
realism, fantasy, hybridity––interact in some storyworlds at other places on the continuum. My 
contention is ultimately that the interpretive method I employ in this essay is useful not only for 
reading the narratives discussed here but for grasping the rhetorical role of world-building in the 
broadest sense. 
    . . .
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Though I will address, directly and obliquely, reasons why world-building matters throughout 
my analyses, I want to reiterate before we begin the principal payoff of storyworld study. As 
Salman Rushdie puts it in a remark we’ll return to in time, “We are storytelling creatures, you 
know, we're the only species on the planet that does this very weird thing of telling itself stories 
in order to understand what kind of a creature it is” (“VermontReads”).  Perhaps apart from 
utmost experimentalism (Beckett at his most inscrutable, maybe?), all stories evoke a space––a 
world––through which they unfold. What we talk about when we talk about storyworlds, then, is 
a fundamental facet of a fundamental facet of our existence. Understanding the first link in that 
chain might well send ripples of understanding down the line.
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I: The Apparatus: Readers, Authors, Storyworlds 
   There seemed to be a dual consciousness running in him. 
   He was thinking vigorously of something he read . . . and
   at the same time his eye ran over he surface of the life 
   around him, and he missed nothing. 
      –––D.H. Lawrence, Women in Love
We go wrong to leave a concept like “experience” unquestioned, unbroken into more 
fundamental components. The present study professes to be an examination of the reading 
experience as it’s affected by the different worlds in which narratives are set. So I’m to track 
variation––but how? That is, how can I account for and explain macro experiential differences in 
a way that does justice to the intricacies of narrative processes? Micro elements, of course, are 
the answer. My approach is rhetorical; the rhetorical experience of narrative––as previewed by 
the definition of rhetorical narratology in my introduction––involves three major parts: a reader, 
a narrative or a set of textual phenomena, and an author or authorial agency. These three parts 
interact in meaningful narratives to challenge, reinforce, or otherwise engage our beliefs, ethics, 
emotions, cognition and aesthetic values. In this chapter I attempt to form working definitions of 
reader, author, and storyworld (my focal textual phenomenon) by engaging with a few of the 
theorists who have most compellingly addressed these terms. The resulting model posits the 
reader as a single figure with two “consciousnesses” in constant interaction: the authorial 
consciousness is grounded in the actual world, while the narrative consciousness is immersed in 
the storyworld, or the physical and ontological landscape that houses and includes the figures 
and events of the narrative. The storyworld is created by an author in an attempt to communicate 
something to the reader. Constructing this three-part mechanism is prerequisite to chapters two 
and three, wherein I examine the interaction between the parts in particular narrative situations.
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 My conception of the reader is a manipulation of Peter Rabinowitz’s work on audiences. 
In “Truth in Fiction” Rabinowitz begins by laying out the double-consciousness inherent in every 
reading of fiction that permits the events of a narrative to be “both ‘true’ and ‘untrue’ at the same 
time” (125). As critics who long predate Rabinowitz––he cites, as he often does, Walter Ong and 
Walker Gibson––have discussed, literary reading requires that we both entertain the fictive 
content of the story as if it were real and remain aware that it’s fictional within the actual world; 
it’s this arrangement that allows us to experience fiction as something apart from a lie. I imagine 
even inexperienced or uneducated readers intuit this double-consciousness, even if they never 
consider or articulate it. But Rabinowitz’s theory is innovative because he splits each of the two 
reading selves into an additional two more precise entities, yielding four “audiences,” which I’ll 
outline here. 
 Most concretely, the [1] actual audience is the flesh-and-blood reader. “It is the only 
audience which is entirely ‘real,’” meaning that it exists independent of the artwork (126). 
Because of this independence, the author has no control over the actual audience and so 
postulates the [2] authorial audience, the “specific” actual audience for which a work is 
intended. The authorial audience’s existence is hypothetical, the body of knowledge and set of 
beliefs that best allow the reader to experience the fiction as its author desires, but it is, at least in 
theory, possible to attain this knowledge and these beliefs, especially because the author bases 
them in part on her knowledge of actual readers. Indeed, in many cases we are poised to 
understand a text to the exact degree that we fulfill our potential to become the authorial 
audience. For instance, if we’re to properly follow Don Quixote, we must have at least a vague 
familiarity with novels of chivalry; if we want to recognize the significance of many scenes and 
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symbols in Ulysses, it helps if we’ve first read the Odyssey. A given text’s authorial audience has 
all the qualities necessary for understanding it––thus the authorial audience is the optimal 
version of the actual audience, as determined by the author from whom comes the work. 
 Rabinowitz calls the audience that’s ontologically analogous to the work itself the [3] 
narrative audience. This audience takes up, in James Phelan’s words, “an observer position 
within the narrative world” and thereafter witnesses the events of the story (EF 4). It’s this part 
of the reader that believes for the duration of War and Peace that Andrei Bolkonsky and Natasha 
Rostov are real and that on New Year’s Eve, 1809, they turned their first waltz at a grand 
dignitary’s ball on the English Embankment and so on, according to Tolstoy’s narrator. Such 
belief is painless in fictions like Tolstoy’s whose inventions are plausible versions of reality, but 
even Tolkien’s fantasy and Wells’s science fiction demand that the reader project a witness into 
the world of the narrative: joining the narrative audience is, Rabinowitz says, “the first and most 
elementary step” in literary interpretation––and, I would add, in literary experience (133). 
Naturally, just as the author has a model actual audience, which we’ve called the authorial 
audience, the narrator has a model narrative audience, which Rabinowitz calls the [4] ideal 
narrative audience. This audience “believes the narrator, accepts his judgments, sympathizes 
with his plight, laughs at his jokes even when they are bad” (134). The ideal narrative audience is 
effectively the narrator’s chorus of yes men. I suspect (and Rabinowitz begins to admit) that this 
notion is an attempt to account for those moments when the narrative audience recognizes 
disparity between what it can discern about the story and what the narrator tries to persuade it to 
believe––in short, unreliable narration. In such cases there is a naive (ideal) narrative audience 
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contrasting with the savvy one that recognizes unreliability as well as some ironies and other 
such devices.
  So, all together, Rabinowitz’s theory maintains that any interaction between reader and 
narrative entails four audiences: the actual audience is the flesh-and-blood reader with the book 
on her lap; the authorial audience is the best-equipped actual audience and the target for which 
the author aims; the narrative audience is the observer within the narrative world who treats its 
figures and events as if they are real; and the ideal narrative audience is the audience that 
believes and humours the narrator without consideration for possible faults in truthfulness, 
perspective, judgment, interpretation, et cetera. Perhaps most importantly, these entities are 
simultaneous. We do not pivot from one to the other but allow all four to work at once; for 
Rabinowitz, reading is just that complex. 
 For my purposes, however, I will compress the model back down to two parts. First, I 
want to refer to the actual and authorial audiences as one unit within my terminological 
framework. It’s important to maintain awareness of the theoretical distinction between the 
authorial and actual audiences and acknowledge individual instances of disparity between them, 
but in this discussion their difference is ultimately subordinate to what they share: a grounding in 
the actual world. Furthermore, this combination is all but justified in places by Rabinowitz’s own 
language. For example, he admits that “as good readers,” which we hope we are, “we usually try 
to become the authorial audience” (127). Phelan reiterates this notion: “The flesh-and-blood (or 
actual) reader seeks to enter the authorial audience; hence, when I speak about what ‘we’ readers 
do in response to a narrative text, I am referring to the activities of the authorial audience” (EF 
4). What’s implicit here is first that the good reader wants to join the authorial audience, and 
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though there is likely a subset that doesn’t, I do not have the space to consider them. Second, and 
more importantly, any real progress in the “becoming” or “entering” of the authorial audience 
entails a real, tangible change in the actual reader; the acquisition of necessary information, for 
instance, results in retained actual-world knowledge, just as the pretense of a required belief 
materializes as a temporary feature of the reader’s actual mind. Thus the authorial audience 
exists only hypothetically until the actual audience succeeds in becoming it, in which case the 
theoretical line between the two thins to practical nonexistence. Some readers will of course fail 
to become the authorial audience, whether because of misreading or deliberate textual opacity, 
and an accumulation of such failures could illuminate something important about a given text. 
Nevertheless, it remains that if only they could’ve joined the authorial audience the text would’ve 
made more sense; and since the goal of analysis is to some degree a making-sense, there’s an 
implied claim to be the authorial audience beneath every productive analytical effort.  I take this 
as justification enough to center the entity around the mutual grounding in the actual world and 
the according awareness of (and commitment to) actual-world laws and norms. I’ll call this 
single representative of the actual world the authorial consciousness.
 A bit more simply, I construct the second half of the binary by dropping the ideal 
narrative audience altogether. Rabinowitz’s move is clever with its perfect parallelism, but I fear 
it’s an over-complication, or else the entity is so abstract it’s perpetually out of sight. In any case, 
all it takes to account for unreliability, irony and the like is to respect the narrative audience a 
little more. Phelan notes that the observer “within the narrative world” adopts “the normative 
beliefs and attitudes” of that world (“MTS” 13). Presumably, then, that observer (the narrative 
audience) is capable of interpreting its observations in terms of the world in which they occur, 
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thus enjoying enough savvy to separate the truth about the narrative events from the narrator’s 
utterances, where necessary. And all this without considering that there might be a vague 
audience who takes the utterances at face value. In other words, a round, reasoning narrative 
audience is all we need within the world of the fiction. So, the clear counterpart to the authorial 
consciousness, I’ll call the observer within the narrative world and its awareness of (and 
commitment to) the laws and norms of that world the narrative consciousness. A parallelism of 
my own. 
 Switching from “audiences” to “consciousnesses” is an attempt to emphasize the most 
important aspects of the entities, namely that they’re two concurrent parts of one whole and that 
they interact instantaneously. Just as Rabinowitz’s audiences exist simultaneously, so the 
authorial and narrative consciousnesses occupy their respective posts at the same time; in 
Kendall Walton’s words, “We do not stop existing when it becomes fictional that we 
exist” (“Appreciating Fiction” 15). Because the consciousnesses are parts of the same “mind,” it 
follows that while the narrative consciousness observes and evaluates the fictional world, the 
authorial consciousness automatically pits those observations and evaluations against its 
understanding of the actual world; the developing beliefs of the narrative consciousness 
inevitably brush against the established beliefs of the authorial consciousness. This process 
cycles ceaselessly for the duration of the narrative––in this way the consciousnesses interact, and 
it happens automatically, at once, no intervention needed. Most importantly, such interaction 
between two sets of norms and beliefs naturally fosters the prospect of discordance or 
“disagreement.” In some cases the authorial consciousness recognizes difference between its 
beliefs and the narrative consciousness’s; in others, sameness. These recognitions can elicit a 
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range of responses in the reader, from glee to tension to confusion and so on, which potentially 
generate a change in the consciousnesses’ relation to each other, to the world, and to the narrative 
itself. And an alteration of the reader’s experience (in terms of belief, cognition and the other 
elements mentioned above) likely results. That process is the foundational concern of this study.  
 Finally, it’s important to note that the authorial consciousness in a sense subsumes the 
narrative consciousness. As readers we are most actually in the actual world, which allows us to 
(requires that we) extend into the narrative or extend our consciousness to account for the 
fictional world. But that extension necessarily exists within our real experience of the book in the 
actual world. In other words, we can close a novel and leave the narrative consciousness behind, 
but we cannot open it and divorce the actual, to which the authorial corresponds. Whatever the 
local experience of our narrative consciousness within the fictional world, it must eventually 
return to the evaluative and interpretive actions of our actual-world selves; the authorial 
consciousness remains aware of this condition, posing a sort of continual so what? that attempts 
to understand the narrative as an actual-world communicative act. So in the end any work that a 
narrative performs––change that it catalyzes––will manifest in the actual world. If, as Walton 
says, “We don’t stop existing when it becomes fictional that we exist,” we do, by contrast, stop 
fictionally existing when we vacate the fictional world. And that’s in part what lends narrative its 
power and potency: in the end it circles back to an effort to affect us and our world. 
 What I’ve been referring to as “narrative worlds” and “fictional worlds” I’ll hereafter call 
storyworlds. My definition of storyworld is, as for many theorists, significantly more 
straightforward than my model of the reader. It follows from David Herman’s simple assertion: 
“Storyworlds can be defined as the worlds evoked by narratives” (105). In my slightly more 
Martello 16
precise terms, the storyworld is the physical and ontological landscape in which the narrative’s 
events occur, its figures live, and its reader temporarily (and partially) “relocates.” It is perhaps 
useful to think of a storyworld as a storyuniverse, a tweak that suggests the one important 
distinction I must make between my definition and those proposed by other critics. For instance, 
Brian McHale, among others, has discussed extensively the complex ontological structures of 
many postmodernist texts, narratives that contain multiple worlds, “paraworlds,” et cetera.1 But 
by my judgment these multiple realms (I’ll call them) all belong to the same storyworld. That is 
to say, if a story is coherent and whole, it cannot have more than one storyworld. Thus the 
storyworld of Neil Gaiman’s Neverwhere contains both real London and the haunted 
Underground peopled by monsters and angels. The split Homeric world is part divine and part 
profane, and different laws govern each realm, but the storyworld of the Iliad is simply a world 
in which multiple realms exist. So in a given reading experience there exist only two worlds, the 
storyworld and the actual world against which the storyworld is set. This distinction will be 
important for my analysis of Rushdie’s novels in chapter two, as will the question of whether 
multiple independent narratives can share a storyworld. Without dipping more than a tentative 
toe into the vast debate about the ontological status of fiction––governed by figures such as John 
Searle––I answer affirmatively to that question on the assumption that sufficient and salient 
similarity across storyworlds’ features and inhabitants can render worlds, for all interpretive 
purposes, identical. Finally, and most importantly for this essay, the storyworld is the world that 
the narrative consciousness inhabits, observes and evaluates and in turn allows the authorial 
consciousness to recognize difference or sameness from or to the actual world. 
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1 The multiple worlds idea surfaces throughout the entirety of Postmodernist Fiction (1987) but is especially 
concentrated in chapters three, four, and five.
 No matter their sameness to the actual world, storyworlds of fiction must be products of 
an imagination, and that imagination, of course, belongs to the author. Jan Alber calls the author 
“omnipotent inventor and creator of the fictional world,” and from a sort of ontological 
standpoint his definition is all but indisputable (UN 92). In critical practice, however, it’s knottier 
to determine the author’s exact relevance to a text and to our interpretations thereof. Phelan’s 
glossary entry for “authorial intention” in Narrative as Rhetoric concludes, “It is much easier to 
define the term than to identify all the different stances critics and theorists have taken regarding 
the concept” (215). He is quite correct. But suffice it to say that I, like Booth, unlike Barthes, do 
not think it theoretically useful or philosophically accurate to kill or ignore the author in either 
the experience or the interpretation of literature. Rhetorical theory understands narrative as an 
interaction, a three-part push-pull between author, text and reader––Phelan calls this relationship 
“recursive,” meaning that it’s endlessly reciprocal: author creates text that affects reader who 
applies return pressure to text, altering the perception of author, and so forth in all directions. The 
obvious consequence of such a view is that all three of these elements are indispensable. For 
Booth the author is everywhere; in the first chapter of The Rhetoric of Fiction, for example, 
under the header “The Author’s Many Voices,” he delineates a plethora of textual phenomena, 
such as reader address and character reliability, that cannot exist without the presence of an 
author, in some more or less overt form (16). I agree on the author’s necessity up to here, but I 
follow Phelan in his distancing from Booth’s insistence on recovering the author’s actual 
intentions to determine the meaning of a text (Narrative as Rhetoric 19). I posit instead a 
ghostlier entity whose existence is imperative but whose specific characteristics may vary as 
interpreters deem appropriate. 
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 Most fundamentally, the author is the presence that allows readers to believe that every 
element of a narrative meaningfully contributes to a conscious attempt at communication. In 
other words, we need the author in order to assume design or intention, which justifies our 
interpretive efforts. Booth writes in Critical Understanding, “When texts are torn free of 
intentions . . . they become uninterpretable.” This assertion follows from his discussion of 
understanding, which he says “no person can have except in conjunction with at least one other 
person, living or dead” (263-265). If we assume that the literary-critical endeavor is an attempt at 
understanding, then texts become “uninterpretable” when “torn free of intentions” because 
they’ve lost the “other person” who guides them to intelligibility. Keeping the “other person” in 
the arrangement means that when interpreting a text, each attained understanding is implicitly 
part of the reconstruction of an author who would (and does) intend that understanding. But 
because we can never reach an objective version of author and design, our reconstructions are 
always hypothetical; my hypotheses are as honest and accurate as I’m capable of formulating, 
but they are no inherently greater than others’, insofar as they’re equally sustained by and loyal 
to the text. What may not vary, however, is the possibility of a reconstruction, the very fact that 
there is, on the other side of the text, that “someone other than ourselves” to whom Phelan is 
always referring. That presence is the foundation of my understanding of the author. My 
argument in this paper relies on the assumption that storyworlds signal something about narrative 
events. Safely I assume that, solely because I maintain awareness of an author who calculates his 
composition. Otherwise there’s nothing we cannot attribute to coincidence, nothing at which we 
cannot lazily throw up our hands and conclude: it means nothing. The author in this sense keeps 
us honest and reassures us that there’s something to uncover if we dig deep enough. And when 
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we do uncover it, we consider each of our findings a step closer to proper understanding of the 
text as designed.
 In sum, then, in every fictional narrative situation there is an author who designs the 
narrative, a storyworld that houses the narrative for some significative purpose, and a reader who 
visits that storyworld with the goal of understanding it. The reader is divided into two 
consciousnesses: the narrative consciousness inhabits the storyworld, observes and evaluates it, 
while the authorial consciousness considers these observations and evaluations in terms of the 
actual world. Recognition therein of accordance or discordance between the two systems––
storyworld and actual world––generates a variety of responses in the reader, which potentially 
alter the consciousnesses’ approach to each other, to the worlds, and to the narrative. This 
interaction occurs instantaneously for the duration of the reader’s visit, and it’s the basis for the 
examination of experiential changes across storyworlds that I’ll be performing in the following 
chapters. And once more, rhetorically we understand these changes as reactions happening in 
accordance with the text’s design, thus circling us back to storyworlds constructed by an author 
for some purpose. With this apparatus assembled we can move into exploring particular 
manifestations the phenomena. 
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II. The Poles: Primary and Secondary Worlds
   The ambition of literary realism is to plagiarize God’s creation. 
     –––Charles Simic, The Monster Loves His Labyrinth 
 
   So when I found myself in a new world, I determined to start anew. 
   What had been right and necessary on Earth did not have to be so here. 
     –––Philip José Farmer, “Riverworld” 
I confess I’ve appropriated the terms primary world and secondary world from J.R.R. Tolkien’s 
classic essay “On Faerie-Stories,” but my usage of the terms differs significantly from his. 
Tolkien’s study outlines a single contrast: the Secondary World, the created world, is set against 
the Primary World, or the world in which the reader lives. In my terms, the equivalent contrast is 
between storyworld and actual world (which I take from Marie-Laure Ryan), and the terms 
“primary” and “secondary” designate storyworld types that are defined by their similarity to or 
difference from the actual world. In other words, the relation of a storyworld to the actual world 
determines whether the storyworld is a primary world, a secondary world, a hybrid world (to 
which I’ll turn in chapter three), or something in-between. Nevertheless, many of Tolkien’s 
remarks in “On Faerie Stories” do directly transfer to my thinking about storyworlds. He writes, 
for instance, about the consuming “enchantment” that readers feel as “wandering explorers” of 
well-made fictional worlds: the author “makes a Secondary World which your mind can enter. 
Inside it, what he relates is true: it accords with the laws of that world. You therefore believe it, 
while you are, as it were, inside” (60). This understanding of world-visiting is foundational to my 
inquiry into the reader’s experience of literary storyworlds, and the insider “belief” he refers to 
is, in effect, the viewpoint of what I’ve called the narrative consciousness. But Tolkien and I 
again begin to differ as he goes on: “The moment disbelief arises, the spell is broken; the magic, 
or rather art, has failed.” Of course aesthetic failure sometimes does generate disbelief, but the  
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“disbelief’ to which Tolkien refers seems just as likely to be ontological complication, that is, 
confusion regarding how the laws of the storyworld relate to those of the actual world. Perhaps 
we briefly “disbelieve” in a narrative event because it violates the parameters we had applied to 
the storyworld, but our ideal response is not to immediately close the book in aesthetic 
displeasure but to adjust those parameters to accommodate the apparently violating event. 
Alternatively, an author might construct a world so quotidian, so unchallenging to our “belief” 
that it almost perfectly resembles life in the actual world; as a result we might simply map our 
understanding of the actual world onto the storyworld. These responses (and others like them) 
constitute interactions and potentially alterations in the relationship between the narrative and 
authorial consciousnesses, which in turn affect the reader’s overall experience of the narrative. 
 The emphases of this chapter are the primary world and the secondary world––the poles, 
I’ll call them, of the storyworld continuum. On one end, a primary world is a storyworld that 
matches the actual world in all fundamental ways (laws of physics, et cetera) and most other 
ways as well, excepting fictive manifestations of actual-world phenomena, such as invented 
characters and their actions. At the other end, a secondary world is a storyworld that contains a 
salient enough presence of the extraordinary to mark the storyworld as fundamentally different 
from the actual world. The analyses in this chapter progress in that order, primary to secondary, 
by turn. I begin by defining realism in terms of the relationship between storyworld and actual 
world then likening that realism to primary worlds, surveying the ways in which Zadie Smith 
aligns the storyworld of White Teeth with the actual world and thereby builds a primary world. 
From there I argue that the primary world produces beliefs in the narrative consciousness that 
match those of the authorial consciousness, which encourages the reader to interpret the narrative 
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in terms of the actual world. In Smith’s case, that tendency encouraged by the primary world 
primes the reader to receive the author’s candid commentary on the actual world, especially 
when that commentary takes the form of a forthright authorial intrusion, or a voice in the 
narration that directly instructs us to consider something about our world. Smith builds a primary 
world, in other words, to disburse the content of her argument to the reader with more 
immediacy and specificity than would be plausible with a storyworld less obviously like the 
actual world. 
 By contrast, in a secondary world, significant and salient difference from the actual world 
signals to the authorial consciousness that actual-world parameters are not sufficient for 
understanding the storyworld; as a result, the beliefs of the observing narrative consciousness 
take lead through the storyworld, allowing the reader to follow, enjoy, and interpret the 
narrative’s extraordinary or impossible phenomena free of the authorial consciousness’s 
commitment to resolving such phenomena in terms of the actual world. In place of these 
individual, micro resolutions, the authorial consciousness becomes interested in the so what of 
the construction more broadly. The secondary world orients this macro interpretive action away 
from particulars toward the general, even universal concepts shared by the actual world and the 
storyworld. In the case of Haroun and the Sea of Stories, Rushdie builds a secondary world to 
argue for the universal necessity of freedom of expression and against the danger that is 
tyrannical ideology.
 a. The Primary World of Zadie Smith’s White Teeth
The term “realism” is troublesome in literary study because it denotes different things to 
different people in different contexts. To some it’s a stylistic maneuver, namely the 
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descriptiveness of, say, Balzac or early James, which over the course of several pages yields 
quite the complete portrait of the chaise lounge in the corner of the drawing room. To others 
realism is an attention to “real life”––Tolstoy representing actual battles––or to “real,” often 
lowly people: Dickens’s poor, Dostoyevsky’s mad. To still others, particularly in pedagogical 
settings, capital-R Realism is a temporal marker used to refer to the period between roughly 1850 
and 1900, brackets inside which all the writers mentioned in this paragraph can fit. And of course 
I still haven’t emptied the definition-hoard. But rather than do so and need afterward to sort 
through the pile, claiming what gets to be “realist” and what doesn’t, I want to propose here a 
broader and simpler definition of the term that includes within it the understandings I’ve 
delineated above and others that might differ in means but work toward the same end.
 By my account, realism is a measure of the perceived similarity between the storyworld 
of a text and the actual world.2 The more clearly and certainly the two worlds accord, the more 
realist the narrative; thus, the writer who aspires to realism strives for clear and certain likeness 
of her fictional world to the actual world of her audience. This clarity and certainty can be 
achieved in myriad ways, which allows, for example, the text-message bubbles embedded in 
Jonathan Franzen’s novel Purity to be as realist as the straightforward he-said-she-said dialogue 
of nineteenth-century fiction, despite the formal difference in technique. Indeed, for Franzen 
translating a text-message exchange into straightforward prose would be less realist than 
providing the exchange as it appears on the screen, just as dividing a conversation into blue and 
white bubbles would be unthinkably un-realist for Hardy or Thackeray. My point here is that the 
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2 As such, I am not positing realism as a genre per se but a classification determined by the relation of qualities of a 
fictional world to those of the actual world. Thus, realism can vary independent of genre or mode, with some 
discrete genres––detective fiction, travel writing––(hypothetically) being equally realist even as others––gothic 
fiction, classical epic––are, by virtue of the storyworlds inherent in their generic status, significantly less so. 
actual world with which the realist storyworld accords is the world of the authorial 
consciousness, or the version of the actual world to which the author understands her audience to 
be in-tune. Rabinowitz proposes a hypothetical “theory of literary realism” based on the 
“distance” between the authorial and narrative audiences, and this idea is similar to the one that 
I’m outlining here. However, I don’t quite agree with “distance” because it implies a sort of 
travel and a duration thereof, which would undermine the instantaneity with which the narrative 
and authorial consciousnesses interact; as Thomas Pavel puts it, “To read a text or to look at a 
painting means already to inhabit their worlds,” therefore any terminology that suggests a time-
lapse is misleading. Hence, Rabinowitz’s realism would be better phrased as a theory of the 
difference between the narrative and authorial audiences, or, in my terms, between the beliefs of 
the narrative and authorial consciousnesses. Yet this is still a little erroneous, for the relation of 
the narrative consciousness to the authorial consciousness doesn’t determine the realism of a text 
but results from it. That is, the similarity of the storyworld to the actual world comes first, and 
the consciousnesses, observing their respective worlds, respond accordingly. 
 The pinnacle of this realism, then, is the narrative whose posited storyworld literally is 
the actual world of the authorial consciousness, as (purportedly) in nonfiction, in which case the 
distinction between the consciousnesses disappears entirely. It is important to consider 
narratological principles in relation to nonfiction, but for now I’m concerned with storyworlds 
whose differences from the actual world are minimal, innocuous; these storyworlds I call 
primary worlds. Because realism is a measure of the storyworld’s accordance with the actual 
world, the degree to which a text is realist is likewise the degree to which its storyworld is 
primary. And just as a text’s realism is contingent upon the clarity and certainty of its world’s 
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accordance with the actual world, so does the world’s primary-ness (so to speak) depend upon 
that same clarity and certainty. In what follows I examine an extreme version of a primary-world 
narrative, Zadie Smith’s White Teeth, surveying various ways in which Smith clearly and 
certainly tethers her storyworld to the actual world and thereby builds a primary world. I do not, 
however, claim comprehensiveness; the strategies I examine are meant to lend an understanding 
of the construction of White Teeth’s world as primary, but neither that list of strategies nor the 
experiential effects I discuss are exhaustive. 
 i. Realism by Reference 
Smith’s most explicit appeal to the actual world in White Teeth is what Phelan calls “local 
referentiality,” or the “presence of historical figures and events in fiction” (EF 217). In McHale’s 
words, “literary reference” is a system “whereby an internal (fictional) field of reference and an 
external (real-world) field overlap and interpenetrate.” As “overlap and interpenetrate” suggest, 
referentiality creates a kind of tangible likeness between storyworld and actual world and thus 
enhances the realism of the text, “on the condition,” McHale points out, “that the properties 
attributed to [the referents] in the text do not actually contradict the ‘official’ [actual-world] 
record” (PF 86-7). I will extend Phelan’s “historical figures and events” to include places, 
objects, ideas, and so forth then impose, for this study, an additional criterion: the references 
discussed here will have or be derived from something with the status of a proper noun. It’s not 
the case that only proper nouns can be referential, but they often function as uniquely clear 
markers of reference, so I’ll make them my focus here. This choice also protects against the 
appropriation of  everything that doesn’t contradict the actual world as contributions to realism, 
which would be redundant to the point of critical uselessness. 
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  It would take a scholarly book twice as long as White Teeth to annotate all of its effective 
references to the actual world, so I cannot attempt to provide a full list of them here. For an 
impression of their pervasiveness, however, here are the local references from the first page of 
each of the novel’s twenty chapters: [1] Cricklewood Broadway (London), Cavalier Musketeer 
Estate (automobile); [2] “Hitler’s Napoleonic ambition”; [3] Corinthians, Morocco, Belgium, 
Italy, Willesden Green (London); [4] Euston Road (London); [5] “English manners,” “Russian 
ground”; [6] “Chinese burn”; [7] Bombay, Kingston, Delhi, and the British television constantly 
airing in these cities; [8] “a map of the Arab Emirates,” English painter George Stubbs, Antiguan 
cricketer Viv Richards; [9] Woman’s Own magazine; [10] New Year’s Eve, Germany; [11] 
adjectives European and Jamaican regarding anatomical proportions; [12] “The March of 
History” (Marx’s phrase), “lapsed-Catholic”; [13] adjective English, the Earl of Ellenborough; 
[14] Saint Paul, Delhi, Keats, adjective Bengali, Clarissa (of Richardson’s novel); [15] 
Cinderella; [16] Heathrow Airport (London); [17] television programs Antique’s Roadshow and 
The Equalizer, English actor Edward Woodward, adjective Cockney; [18] Islam, adjective 
Caribbean; [19] “Union Jacks,” England, New Year’s Eve, adjective Somalian, Willesden and 
Trafalgar Square (London); finally [20] almost nothing, except that the chapter title, “Of Mice 
and Memory,” alludes to Steinbeck’s novella Of Mice and Men and Robert Burns’s poem “To a 
Mouse” (“The best laid schemes of mice and men / Go often askew”). Marie-Laure Ryan notes 
that “the use of place names borrowed from real-world geography situates the story in a specific 
spatial setting” (NS/SN 19). Smith displays, with the places mentioned above and many others, a 
topographical mastery of London, past and present, and thereby firmly roots (most of) White 
Teeth in the capital city of England. I would furthermore argue a rough equivalence of Ryan’s 
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claim about places to the effect of “names borrowed from real-world [anything else].” In other 
words, just as “Trafalgar Square” situates the action in London, somewhere between the National 
Gallery and Elizabeth Tower, so does “Hitler’s Napoleonic vision” situate the surrounding 
discourse within our understanding of foolhardy ambition in the actual world. In this way each 
instance of local referentiality reaches out and wraps around the actual world in whatever context 
the reference appears.3 And by wrapping around the actual world, each instance of local 
referentiality therefore appeals to the authorial consciousness, verifies the applicability of its 
beliefs to whatever aspect of the storyworld a given reference pertains. This understanding will 
be the basis of the analyses to come. I’ll stress once more that the references I’ve included above 
are from only the first page of each chapter. If we consider the length of White Teeth––448 
pages––in light of the twenty pages worth of references I’ve listed here, the enormous 
importance of actual-world elements to the construction of the storyworld becomes obvious. 
 But more potent than the mere appearance of these references in the book are the 
characters’ interactions with them; as the characters interact with actual-world elements, they 
solidify the existence of those elements in the storyworld and simultaneously place themselves 
within actual-world physical or psychological spheres. For example, a little over midway through 
the novel, Irie agrees to be a part of Marcus Chalfen’s FutureMouse project, a genetic-
engineering study that Chalfen proposes will “eliminate randomness” and thence enable 
scientists to eradicate disease and other undesirable traits and conditions. Clara, Irie’s mother, is 
displeased with Irie’s involvement, but she’s too busy to “consolidate” her displeasure with 
Alsana, whose son Millat is also, at this moment, a friend of the Chalfens. The source of that 
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actual world. 
busyness: “night school three days a week (courses: British Imperialism 1765 to the Present; 
Medieval Welsh Literature; Black Feminism)” (284). By specifying these courses, which could 
well be in session right now at any English or American university, Smith not only explains what 
consumes Clara’s time but also immerses Clara in entire actual-world bodies of thought. As a 
result, the overlap between actual world and storyworld extends to the intellectual level: the 
characters muse over the same topics that we do. 
 That intellectual referentiality expands to cover spiritual and political territory as well. 
The focal characters in the novel are divided on religious grounds. Hortense and Ryan Topps, for 
instance, are Jehovah’s Witnesses, while Samad and Millat are Muslim, and their respective 
affiliations often surface blatantly in the discourse. Nearly every sentence Hortense speaks is 
scriptural. She quotes Genesis 11:9 on page 318 and nine pages later “interprets” Revelation 
3:15, pivoting through the bookends of the Bible as if to posit her Christian commitment as total, 
all-encompassing. Similarly, near the end of the novel Millat and his group KEVIN (Keepers of 
the Eternal and Victorious Islamic Nation) discuss translations of the Qu’rān. Brother Hifan 
exclaims, 
  “But Dawood is a plod! . . . I refer you to 52:44: If they saw a part of heaven falling 
  down, they would still say: ‘It is but a mass of clouds!’ Mass of clouds? It is not a 
  rock concert. At least with Rodwell there is some attempt to capture the poetry, the 
  remarkable nature of the Arabic . . .” (415)
These remarks densify the religious referentiality by engaging the characters in debates that 
occur within actual-world religious communities. Such is the case too with the veiled but 
powerful allusion to Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses and the fatwa affair that followed. In 
chapter nine Millat’s crew, still relatively newly-formed, boards a train at King’s Cross for which 
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they have not purchased tickets. The train is bound for Bradford, where the boys plan to partake 
in a protest of, it becomes clear, Rushdie’s book. 
       “Is he actually gonna be there?”
       All serious questions were always addressed to Millat, and Millat always 
  answered the group as a whole. “No way. He ain’t going to be there. Just brothers 
  going to be there. It’s a fucking protest, you chief, why’s he going to go to a protest 
  against himself?”
       “I’m just saying,” said Ranil, wounded, “I’d fuck him up, yeah? If he
  was there, you know. Dirty fucking book.” (193)4
The Satanic Verses was published in the United Kingdom in 1988 and immediately became 
controversial for content Muslims deemed blasphemous against the prophet. On Valentine’s Day 
1989, Iranian Islamic leader Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa that called for Rushdie’s murder. 
Exactly a month previous, 14 January 1989, Muslim protestors had staged a book-burning in 
Bradford, England5; in a very deliberate and inviting stylistic move, Smith heads the section from 
which I’ve excerpted “January 14, 1989,” so that this scene of Millat’s crew cursing that “dirty 
book” is even more strongly referential than it initially seems. The date of the protest in the 
storyworld perfectly matches the date of the historical event––the fictional characters are 
participating in the behavior of many actual-world people. And that behavior is, of course, driven 
by religious and political ideology that exists in the actual world. The referentiality of the scene 
thus aligns the actions and motivations of the characters with the actions and motivations of the 
corresponding actual-world communities. 
 As it turns out, none of the crew members has read The Satanic Verses. “I haven’t exackly 
read it exackly,” Millat admits, but “you don’t have to read shit to know that it’s 
blasphemous” (194). That of course isn’t true, but Smith here is implicitly aligning Millat and his 
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successive sentences. Local referentiality at its eclectic extreme. 
5 See Rahim (2012), The Guardian’s “Looking Back” (2014), and BBC’s The Satanic Verses Affair (2009)
friends with the actual-world communities who condemned Rushdie without reading his book. 
Other characters do actively participate in the aesthetic experiences of the actual world. Early on, 
for example, Archie sings “a ten-year old Dylan track”: “But I was so much older then . . . I’m 
younger than that now” (17). The track is “My Back Pages,” from Dylan’s 1964 album Another 
Side of Bob Dylan, the relative obscurity of which––it isn’t exactly “Like a Rolling Stone”––
drills depth into the cultural overlap of the worlds. Moreover, that Archie is evidently a fan of 
Dylan inducts him into another actual-world community, Dylan’s sizable following, which in 
turn implies (if more weakly) the historical phenomena partially responsible for that fandom: 
Dylan’s unpredictable live shows, his smart-aleck manner in interviews. In this way a single, 
short character-engagement with local referentiality signals the existence of an entire strand of 
our cultural history within the storyworld. Equally potent from a world-building perspective is 
Millat’s reliance on film for his personal identity, which frequently leads Smith to near-epic 
similes involving figures from showbiz. 
  All women, of every shade, from midnight-black to albino, were Millat’s . . . 
  Now, don’t be jealous. There’s no point. There have always been and always 
  will be people who simply exude sex (who breath it, who sweat it). A few 
  examples from thin air: the young Brando, Madonna, Cleopatra, Pam Grier
  . . . And Millat had it. (306)
We’re made to understand Millat’s sexual appeal by way of a comparison with the actual-world 
people who portray characters like the ones by whom Millat is captivated. This move is taken an 
ontological half-step down shortly thereafter. 
  He minded about Karina Cain, because she was his love, and his love 
  should be his love and nobody else’s. Protected like Liotta’s wife in 
  GoodFellas or Pacino’s sister in Scarface. Treated like a princess.  (310)
Here Millat has just “dumped [Karina] unceremoniously,” and the heavily focalized narration 
grants us access to the references Millat uses to make sense of his feelings. The proper nouns 
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themselves, Liotta and Pacino, are still of the actual world, but the characters referenced 
(“Liotta’s wife”) are from the storyworlds of GoodFellas and Scarface. This referentiality entails 
not only the existence of the films in the storyworld but also a kind of affective engagement with 
the films’ characters on the part of Millat that mirrors our engagement with him and his 
acquaintances in White Teeth. In other words, Millat, like us, identifies with and is influenced by 
powerful fictional characters, and these particular characters belong to actual-world films that are 
equally available for our engagement. 
 As Millat’s outrage at Rushdie and the association of his relationship with films indicate, 
Smith also employs local referentiality to illustrate the emotional lives of her characters. The 
most straightforward version of this strategy is the inclusion of actual-world catastrophe in the 
storyworld, which has additional implications for the biographies of the characters. Hortense, 
matriarch of the novel, is given a short biographical chapter titled “The Root Canals of Hortense 
Bowden” that contextualizes her somewhat abusive conception and narrates the occasion of her 
birth. “Any root canal of Hortense,” Smith writes, “must go right to the very beginning,” by 
which she means “The events of January 14, 1907, the day of the terrible Jamaican 
earthquake”––and the day of Hortense’s birth. Ambrosia, Hortense’s mother and a Kingston 
native, endures on 14 January 1907 a parallel between the natural disaster outside and the 
physical experience of childbirth. 
  And then the world began to shake. Inside Ambrosia, waters broke. Outside 
  Ambrosia, the floor cracked . . . Any other afternoon in Jamaica, the screams 
  of Ambrosia, the screams that followed each contraction of her womb as Hortense 
  pushed out, would have caught somebody’s attention, brought somebody to her aid. 
  But the world was ending that afternoon in Kingston. Everybody was screaming. (299)
In this passage Hortense’s first moments are tightly intertwined with the earthquake: the onset of 
her birth occurs concurrently with initial shake of the quake; the floor cracks from shock as 
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Ambrosia opens to allow Hortense’s entrance into the world. Most explicit of all, Ambrosia’s 
contraction screams blend into the screams of those terrified by the earthquake, audibly 
synthesizing the fictional birth with the historical disaster, effectively positing storyworld and 
actual world as one even as the authorial consciousness remains aware of the characters’ 
fictionality. The referentiality covers emotional ground in that the death and destruction caused 
by the earthquake doubtless created a general air of devastation in Kingston, the city in which 
Hortense was to be raised and conditioned.  Furthermore, Hortense is by far the oldest main 
character in White Teeth, and as such we might say she’s the foundation of the rest of the main 
characters; Clara issues forth from her and marries Archie, bears Irie, and together they move 
through the storyworld. Thus, this very real historical event and its consequences are embedded 
into the personal history of many of the novel’s characters, and importantly, vitally so, as 
revealed by such remarks as “Clara Bowden . . . could only state definitively that her own mother 
was born . . . in the middle of the Kingston earthquake. The rest was rumor, folktale, and 
myth” (280, my emphasis). The sole genealogical certainty that fictional Clara possesses is 
inseparable from an actual-world historical catastrophe. 
 It is actually inaccurate to call Hortense the foundation of the main characters, for she is 
the foundation of only the Bowdens and is therefore responsible for only half of the main 
population of White Teeth. The other half we can trace up through Samad to Mangal Pande. 
Great-grandfather Pande’s referential status is double that of Hortense’s, for he has not only a tie 
to a historical event, the Indian Mutiny of 1857, but also the status of a historical figure within 
that event. Indeed, Pande is sometimes credited with catalyzing the Indian Mutiny,6 and for that 
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reason Samad sees Pande as a hero, defending him against charges of treason, irrelevance, and 
all the rest besides heroism. We can probably credit Samad’s worship of Pande for some of 
Samad’s rather erratic and frustrated behavior during and immediately following World War II; 
these war scenes, which comprise chapter five, constitute a large-scale referentiality that I will 
discuss again below. For now I will simply reemphasize that Pande’s referentiality functions for 
the Iqbals as Hortense’s birth amidst the earthquake does for the Bowdens: he tethers their 
familial history and, in this case, Samad’s self-identification to the actual world. 
 The result of White Teeth’s local referentiality as I’ve surveyed it is a storyworld that is 
topographically, intellectually, spiritually, politically, artistically, emotionally, and (more broadly) 
historically akin to the actual world. References to actual-world places, people, events, ideas, and 
artistic artifacts clearly suggest a connection to the world of the authorial consciousness, and as 
the fictional characters interact with those referents in ways that resemble actual-world 
interactions, the existence of the referents within the storyworld becomes objective, empirical, 
and the characters’ lives reflect our own. Clearly and certainly, the worlds accord. We have thus 
literary realism par excellence; we have thus a defining exemplar of the primary world. 
 The experiential consequence of the primary world is a sort of bolstering of the beliefs of 
the authorial consciousness. If the storyworld matches the actual world in every important 
conceivable way––topography to religion to emotion and so forth––then the observer of the 
storyworld, the narrative consciousness, will operate under a system of beliefs that matches those 
belonging to the authorial consciousness, the observer of the actual world. In turn, the authorial 
consciousness, ultimately the interpreter of the narrative as designed by an author, will apply its 
understanding of the actual world to the storyworld. The consciousnesses respond this way on a 
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small scale to each of the storyworld’s appeals to the actual world, and when these appeals 
compound to form such a primary world such as White Teeth’s, the reader interprets and 
generally experiences the narrative as a story that is to be understood as occurring in the actual 
world, with the sole distinction that it did not historically transpire. 
 ii. Realism and Narrative Progression
White Teeth sprawls more than it flows. Upon its release Michiko Kakutani called it, in The New 
York Times, “a big, splashy, populous production reminiscent of books by Dickens.” Five days 
later, in the Times Book Review, Anthony Quinn described it as portraying “a restless hybrid of 
voices, tones and textures” and “hopscotching through several continents and 150 years of 
history.” Whatever our phrasing, it’s breadth––of time, of space, of personality––that 
characterizes White Teeth more than anything else, and, moreover, it’s breadth that makes White 
Teeth so richly world-oriented. Nevertheless, Smith has a story to tell, a narrative that is to 
progress through the primary world of the novel, and my objective at present is to examine the 
interaction of this story’s movement with the primary world in which it moves. That is to ask, 
how does Smith achieve realism at salient points in the narrative progression? How does the 
realism in those moments influence our experience of the narrative progression? And how does 
the narrative progression affect (enhance or diminish) the primary-ness of the storyworld? I will 
admit outright that I cannot do justice to the “whole” of White Teeth’s narrative progression in 
this essay because, as suggested by the review excerpts above, little stories, petits récits, abound 
almost endlessly across centuries of storyworld time. My focus, rather, will be only a few 
moments of particular importance on the macro scale. 
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 Let us begin, then, at the beginning. In Phelan’s terms, narrative beginnings are defined 
by four aspects, the first of which is exposition, or “everything, including the front matter, that 
provides information about the narrative” and its characters, setting, and events. Exposition is not  
limited to beginnings; it can occur anywhere in a narrative; but beginning exposition is especially 
consequential because it constitutes the initial influence on “our understanding of the narrative 
world” (EF 17). The beginning is, in other words, our all-important first impression of the 
storyworld. As such, the expository first paragraph of White Teeth is a proper introduction into a 
primary world. 
  Early in the morning, late in the century, Cricklewood Broadway. At 0627 hours 
  On January 1, 1975, Alfred Archibald Jones was dressed in corduroy and sat in 
  a fume-filled Cavalier Musketeer Estate facedown on a steering wheel, hoping 
  the judgment would not be too heavy upon him. He lay in a prostrate cross, jaw 
  slack, arms splayed on either side like some fallen angel; scrunched up in each   
  fist he held his army service medals (left) and his marriage license (right) . . . (3)
This is the realism of mechanics, the inventoried information, the successive descriptors upfront 
and at length; it’s a case of the stylistic maneuver I mentioned (with reference to Balzac and 
James) above. Smith gives us place, time, protagonist, his thoughts, outfit, posture, and car 
model, all in the first three sentences of the novel. Some of it is so precise it almost winks in 
irony: military notation? Alfred Archibald Jones? The parentheticals “(right)” and “(left)” are 
unnecessary except to relieve the reader of imaginative inference. What results is clarity and 
certainty of scene, and when local referentiality––Cricklewood, Cavalier––overtly overlaps that 
scene with the actual world, our first impression is that White Teeth’s storyworld is definitively 
primary. And, as happens, we carry that first impression with us and let it color our experience of 
subsequent episodes. 
 Smith also employs throughout a kind of discursive, form-content realism that 
coordinates what occurs in the storyworld with how the reader experiences the discourse in the 
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actual world. This strategy is most outrightly prevalent in the dialect in which Clara and 
Hortense speak: “Marnin’ de the world new, every time. Man . . . dis life no easy!” (21). We find 
dialect renderings in many nineteenth-century novels such as Wuthering Heights and 
Huckleberry Finn, and, as the former’s tenebrous storyworld suggests, it is not a technique 
exclusive to realist narrative. But it works toward realism in White Teeth by diminishing the 
inferential brainwork necessary for accurate apprehension of the primary storyworld. Various 
other versions of form-content realism have this effect in the novel. For instance, on two 
occasions Smith transcribes rather than describes figures hand-drawn by the characters. The first 
figure is a set of skeletal illustrations that Irie draws while lamenting her physique, and the 
second is “IQBAL” scratched into the cement beneath a bench in Trafalgar Square; in these cases 
the narration is focalized through Irie and Millat, respectively, and the transcriptions appear as 
the characters themselves are looking at them (223, 418). Therefore what we apprehend is the 
thing itself, a direct experience of the storyworld that corresponds to the experience of the 
characters. Such an increase in immediacy equalizes the storyworld and the actual world and in 
turn enhances the realism of the moment. 
 If that moment is uniquely gripping or salient, it follows that an enhancement of its 
realism would be especially consequential for the realism of the storyworld more generally. The 
latter illustration above, the “IQBAL” beneath the bench, appears near the nearest thing to a 
global “climax” we might find in White Teeth. Chapter eighteen ends with the “birth” of 
FutureMouse. The narration, focalized through Magid, runs through FutureMouse’s completion 
in comparison to a human birth then concludes, “Just certainty in its purest form. And what 
more, thought Magid . . . What more is God than that?” (405). In other words, through this 
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project, Marcus has accomplished with science the power and status of the Almighty. Chapter 
nineteen offers a panoramic of the main characters as they travel downtown to Marcus’s 
culminating presentation of the mouse. We begin with Marcus’s son Joshua and move seamlessly  
to Millat then to Ryan, all of whom oppose FutureMouse and plan to disturb Chalfen’s 
presentation of it––Joshua objects on animal-rights ground, and Millat and Ryan on religious 
ground. Millat is cognitively impaired, freshly high on marijuana; “Will you do it?” he asks 
Shiva, referring to the disturbance, to which Shiva replies, “Taking into account your . . . 
umm . . . present condition . . . the question is, will you?” The Millat-focalized narrator responds:
       Now there was a question. Millat was half sure that he was possibly maybe
  going to do something or not that would be correct and very silly and fine and
  un-good. (416)
What? The second sentence, as I take it, represents the thoughts of a weed-muddled mind, and its 
claim is incoherent, slurred and self-negating as it is: do something or not, fine and un-good. 
Though we do not yet know the nature of the act, the idea swirling through Millat’s head is 
explicitly opposed to KEVIN’s “Plan B,” which entails (nonviolently) reading aloud from the 
Qu’rān during the presentation. So we assume that Millat’s “Plan A” is violent, dangerous, and 
our anticipation thereof charges the moment with suspense. Form-content realism in the 
focalization enables us to apprehend Millat’s cognitive bleariness with immediacy, which 
strengthens our perception of his erraticism and thereby intensifies our anxiety in the face of the 
coming scenes. 
 Millat chokes back vomit, he and KEVIN board a train, and “twenty minutes later” they 
arrive within a brief walk of their destination. 
  . . . the Bakerloo Line delivered them into the icy cold of Trafalgar Square.
  In the distance, Big Ben. In the square, Nelson. Havelock. Napier. George IV. 
  And then the National Gallery, back there near St. Martin’s. All the statues 
Martello 38
  facing the clock. (417)
And thus we arrive, in our suspense, at a sequential view of Trafalgar Square, punctuated at each 
point by the actual-world landmarks that pepper the plaza. Here the form-content realism of 
Millat’s muddled musing runs immediately into local referentiality; Millat is high, we anticipate 
his severe action, and at this precise moment we’re reminded of the primary world. This point in 
the narrative progression is important, the end is near so it feels momentous, and the 
juxtaposition of such a consequential fictional moment with a complete view of the actual-world 
setting suggests the two worlds are necessarily linked. To take “linked” a step further, “All the 
statues facing the clock” echoes a scene five pages previous in which Joshua, also high, turns 
“out of Westminster” and watches “Big Ben approach the hour” when he will “topple [his] 
father’s house” (412).7 Suspense is here too, the event to come clearly indicated, and that 
suspense is marked tangible by the movement of the actual-world clock that Joshua watches. In 
other words, the nonfictional clock traces the approach of the fictional event. As a result the 
difference between the storyworld and the actual world is all but imperceptible. 
 The climactic event unfolds. Millat goes with Plan A, which, it turns out, entails a 
handgun, entails killing the FutureMouse researcher(s); this is ultimately unsurprising, for we 
learn that Millat’s religious motivation is only superficial, and his actual objective is infamy: “If 
Marcus Chalfen was going to write his name all over the world, Millat was going to write his 
BIGGER” (419). Heroically, however, and perhaps foolhardily, Archie leaps in front of the firing 
gun, filling the space “between Millat Iqbal’s decision and his target” and thus, we presume, 
saving Chalfen’s life (442). But before we can be sure of the outcome, the narration flashes back 
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7 Smith means Elizabeth Tower. Big Ben is the bell inside the clock tower and so cannot quite be “watched.” But the 
mistake is inconsequential. 
to Greece, 1945, to Archie leading captured Frenchman Dr. Marc-Pierre Perret, a scientist who 
worked on the Nazi “sterilization program,” to his execution. Giving this analepsis its proper 
evaluative due is outside the scope of this essay; my point here, from a world-building 
perspective, is that the grandest item of White Teeth’s local referentiality, the Second World War 
that unites Archie and Samad, literally intercepts the most pivotal moment in the narrative 
progression. The storyworld’s World War II is complete with its own references (Hitler, Russian 
soldiers, Colonel-General Jodl’s peace-signing) that ensure actual-world validity, and we have to 
revisit that war to make our way through the final, decisive fictional event. Again, the fictional 
and the actual seem to be inseparable, and that Smith repeatedly underscores this inseparability 
as the narrative progresses from anticipation to arrival of the story’s most globally climactic 
event serves only to augment our perception of the storyworld’s likeness to the actual world––
which is to say the text’s realism, which is to say its primary world. 
 Yet the shooting, which I’ve called the narrative’s most pivotal event, is still perhaps 
eclipsed in consequentiality by the disclosure in the scene that bifurcates it. The flashback to 
Archie’s episode with Perret fills a major gap in the progression of chapter five, the war chapter. 
Therein Archie had taken Perret “into the darkness,” a shot had rung out, which we hear 
focalized through Samad, and Archie had emerged bloody and alone. There the chapter ends, and 
for three hundred pages we can reasonably presume Perret dead. But then he turns up at the 
FutureMouse presentation as Chalfen’s “mentor,” the pioneer of the genetic-engineering field 
and the godfather, as it were, of the Mouse project. Marcus credits Perret accordingly just before 
the shooting and thus just before the flashback, which then divulges how and why Archie did not 
kill Perret thirty-seven years before. In the flashback Perret pleads for his life, gradually 
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softening Archie’s resolve, so Archie places his gun on the dirt and decides to flip a coin: heads, 
the doctor dies, tails, he lives. The coin lands tails but irrelevantly, for as Archie turns to retrieve 
his errant toss Perret fetches the gun from the ground and shoots Archie in the thigh before the 
verdict is revealed. That shot explains the blood on Archie’s leg as he emerges from the darkness 
at chapter five’s end, and Archie’s decision to flip the coin, which was not the murderous plan, 
ultimately explains how and why Perret has lived to embolden FutureMouse to completion. Just 
before Millat draws his gun Marcus remarks, “If any one person deserves the lion’s share of 
recognition for the marvel you see before you, it is Dr. Marc-Pierre Perret” (441). The 
implication after the flashback, then, is that had Archie chosen to kill Perret as planned, 
FutureMouse––indeed, maybe the entire field of inquiry––would never have existed. And had 
FutureMouse never existed, a sizable portion of the narrative events, including these final scenes 
that bring all the novel’s characters together, could never have occurred. Therefore, not only does 
the flashback intercept the climactic shooting, forcing us to notice the actual world through 
referentiality, but the decision that Archie makes in that flashback, within the referential frame of 
World War II, facilitates the events that ensue. In this way, White Teeth acts out its own 
argument.
 iii. The Argument 
 In the pages leading up to Millat’s shooting, scenes and discourse begin to recur from earlier 
moments in the novel. Questions raised during Archie and Samad’s time in the war resurface 
among the younger generation. Joshua runs through “that old, cheesy, end-of-the-world 
scenario,” wondering what he might do if the apocalypse was imminent (convert to Judaism? 
copulate with the babysitter?); Joely, Josh’s FATE partner, discusses choosing “between 
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betraying [her] country and betraying [her] friend,” the choice “between a duty and a 
principle” (410-11). Josh’s apocalyptic reflection harkens back to a wartime debate between 
Archie and Samad, in which Samad chastised Archie for choosing to “achieve orgasm” with his 
final moments, claiming that he would kneel and pray instead. The debate between kin and 
country (to whom are we most obligated?) is a famous thought-experiment of Sartre’s and one of 
the rhetorical devices employed by Perret to dissuade Archie from killing him. Interestingly, this 
occurrence becomes a recurrence for the reader only retrospectively, after the flashback, just as 
the narration of Archie’s coin flip at O’Connell’s in chapter seventeen becomes a “repeat” of the 
flashback flip in chapter twenty: “The coin rose and flipped as a coin would rise and flip every 
time in a perfect world . . . [then] the arc went wrong, and Archibald realized that it was not 
coming back to him at all but going behind him, a far way behind him” (377, 447, identically). 
Due to the length of the novel, it even perhaps takes us recognizing Perret’s physical 
reappearance to realize that the location of the FutureMouse presentation, the “Perret Institute,” 
is named after a character from chapter five. All of these examples, including the formal 
placement of the flashback itself, exemplify Smith’s principal argument: the past inevitably 
returns, whether by literally recurring or by conditioning the present, even if that fact becomes 
apparent only in retrospect; thus, it behooves us to remember our past and to act at every 
moment as if our actions will be felt forever. Or, as Smith’s first epigraph puts it, “What is past is 
prologue.” It’s this point that Smith makes through Archie’s saving Chalfen and Perret and 
sending the engineered mouse on an implied journey into the world (“Go on my son!”). We can, 
as Chalfen proposes, “eliminate the random,” triumph over our helplessness, by acting now as if 
we alone effect our future.
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 But what does this have to do with the storyworld? My claim is that the primary world of 
White Teeth reduces the difference between the authorial and narrative consciousnesses to its 
smallest point short of erasure, which encourages us to interpret8 every element of the narrative 
in terms of the actual world. In the final two chapters Smith begins to articulate the contours of 
her argument via ventriloquy through the characters. Piqued by the effigies in Trafalgar Square, 
KEVIN member Abdul-Colin wonders why the English “build their statues with their backs to 
the culture and their eyes on the time” then concludes that “they look to their future to forget 
their past.” The narrator digs into Millat’s psyche to reveal his philosophy of life, or more 
specifically that “he believes the decisions that are made, come back. He believes we live in 
circles.” Clara criticizes Alsana for her “very convenient way” of “forgetting what happened two 
minutes ago.” Irie complains about her family and the Iqbals and their “endless maze of present 
rooms and past rooms and things said in them years ago and everybody’s old historical shit all 
over the place” (417-26). The primary world siphons these remarks to our authorial 
consciousness unmediated and thus conveys them directly to our understanding of the actual 
world. Smith quite clearly has an actual-world contention that she wants and expects every 
reader to have heeded by book’s end; by uniting the beliefs of the narrative and authorial 
consciousnesses, the primary world of White Teeth ensures that we apply (even if we disagree 
with and ultimately discard) argument-revealing claims to the world in which we live. Rhetorical 
theorists, of course, assert this same thing about every narrative: authors try to persuade readers 
to take a certain position. But it’s the immediacy, the frequency, and the specificity with which 
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8 I use “interpret” to refer not only to the deliberate and often arduous act of literary analysis but also to the more 
automatic, intuitive processes that enable us to understand phenomena.  
Smith inserts her contentions into the reader’s world that sets apart White Teeth and its primary 
world. 
 This strategy works particularly well for Smith’s design because her argument is 
resolutely content-based, by which I mean that White Teeth essentially has a paraphrasable 
thesis. The novel, like all others, of course offers a temporal aesthetic journey too, but that 
journey is ultimately subordinate to the content of the contention. So as long as readers 
apprehend her claims, Smith has succeeded. Storyworlds as definitively primary as White Teeth’s 
support the wielding of an additional discursive device that is particularly useful for disbursing 
claims about the actual world––we might call it a lyric voice. Phelan defines lyric as “somebody 
telling somebody else . . . that something is” or “somebody telling somebody else . . . his or her 
meditations on something.” The characteristic experience of lyric in these terms is a kind of 
participation in the speaker’s position: we “recognize that the speaker is different from us,” 
Phelan writes, but we move “toward adopting the speaker’s perspective” (EF 22). This latter 
claim shares a great deal with Kendall Walton’s formulation of (lyric) poetry as 
“thoughtwriting,” the mental equivalent to speechwriting, whereby the poet constructs a kind of 
cognitive stance for the reader to try on for the duration of the poem. In his recent Theory of the 
Lyric Jonathan Culler endorses Walton’s “thoughtwriting” notion and offers an accordant 
assertion of his own: lyrics “do not in general . . . create a fictional universe” but rather “make 
real statements about our world” (107, 129). An amalgamation of these three definitions 
constitutes what I’m calling the lyric voice in White Teeth. The narration often shifts into a 
personality that seems concerned not with the storyworld but with the actual world, and it 
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beckons us to think in those terms alongside it. A brief survey of the lyric voice in White Teeth 
and its world-building effect will wrap up my discussion of primary worlds. 
 Smith builds and buttresses a lyric voice in multiple ways, each contributing with 
different degrees of explicitness to a narrating personality willing and ready to tell “that 
something is” in the actual world. To begin at the atomic level, the narrator occasionally uses 
profanity outside of dialogue––for instance, “There is no fucking end to it, just as there is no 
fucking beginning to it” (383). If we understand profanity as emotional or crude or powerful or 
even indicative of a speaker’s having “nothing better to say,” its presence in the narration implies 
a kind of mimetic subjectivity that we would not expect in this seemingly omniscient third-
person extradiegetic narrator. In many cases we can attribute profanity to focalization, which 
would diminish this effect, but that rationale does not work for some other lyric techniques. 
There are a number of pronoun usages that implicate the actual world, many you’s and we’s, and 
they increase in power and complexity when they involve not only the reader but a character as 
well. “You could be without family in O’Connell’s,” chapter ten opens, “and be exactly the same 
as everybody else in there.” This statement is about what is in the storyworld, but the second-
person pronoun reaches out to us, includes us in the collective you comprised of the fictional 
characters for whom O’Connell’s really is the place described here. Similarly, as we learn of 
Millat’s belief that “we live in circles,” the narrator evaluates Millat’s position: “Amid the 
strange landscapes that have replaced our belief in the efficacy of the stars, Millat’s is not such 
an odd terrain” (419). This sentence is a striking ontological maneuver––the succession of the 
words “amid,” “our,” and “Millat’s” joins the reader’s “strange landscapes” to the narrator’s then 
inserts Millat’s belief into the same domain, thereby equalizing the worlds of the reader, the 
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narrator, and the characters. Replicating that equalization are allusions and similes that invoke 
actual-world subjects. In addition to comparing Millat to film actors, as I’ve discussed, the 
narrator sometimes quotes actual-world literary figures, even on occasion overtly applying these 
allusions to situations in the storyworld. Especially savvy: “John Donne said more than kisses, 
letters mingle souls and so they do; Irie was alarmed to find such a commingling as this” (304). 
As if to underscore the ontological overlap, Smith employs a semicolon instead of a period, 
forcing John Donne and Irie Jones to cohabit in the confines of a single sentence. “And so they 
do,” the narrator’s outright endorsement of Donne as occasioned by Irie’s alarm, completes the 
leveling of the worlds. The activity of these strategies is to bring the actual world, the storyworld, 
and the narrator closer together and thus erect a post from which the narrator can make assertions 
in the context of the storyworld that function as, in Culler’s words, “real statements about our 
world.” 
 And when such statements are an author’s foremost rhetorical task, she can use her 
narrator’s lyric moments in a primary world as mouthpieces to speak them. Smith is too shrewd 
to fall victim to full didacticism, but she nevertheless pokes through with transparent assertions 
of her own from time to time. These vary from wary directions such as “When an Englishman 
wants to be generous, the first thing you ask is why” to linguistic observations such as 
“Homeland is one of the magical fantasy words like unicorn and soul that have now passed into 
the language” to broad cultural critiques with noun-phrases such as “The sexual and cultural 
revolutions we have experienced these past two decades” (257, 296, 332). (It’s worth noting that 
the present-tense verb-phrases accord with the “perpetual present” that, according to Culler, 
characterizes lyric.) These statements about our world culminate in occasional paraphrases of the 
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macro argument of the novel as I’ve delineated it above. “It’s all about time,” Smith reminds us, 
though no reader can forget in the world of White Teeth. Later she elaborates:
  The sheer quantity of shit that must be wiped off the slate if we are to start
  again as new. Race. Land. Ownership. Faith. Theft. Blood. And more blood.
  And more. And not only must the place be neutral, but the messenger who 
  takes you to the place, and the messenger who sends the messenger. There 
  are no people or places like that left in North London. (378)
For “North London” read “actual world.” We have the inescapable past, its pounding on the 
present, an acknowledgement of the historical injustices still felt today. That’s the backward-
looking prong of Smith’s thesis. But in full it’s bidirectional and ultimately optimistic, so on the 
final page of the novel Smith insists, lyrically, that “the end is simply the beginning of an even 
longer story.” Together these two lyric assertions paraphrase the contention of the novel so neatly 
that my own effort to do so above is perhaps unnecessary. Do not lose sight of the past, Smith 
instructs; learn from the theft and the blood and act in accordance with those lessons, for the 
future depends on our every action, down to the breath, to the period. 
 In a sense, Smith builds a primary world in the service of issuing this forthright 
instruction. While it’s true that some components of the lyric voice––allusion, simile––enhance 
the realism of the text, the lyric voice simultaneously depends on the primary world for its 
rhetorical force. The alignment of the storyworld with the actual world and the consequent 
bolstering of the authorial consciousness’s beliefs prime the reader to receive straightforward 
commentary on the actual world. The primary world, then, sets the stage for the author to 
articulate her argument lucidly and directly to the reader within the narration. Finally, as the 
specifics within the “sheer quantity of shit” (blood, race, ownership) above suggest, Smith has in 
mind not only the general, conceptual past shared by all humankind but also the tangible 
histories of particular reprehensible groups––imperialists, slave owners, oppressors all. Smith’s 
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call to remember the past is thus a call to examine our actual histories, the damage done to our 
and others’ cultures by oppression and discrimination, the ways in which that damage is still 
forcible today and the possible means of amending it to reduce that force in the future. We trust 
Smith when she instructs us thus, and we even do as she says, because we know that the world 
she has built suffers from those histories too. 
 There remain makers of realism in White Teeth that I have not delineated in this chapter. 
The realist effect of occasional OED citations (209) and full-length bibliographical entries (330) 
seems obvious enough to rest unexamined, and to account for all the variations on the themes I 
have discussed would be to fall into monotonous pedantry. Here’s the nub: Smith builds a world 
that is identical to the actual world in every important way, and that similarity generates a set of 
assumptions in the narrative consciousness that matches those of the authorial consciousness. As 
a result, the authorial consciousness is assured it of its ability to understand the storyworld with 
its existing beliefs; the reader, then, is guided by the primary world to interpret every element of 
the narrative in terms of the actual world. Rhetorically we understand this guidance as part of 
Smith’s rhetorical design. It positions the reader to receive Smith’s commentary as a direct 
statement about the actual world and thus ensures that the reader heeds the author’s instruction to 
evaluate particular portions of actual history and act in response to the lessons gleaned from that 
evaluation. Much of this experience and interpretive action provoked by White Teeth’s primary 
world differs significantly from the experience and interpretive action provoked by what I call 
secondary worlds, to which I now turn. 
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b. The Secondary World of Salman Rushdie’s Haroun and the Sea of Stories
Marie-Laure Ryan’s principle of minimal departure states that we “reconstrue the world of a 
fiction . . . as being the closest possible to the reality we know.” This “reconstruing” requires that  
“we project upon the world of a statement everything we know about the real world” and “make 
only those adjustments which we cannot avoid” (“POMD” 406). In my terms, Ryan’s principle 
effectively means that we begin reading a narrative with the expectation that its storyworld will 
match the actual world; thus, even if there is no explicit appeal to the actual world in the 
narrative, the reader will experience the storyworld as primary in the ways outlined above, albeit 
minimally so.9 From this default we can consider the realist strategies that Smith employs 
affirmations of the reader’s expectation of minimal departure, which enhance or intensify the 
minimal primary-world experience. The opposites of these affirmations are, to underline the 
obvious, disaffirmations, which signal to the reader that the storyworld is unlike the actual world 
in whatever way indicated by the divergent phenomenon. These disaffirmations elicit the 
“adjustments” to which Ryan refers, and a great enough degree of the difference they signal 
renders a storyworld a secondary. 
 Because we’ve come a long way since this chapter’s thesis statement, it would be wise to 
pause to restate my argument about secondary worlds before we move into one. In a secondary 
world, significant and salient difference from the actual world signals to the authorial 
consciousness that its understanding, which is tethered to the constraints of the actual world, is 
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9 Ryan’s argument and my inferences from it engage some interesting issues about genre expectation, branding, and 
so forth. My understanding though is that these extra-textual elements do not negate the principle of minimal 
departure (resulting in, in Thomas Pavel’s words, an “expectation of maximal departure”) but serve as early actors 
on it, simply encouraging adjustments before the actual narrative opens. Thus, in this paper’s terms, classifications 
such as “fantasy” and “gothic” are preliminary descriptors of a text’s storyworld, and any expectations that arise 
from them are early and vaguer versions of the same adjustments provoked by in-text extraordinary phenomena. 
not sufficient for understanding the storyworld. The authorial consciousness’s recognition of this 
condition puts the beliefs of the narrative consciousness, which correspond to the storyworld, in 
the driver’s seat, as it were, allowing the reader to follow, enjoy, and interpret the narrative’s 
extraordinary or impossible phenomena free of the authorial consciousness’s commitment to 
resolving such phenomena in terms of actual-world parameters. In place of this resolution of 
individual elements, the authorial consciousness becomes interested in the so what of the 
construction in broader terms, and this interpretive action is oriented by the secondary world 
away from particulars toward the general, even universal concepts shared by the actual world 
and the storyworld. In the case of Haroun and the Sea of Stories, Rushdie builds a secondary 
world to argue for the universal necessity of freedom of expression and against the danger that is 
tyrannical ideology. The principle of minimal departure mandates that the experience of a 
secondary world is inherently progressive, entailing as it does the accumulation of violations and 
adjustments. In an effort to responsibly observe this temporality, most of what follows is itself 
progressive; my analysis traces changes in the response to transgressions of reality by moving 
along with the characters through narrative episodes, bouncing between theory and practice and 
circling only in the end to interpretive commentary on the text as a whole. This approach makes 
unavoidable a good deal of summarization, but I’ve tried to limit such material to what is 
necessary to elucidate my interpretations. 
 Primary worlds, like all fictions, sanction some difference from the actual world: fictional 
characters, fabricated scenarios, even invented geographical locations can exist in a storyworld 
without necessitating a significant discordance with the reality we know. Thus it takes 
differences more noteworthy, more fundamental, to build a secondary world. I’ll call such 
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differences and their particular manifestations in the storyworld extraordinary phenomena, a 
rather commonplace formulation whose definition is nonetheless grounded in some recent 
narrative theory––namely, the unnatural narratology of Jan Alber. Alber uses the term 
“unnatural” to refer to “physically, logically, and humanly impossible scenarios and events” (14). 
This definition still covers a good bit of ground, but limiting that ground to impossibilities 
guarantees that the unnatural entails some fundamental deviation from the actual world; as such, 
Alber’s unnatural is fit to serve as my definition of the extraordinary.10 However, because I’m 
concerned with the reader’s perception of the storyworld’s difference from the actual world, 
certain extraordinary phenomena must be more extraordinary––or more consequentially 
extraordinary––than others. Here we should draw a distinction between violations and extensions 
of reality. An example of a text whose extraordinary phenomena violate reality is Martin Amis’s 
Time’s Arrow, in which the flow of events is reversed so that acts such as eating become 
regurgitation-and-assembly; an example of a text whose extraordinary phenomena extend reality 
is Aesop’s “The Wolf and the Kid,” in which a wolf sings a song to grant a baby goat its dying 
wish.11 It’s easy to see how and why Amis’s reversal of chronology entails a greater divergence 
from the actual world than Aesop’s attribution of voice and sentimentality to animals––the 
former alters the fundamental laws, the données, of the actual world, whereas the latter merely 
adds to or combines what already exists. I want to use this distinction to delineate the kinds of 
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cases, but “impossible” may occasionally become controversial in a way that distracts from the main discussion of 
world-building-as-rhetoric. I think, for instance, of William Gibson’s (supposed) remark that “the future is already 
here –– it’s just not very evenly distributed.” This remark refers to the disparity between specialists’ knowledge and 
the knowledge of the general public, particularly as it pertains to technological phenomena. Certain things are 
possible for the specialists that others might consider impossible. But “extraordinary” in the context of the world 
writ large is satisfactory for both groups. 
11 These are my own arbitrary examples, though Time’s Arrow is a favorite of the unnatural narratologists. 
extraordinary phenomena that might exist in a storyworld. Violations of actual-world laws (e.g. 
the reversal or halting of time, the erasure of gravitational force) are degree one extraordinary 
phenomena (the stronger), and, extensions, figures and events that do not exist in the actual 
world but also do not violate fundamental laws (e.g. talking animals or winged humans), are 
degree two extraordinary phenomena (the weaker). Both indicate difference from the actual 
world and require “adjustments” in Ryan’s sense, but the degree determines the radicalness of the 
difference and the extent of the responding adjustment. 
 I will discuss, in addition, a third suggester of difference that does not involve an 
empirical transgression of reality but nonetheless loosens the reader’s hold on actual-world 
specifications. Just as Smith uses discursive strategies such as allusion and form-content realism 
to ground White Teeth in a primary world, so can secondary-world-builders use discourse to hint 
at a contrast with reality. For one example of the near-endless possibilities, about the post-
apocalyptic world the narrator in Colson Whitehead’s Zone One says, “God had watched over 
children and drunks, and now he watched over no one” (139). Though this remark doesn’t mean 
that there was a God and He has died of plague too, it does evoke a cosmic notion of difference 
in the storyworld and thus provokes  some hesitation on the part of the reader.  (My additional 
examples below will clarify this category further.) Such rhetorical devices obviously entail the 
least radical departure from the actual world, so for ease of reference I’ll call them degree three 
extraordinary phenomena. 
 Of course there is not necessarily a clean boundary between these categories that renders 
them wholly discrete; I grant the likelihood of ambiguity and the possibility that the difference 
between the categories might sometimes be insignificant to our experience of the narrative as 
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designed. This model is simply an attempt to articulate and keep track of the ways storyworlds 
diverge from the actual world. I should note, in addition, that the actual-world beliefs of flesh-
and-blood readers can influence the degree to which a given phenomenon registers as 
extraordinary. For instance, some people believe that ghosts are an empirical feature of the actual 
world, while others are certain that “life” begins and ends with the corporeal––for the first group 
a ghost would not signal much difference from the actual world, but for the second it would 
constitute a fundamental violation of reality. These variations are interesting in themselves and as 
they produce manifestly diverse readerly receptions. For the purposes of the present study, 
however, I want to limit my focus to the authorial consciousness’s responses to extraordinary 
phenomena, which (recalling Rabinowitz) are guided by the authorial agency behind the text. In 
other words, it’s through the author’s treatment of a phenomenon that we determine the degree of 
its extraordinariness. This strategy should make it possible to cut through the perspectival 
diversity of actual-world readers to something of a consensus concerning the world-building 
effects of given phenomena––how and how much they set the storyworld apart from the actual 
world. 
 The base claim of this section is that secondary worlds provide a qualitatively different 
reading experience from primary worlds. My test case is Salman Rushdie’s Haroun and the Sea 
of Stories, a purported “children’s novel” that, like all great children’s literature, ultimately 
transcends that label tenfold. (I will say more about this, with the help of Rushdie himself, at the 
end of this chapter.) It tells the story of Haroun Khalifa and his father, Rashid, the “Shah of 
Blah,” a revered storyteller whose wife, Soraya (Haroun’s mother), leaves him because he’s too 
imaginative, too detached from “reality.” After she leaves, Rashid sulks, according to the 
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narrator, somewhat pathetically, which leads Haroun to ask in frustration, “What’s the use of 
stories that aren’t even true?” Upon heeding this question from his son, Rashid loses his ability 
to tell stories. As it turns out, that “ability” is more tangible than talent; it’s controlled by folks in 
a fantastic realm that contains the Stream of Story, through which flow, in liquid form, all tales 
old and new. Rashid, discouraged by his abandonment and his son’s loss of faith in fiction, 
“cancels” his “subscription” to the stream’s story water and therefore casts out his capacity for 
narrative invention. The remainder of the novel tracks Haroun’s journey through the fantastic 
realm in his effort to recover Rashid’s access to stories and thereby make amends for his role in 
its original cancellation.12
 As that brief summary already indicates, the storyworld of Haroun and the Sea of Stories 
contains two realms, one fantastic and the other profane, which functions as a sort of global 
degree-one extraordinary phenomenon that distinguishes the storyworld from the actual world on 
a general, structural level. The profane realm is “earth” by name, and the fantastic realm is in fact 
earth’s second moon, called “Kahani,” which further violates our understanding of cosmic 
reality. (These differences would obviously cascade consequent differences on the storyworld.) 
Kahani itself consists of two cities, Gup and Chup; the former is in perpetual daylight and its 
people (the Guppees) are talkative, while the latter is in perpetual darkness and its people (the 
Chupwalas) are silent. Between them lies the Twilight Strip, and beginning at the Wellspring in 
the “Old Zone” of Chup and running through all of Kahani is the Stream of Story, the source of 
narrative matter for the entire storyworld. Nearly needless to say, Kahani is populated by genies, 
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12 My distribution of attention here is perhaps a little misleading. The first five sentences of my summary, from 
Soraya’s departure to Rashid’s cancellation of his story subscription, encompass only about sixty pages. The final 
150 pages contain what I’ve alluded to in the final sentence of my summary, Haroun’s time in the fantastic realm. 
Haroun’s adventures therein are many; I exclude details of them here only because I will discuss those that are 
important from a world-building perspective in my analysis. 
talking fish, telepathic birds, philosophizing flowers, and loads of other degree-two extraordinary 
figures, as well as additional degree-one violations of reality that we will come to in due time. 
 Almost everything about Kahani marks it as blatantly different from the actual world and, 
the idea is, from the “earth” of the storyworld as well. But by our standards the profane realm 
isn’t so loyal to reality either, and as we move through it we notice that we’re in a world very 
unlike ours indeed. The novel opens with a straightforward introduction to a vague storyworld. 
  There was once, in the country of Alifbay, a sad city, the saddest of cities,
  a city so ruinously sad that it had forgotten its own name. (15)
Consider this beginning in contrast to that of White Teeth. Smith gives us time and place with 
remarkable precision, while Rushdie gives us the temporally ambiguous “There was once” and 
the confessedly (in the novel’s glossary) fabricated location “Alifbay,” preceded by “the country 
of,” a phrase that stresses the land’s otherness, redundant as it would be if the country were 
familiar to us earthlings. According to the narrator, the city itself, not its inhabitants, is sad, 
which is a classic instance of Ruskin’s pathetic fallacy, except that it could be literally true; can 
spaces feel emotions here? That the city has “forgotten its own name” emphasizes the ambiguity 
of the location and doubles down on its anthropomorphism, for a city that forgets is a city that 
must first have possessed the capacity for memory. I grant that the principle of minimal departure 
might make this expository anthropomorphism register as figurative, and indeed perhaps it 
should. But the same cannot be said for “Alifbay” and ambiguity, and we need only continue 
reading to be urged away from that figurative orientation.
  In the north of the sad city stood mighty factories in which (so I’m told)
  sadness was actually manufactured, packaged and sent all over the world,
  which never seemed to get enough of it. Black smoke poured out of the 
  chimneys of the sadness factories and hung over the city like bad news. (15)
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A parenthetical intrusion of the first-person complicates the assertions here, marking them as 
secondhand and so lightly speculative, but there is no real sign of unreliability in the narration 
and thus no reason to look away from the narrator for more accurate reports of the storyworld. In 
this passage, then, an emotion, abstract and ephemeral, is concretized and harvested as industry, 
and we can see it––feeling as product, and a skyline of smokestacks shooting blankets of sullen 
waste over the enigmatic city. This extraordinary scene is the first to take shape before the eyes 
of our narrative consciousness, and when it does it forces our authorial consciousness to wonder: 
is this my world or another? Is it the city who’s sad, who’s lost track of its name? Even the 
profane side of the storyworld looks to us thoroughly foreign in its first moments under the light.
 Like the realist impression of White Teeth’s opening, such an extraordinary first 
impression sticks with us,13 so that when we read shortly thereafter that Rashid is “a magician” 
we don’t immediately conclude that it’s a figurative description or even that his magic is, like 
that of our performance magicians, illusory and decodable; likewise, when we learn that his 
stories make the town cows “stop and cock their ears” and the monkeys “jabber approvingly 
from the rooftops,” the possibility lingers that Alifbay’s animals understand Rashid's language 
and really are sensitive to the aesthetics of narrative (16). We aren’t yet fully acquainted with this 
world, but we’ve had our expectation of minimal departure weakened to the point of a hesitant 
openness to the extraordinary. This openness is particularly important for us when Rashid 
explains to Haroun the source of his storytelling “magic” and thereby previews the adventures 
that make up the majority of the narrative. Haroun forthrightly asks, “Where do they come from 
really?” Then:
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13 See Rabinowitz, Before Reading 
  ‘From the great Story Sea,’ [Rashid replies], ‘I drink the warm Story Waters
  And then I feel full of steam.’ . . . ‘It comes out of an invisible Tap installed
  By one of the Water Genies,’ [says] Rashid with a straight face. ‘You have
  To be a subscriber.’ (17)
It sounds like the sort of fantastical explanation any father might give his son about capacities the 
son is too green to exercise himself. “Could dad be God?” wonders Dave Matthews in “Spoon,” 
and parents often have a way of exploiting this dynamic to play with a child’s understanding of 
fantasy and reality, possibility and impossibility. Haroun, at eleven perhaps a little old for the 
games, remains suspicious of the explanation. We, on the other hand, are very likely less so; 
we’ve been primed by a generally ambiguous storyworld that’s unfamiliar where it is clear, and 
as a result we key on clues such as “with a straight face” and therefrom surmise that maybe 
Rashid isn’t playing games at all. 
 We’re soon to find that such a guess is correct, but first Rushdie sets the profane realm 
apart from the actual world even more. After Soraya leaves, Rashid smashes a clock, stopping it 
at exactly eleven o’clock; from that moment on, Haroun finds that he can’t “keep his mind on 
anything for very long, or, to be precise, for more than eleven minutes at a time.” He wonders 
then if he’s “stuck in time like a broken clock,” and though this thought is a vulgarly obvious 
move on Rushdie’s part, the event itself is interesting from a world-building perspective. The 
causal link between the broken clock and Haroun’s shortened attention span isn’t quite possible, 
and Rushdie takes a rare moment of precision (“to be precise . . . eleven minutes”) to insist upon 
that link. Recall that Smith uses precision to clearly and certainly ground moments in reality, and 
see that here Rushdie uses the same tactic in the opposite direction, toward an extraordinary 
storyworld. In more general matters these precise moments are all but nonexistent.  Shortly after 
Haroun notices his cognitive trouble, Rashid is invited by “politicos” to deliver public stories in 
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other towns, namely “the Town of G and the nearby Valley of K, which is nestled in the 
Mountains of M” (24). “I should explain,” the narrator says, 
  that in the country of Alifbay many places were named after letters of
  the Alphabet. This led to much confusion, because there were only a 
  limited number of letters and an almost unlimited number of places in 
  need of names. As a result many places were obliged to share a single
  name. This meant that people’s letters were always going to the wrong 
  address. (24)
Deliberate, almost obnoxiously nebulous geography reaches its summit in this nomenclature: one 
name literally designates multiple places, so that if a character were to say that X happened in Y 
we and the other characters would not know which Y was the location in question. In many 
instances, then, place names in Alifbay are useful only insofar as they narrow down the list of 
possible locations; they do not denote definitively. It’s almost a parody of the fastidious 
referentiality that Smith uses to set events in particular nooks in London. Furthermore, when 
specific geographical names do show face in the narration, Rushdie engages with that 
referentiality in an explicitly negational manner. “Dull Lake” is uniquely titled and remembered 
without a problem but it doesn’t exist in the actual world, so its proper name works toward 
otherness instead of familiarity.14 Iff the Water Genie asks Haroun, “Africa, have you seen it? 
No? Then is it truly there? . . . Kangaroos, Mount Fujiyama, the North Pole?” (63). Massive and 
general as they might be, Africa, Fujiyama, and the North Pole are visitable actual-world 
locations, but this referentiality is undermined by Iff’s usage of them as examples of places 
Haroun has not seen. I argue in section one of this chapter that it’s the characters’ interactions 
with referential places and things that solidify the existence of the referents within the 
storyworld; here, then, Haroun has emphatically not interacted with these places, and so their 
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14 There’s a Dal Lake in Srinagar and a Dull Ax Lake in Alaska but, understandably, no Dull Lake. 
realist force is minimal, if existent at all. Thus even where he invokes it, Rushdie resists the 
actual. 
 I’ve just previewed Haroun’s encounter with Iff the Water Genie without mentioning that 
it is, like any encounter with any genie, impossible, and it’s prefaced in the narrative by other 
impossibilities in the preceding scenes. After Rashid fails to speak during his performance in the 
Town of G, he and Haroun are taken to the Valley of K, which requires a winding trek in a “Mail 
Coach” through the Mountains of M. Dangerously they dart along ravines and around bends, and 
as they near the peak of their ascent 
  a thick cloud, shot through with impossible, shifting colours, a cloud from 
  a dream or a nightmare, hop[s] up from the gorge below them and plop[s] itself   
  down on the road. (38)
The description alone suggests otherness: “impossible” yet witnessed, “from a dream” but no 
character is asleep. It’s not terribly offensive for the vehicle to drive “through clouds” in the 
mountains, but for a cloud to “hop” and “plop” requires an agency and, moreover, an agility that 
we can’t responsibly attribute to a collection of water molecules. Ultimately they survive their 
collision with the cloud and arrive in the Valley of K, where Rashid and Haroun are welcomed 
warmly and taken out on a large boat on Dull Lake. In the truly extraordinary ensuing scene, the 
lake water and the weather change to match the moods of the characters in the boat: “the more 
shrieks and yelps there [are], the rougher the waters [become]”; all go silent, and “at once the 
boiling breeze [falls] away, the thunder and lightning [stop]” (49). If the attribution of sadness to 
Haroun’s hometown is pathetically fallacious in a tentative manner, the correspondence of nature 
with emotion in this scene is a literalized, empirical manifestation of the fallacy. By this point 
we’re certain that this “earth” is fundamentally different from ours, and after Dull Lake even 
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Haroun himself admits that “the real world” is “full of magic”––though he doesn’t yet know the 
extent to which it is so (50). 
 The politicos in the Valley of K give Rashid and Haroun each a bed shaped like a peacock 
and a turtle, respectively, and these animal-objects lend a preliminary air of the fantastic to the 
setting immediately following the Dull Lake scene. Significantly unsettled by his turtle-bed, 
Haroun switches rooms with Rashid, which is why, the narrator then says, “the Water Genie who 
visited . . . that night and crept into the Peacock Room found an unsleeping boy about his own 
size staring him in the face.” After this brief flashforward we’re pulled in close by re-focalization 
(through Haroun) and a promise of exactitude: “To be precise,” the narrator begins, then Haroun 
looks toward the open and illuminated bathroom and sees “a figure almost too astonishing for 
words” (54, my emphasis). This figure is Iff and his appearance is later naturalized a bit, but 
consider the loose paradox in the rhetoric here: to be precise the figure is too astonishing to be 
described with precision. Like negating geographical referentiality with absence, zeroing in on 
its indescribability underscores the remoteness of the Genie from our actual-world frames of  
reference. What follows this non-description is the preparation of Haroun’s journey to Kahani. 
 Iff is initially unaware of Haroun, and it’s through the former’s “remarkable monologue” 
that we discern the Genie’s purpose and identity. 
  ‘Put it in, take it out. The fellow comes up here, so I have to come and install
  it, rush job, never mind my workload. ––Then, wham, bam, he cancels his 
  subscription, and guess who has to come back and take the equipment out, 
  right away, pronto . . . okay, let’s be methodical. ––Hot tap, cold tap, go 
  halfway in between, go up in the air six inches, and there should be your
  Story Tap . . . Okay. Time to Disconnect.’ (54-55)
Haroun doesn’t seem to heed this hilarious reveal at first, but for us it’s a materialization of what 
we already suspected was an accurate account of Rashid’s storytelling powers––the “Story Sea” 
explanation of thirty-seven pages previous. Iff has long sky-blue whiskers, which Haroun, 
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having “never seen blue hair before,” comes nearer to inspect; when he does, Iff “whirl[s] about, 
[spins] all the way round three times, and disappear[s]” (55). But he leaves behind his 
“Disconnecting Tool,” and he reappears just as Haroun retrieves the tool and refuses to return it 
until Iff explains what’s going on. I should stress, as we approach our decampment to Kahani, 
that these extraordinary phenomena––the degree-three estranging rhetoric, the degree-two genie, 
his degree-one disappearance and reappearance––are all occurring in the profane realm of the 
storyworld and thus further differentiating Haroun’s “earth” from ours. And they continue: the 
wrench-shaped Disconnector is “more fluid than solid,” made of “liquid veins” held together by 
“some invisible force,” and the Story Tap it’s meant for is likewise invisible, dinging aloud when 
hit but showing no material body. Haroun is at first mesmerized by the vascular liquid-solid, but 
he collects himself into practicality. 
 The explanation he leverages out of Iff articulates what we’ve inferred from the 
monologue, namely that Iff has come to turn off Rashid’s access to the Story Water because he 
has “discontinued narrative activities,” or “cancelled his subscription.” Haroun, quite astute, is 
puzzled by the news of his father’s cancellation and by the process of cancellation more 
generally; “How did [Rashid] send the message?” he asks, reasoning that he’s “been right with 
[Rashid] almost all the time.” Iff’s response and the exchange that ensues are absolutely vital. 
      ‘He sent it by the usual means,’ Iff shrugged. ‘A P2C2E.”
       ‘And what is that?’
       ‘Obvious,’ said the Water Genie with a wicked grin. ‘It’s a Process
  Too Complicated To Explain.’ Then he saw how upset Haroun was, and 
  added: ‘In this case, it involves Thought Beams. We tune in and listen to 
  his thoughts. It’s an advanced technology.’
       ‘Advanced or not,’ Haroun retorted, ‘you’ve made a mistake this time . . .’
       ‘Orders,’ said Iff. ‘All queries to be taken up with the Grand Comptroller.’ (57)
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Iff then elaborates on this instruction, explaining that there is a “P2C2E House” in “Gup City, 
Kahani,” wherein resides “the Walrus,” who is in charge of the Processes Too Complicated To 
Explain. Haroun, again astute, interrogates further.  
  ‘And how does the letter get there?’ he asked. The Water Genie 
  giggled softly. ‘It doesn’t,’ he answered. ‘You see the beauty of the
  scheme.’
       ‘I certainly don’t,’ Haroun retorted. (58)
This conversation effectively forces an epistemological surrender. The very concept of a 
“Process Too Complicated To Explain” rhetorically estranges us from the storyworld, implying 
as it does that certain events therein can be neither understood nor articulated. And that such 
processes govern the narrative’s main instability––Rashid’s loss of storytelling capacity––
indicates that the world of the novel differs from actual world on a foundational, almost 
existential level. Of course Rushdie is writing nonetheless for readers with authorial 
consciousnesses, with epistemological commitments to the actual world; so by attributing this 
global, governing impossibility to a “P2C2E” he explicitly expresses to us that the laws of the 
storyworld are outside our understanding. They must not be the point. The pseudo-explanation 
that Iff gives, “Thought Beams,” only solidifies the otherness of the extraordinary phenomenon, 
which his calling it an “advanced technology” then stresses even further. Moreover, and perhaps 
most importantly, Haroun’s letter will not get there, any inquiry he pursues into the P2C2E will 
not only go unanswered but entirely unobserved. In other words, probing the processes will yield 
nothing but the wasted energy of the prober. 
 This condition gestures toward a definitive experiential quality of the secondary world: a 
sort of compelled, passive belief in the extraordinary, which I will call secondary belief. When Iff 
attributes the Story Water and surrounding extraordinary phenomena to Processes Too 
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Complicated To Explain, he undercuts Haroun’s potential objection and coerces belief on the 
premise that, as far as Haroun is concerned, it just is. In secondary worlds such as the one 
Rushdie has built here, extraordinary phenomena continually contradict our expectation of 
minimal departure, and each of these contradictions forces our authorial consciousness to 
recognize difference between its norms and the storyworld’s. If that difference is significant and 
salient, as it certainly is in Haroun, the authorial consciousness will ultimately realize that its 
conception of possible and impossible does not apply in the storyworld, that the extraordinary 
phenomena are not anomalous violations of ontological law but are attributable, rather, to 
Processes Too Different To Explain. Another way of putting this is that the secondary world 
generates a set of beliefs in the narrative consciousness that differs so significantly from the 
authorial consciousness’s that the latter realizes it should not––indeed, cannot––approach the 
storyworld’s extraordinary phenomena as if they were occurring in the actual world. As a result, 
we too have that interpretive crutch it just is; we can believe in the extraordinary phenomena our 
narrative consciousness observes without recourse to our authorial consciousness’s insistence on 
resolving phenomena in terms of the actual world. The authorial consciousness does ultimately 
become interested in the so what of the invention on a macro scale, which I will attempt to 
illustrate later in this section, but for a moment I want to linger over this freedom from 
interrogating individual extraordinary phenomena. 
 I am indebted in different ways to a few theorists for the notion of secondary belief, the 
most obvious of whom is Tolkien, who uses the term itself to refer to the enchanted state that I 
briefly mention in the introduction to this chapter. For Tolkien, “Secondary Belief” is, as I take it, 
the result of a pleasureful immersion that, through pure elation, incites “belief” in the reader: he 
Martello 63
writes, “If they really liked [a story], for itself . . . they would believe––in this sense” (61). While 
I value such immersion as a vital virtue of narrative, I cannot help but think that Tolkien and I 
mean something different when we talk about belief. Whereas he seems to assert that a great 
enough degree of aesthetic pleasure exempts the reader from rationalizing or objecting to 
impossible occurrences and thus renders belief inevitable and almost unconscious, I yoke belief 
to its supporting rationalization processes and thus make it necessary to examine how seemingly 
impossible things are occurring in the storyworld and whether we should truly believe in them. 
Our conclusions, which might be that a character is dreaming or that alternate laws govern the 
storyworld or something else entirely, can exist independent of the depth and pleasure of our 
immersion in the narrative, even as our belief often contributes (for better or worse) to our 
aesthetic experience. Belief, then, is simply the conviction that something is indeed the case, and 
it is inseparable in our critical practice from the rationale that supports it. 
 Relevant to that rationale is Tzvetan Todorov’s now-classic study The Fantastic, which 
outlines three ways to incorporate––or perhaps three ways to approach––the supernatural in 
fiction. What Todorov calls the uncanny is the apparent supernatural phenomenon for which 
there is actually a natural explanation, e.g. Scrooge was dreaming; by contrast, the marvellous is 
the supernatural phenomenon that exists because the story is controlled by other laws, e.g. ghosts 
empirically exist in the world of A Christmas Carol; in the middle is the fantastic, which is 
defined by a “hesitation” between the uncanny and the marvellous and exists only insofar as the 
reader cannot decide between natural and supernatural, between Scrooge’s dream or his spirit-
world. As is surely clear, Todorov’s model is germane to my entire study, dealing as it does with 
interpreting the impossible and negating actual-world laws, but for now I want to highlight the 
Martello 64
marvellous, the essence of which is that the reader decides upon encountering the supernatural 
that “new laws of nature must be entertained to account for the phenomena” (41). In a sense, this 
marvellous entails the same process as does secondary belief. But Todorov’s model in its base 
form doesn’t go quite far enough. Entertaining new laws of nature to account for phenomena is 
the reader’s foundational response to the truly impossible (so not the uncanny), and there are 
degrees of this response that correspond to greater and lesser differentiations from the actual 
world. Some authors write of a single, perhaps even unimportant impossible figure for which 
there is no natural explanation, while others, such as Rushdie in Haroun, employ salient 
extraordinary phenomena that force the reader to entertain a great many new possibilities. Both 
of these instances would count, for Todorov, as marvellous, but we would not respond to them in 
identical ways. My point, then, is that certain narratives are more marvellous than others––and 
secondary belief is the marvellous response scaled up to the macro level of the  storyworld. 
 Lastly, I return to Jan Alber and unnatural narratology. Alber offers nine “reading 
strategies” for making sense of the unnatural, three of which are especially pertinent to the belief 
we experience in secondary worlds. Strategy two is what Alber calls “Generification,” or 
“accounting for the unnatural element by identifying it as belonging to a particular literary 
genre”; strategy seven is “Positing a transcendental realm,” or explaining “projected 
impossibilities by assuming that they are part of a transcendental realm”; strategy nine, the final 
and in some ways most radical option, is “The Zen way of reading,” which involves merely 
accepting impossibilities and the resulting cognitive experiences (fear, joy, confusion, et cetera) 
(UN 42-46). Something about each of these strategies irks its alignment with secondary belief: 
the principles I’m attempting to outline operate independent of genres and their conventions; the 
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“transcendental realms” to which Alber refers are primarily spiritual, such as Heaven or Hell; 
and the straightaway acceptance of impossibilities neglects the interpretive aspect of literary 
reading (Tolkien’s Secondary Belief does this too), which is perhaps the main focus of this study. 
But combining other facets of the strategies yields a relatively complete illustration of secondary 
belief. Generification is about “the construction of a supportive context” that “helps us come to 
terms with represented impossibilities.” The storyworld that is clearly and certainly not the actual 
world functions as this supportive context, and, though it isn’t Heaven or Hell, its liberation from 
actual-world laws does indeed mean that such a context transcends the limits of our reality. 
When our authorial consciousness recognizes this transcendence, it surrenders its authority over 
what’s possible and impossible, which licenses that it just is, a far more “Zen way of reading” 
than we can rightfully carry out in a world more like our own. Secondary belief is therefore a 
conglomeration of unnatural reading strategies two, seven, and nine. 
 Haroun and the Sea of Stories provides an interesting test case for secondary worlds and 
their experiential offerings because the storyworld permits traffic between its two realms, and 
when Haroun travels from Alifbay to Kahani for the first time he undergoes something like what 
we experience when we recognize the difference of the storyworld from the actual world. Here, 
then, I turn to a second progression. In the beginning of Haroun’s encounters with Iff, other 
Kahani natives, and the second moon itself, he frequently misapplies his “earthly” norms to the 
bizarre things he’s witnessing. After learning about Rashid’s cancellation, the Processes Too 
Complicated To Explain, and the Walrus who controls such processes, Haroun uses the 
Disconnector Tool to coax Iff into taking him to see the Walrus so that he can renew Rashid’s 
Story Water subscription––he will not return the Tool otherwise. For the trip to Kahani they’ll 
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need transportation, so Iff commands, “Pick a bird . . . Any bird.” Haroun sees no birds, only the 
“wooden peacock” that was his bed, and this naiveté irritates the Water Genie:
  Iff gave a snort of disgust. ‘A person may choose what he cannot see,’ he said, 
  as if explaining something very obvious to a very foolish individual. ‘A person may
  even select a flying creature of his own invention, for example winged horse,
  flying turtle, airborne whale, space serpent, aeromouse.’ (63)
The tone established by “a snort of disgust,” “something very obvious,” and “very foolish 
person” hints at Haroun’s ignorance of the storyworld’s laws from the outset. The suggestion that 
one can invent creatures, if true and not a reference to plastic or putty, is doubly extraordinary: 
degree-two products, degree-one capability. It comes across as such for Haroun too, for the laws 
of his earth, as he understands them, forbid such phenomena. And in those terms he forthrightly 
objects: “That may be true where you come from . . . But in these parts stricter rules apply” (63, 
my emphasis). (He seems not to apprehend what Iff’s intrusion into the profane realm has done 
to these “stricter rules,” i.e. exposed them as flimsy at best.) Of course he’s wrong; a number of 
tiny “fabulous winged creatures” spawn in Iff’s palm, Haroun makes a selection, then Iff 
“hurl[s]” the chosen bird “into the night.” Needlessly rambunctious, this action annoys (and 
confuses) Haroun: 
  ‘What did you do that for?’ hissed Haroun, not wishing to wake his father;
  at which Iff gave his wicked grin. ‘A foolish notion,’ he said innocently.
  ‘A fancy, a passing whim. Certainly not because I know more about such
  matters than you, dear me, no.’ (64)
Obvious irony in Iff’s response pokes fun at Haroun’s ignorance and underscores it in the 
process; the “wicked grin” and the adverb “innocently” suggest that Iff is playfully mocking 
Haroun, and the actual meaning behind the statements’ irony, that Iff knows the ins and outs of 
the storyworld better than Haroun, solidifies the impossible Water Genie from earth’s impossible 
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second moon as the general authority in this relationship. Iff, unlike Haroun, knows that when he 
throws the tiny bird into the night it’ll grow large, fit for a trip through space. 
 Much of the initial trip to and through Kahani contains an even more obvious push-pull 
between Haroun’s “earthly” expectations and Kahani’s continual violations thereof. “Surely the 
earth has only one moon,” Haroun objects, as Iff and Butt the Hoopoe (the transportation bird) 
explain the extraordinary cosmic arrangement of the storyworld. Haroun feels that they’re not 
flying but floating in an “impossible, blurry space.” As the trio approaches Kahani, the moon’s 
surface shows in “colours such as Haroun could never have imagined.” A little later, Iff and Butt 
say hello to Mali the “floating gardener,” and Haroun responds, “You mean a floating garden.” 
Rushdie’s rhetoric in this exchange twice underlines Mali’s otherness: when Haroun asks what 
Mali is, Iff says, “Floating Gardener, naturally”; after Haroun’s objection, Mali runs “over the 
surface of the water, showing no signs of sinking.” In the first case “naturally” is attached to a 
figure that Haroun (and we) would not consider natural at all, and in the second case by stating 
that Mali shows “no sign of sinking” the narrator preemptively overrides Haroun’s (and our) 
expectation that such a figure would be incapable of walking on water. Finally, Haroun notes of 
Butt the Hoopoe, “No bird could fly so fast.” About that, in fact, he’s correct, for Hoopoe is a 
strange mechanical bird––a sentient plane?––that possesses all sorts of powers that earthly birds 
(or planes) do not have. For example, telepathy, that classic superpower on which so much 
science fiction has been built.
  ‘You can read my mind,’ Haroun said, somewhat accusingly, because it 
  wasn’t entirely a pleasant feeling to have one’s private ruminations bugged 
  by a mechanical bird. ‘But but but certainly,’ answered the Hoopoe. ‘Also
  I am communicating with you telepathically, because as you may observe 
  I am not moving my beak . . .’ (66)
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Telepathy is a degree-one extraordinary phenomenon that Rushdie also exploits in Midnight’s 
Children, tellingly a text often cited by Alber and Brian Richardson as prototypically unnatural. 
This telepathy, however, is even more extraordinary than Midnight’s Children’s because here a 
mechanical bird reads the mind of Haroun, a human, without the consent of the latter, then 
forcibly relays that reading in a telepathic language in which Haroun has no idea he’s capable of 
engaging. The narrative (quite fittingly) withholds answers as to who exactly possesses telepathic 
capability, where it can be exercised, and under what circumstances it manifests, but, in any case, 
we have to entertain a great degree of extraordinariness to accommodate this complicated and 
confusing telepathy. Haroun finds it confusing too. “How are you doing that?” he demands, then 
“back [comes] the inevitable answer . . . A P2C2E.” The answer is inevitable, never a chance for 
revelatory remark. Recognizing the insurmountable obstacle that is the Process Too Complicated 
To Explain, Haroun throws in the epistemological towel: “I give up” (65-67, 82).
 He reiterates that surrender somewhat sullenly elsewhere. For example: “I don’t think I’ll 
ever get the hang of this place.” Yet implicit in these remarks is a resilience, for it’s only through 
repeated failure to understand that he could be driven to such a conclusion. And, sure enough, he 
persists further, so that after a single page containing phrases such as “Haroun noted,” “Haroun 
deduced,” and “Haroun worked out,” he can reflect, “It’s amazing what you can get accustomed 
to, and at what speed . . . This new world, these new friends: I’ve just arrived, and already none 
of it seems very strange at all” (85-87). What’s happened here is Haroun has achieved something 
very like secondary belief. I won’t go so far as to argue that Haroun has a narrative 
consciousness and an authorial consciousness, because it’s life for him, not literature, so Kahani’s 
extraordinariness amends his actual understanding of reality. But the parallel is clear. The 
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conception of reality with which Haroun entered Kahani has been repeatedly violated by what he 
sees as extraordinary phenomena; as we’ve seen, he tries to apply his “earthly” frameworks to 
the phenomena he’s witnessing, and when it doesn’t work he becomes frustrated. Gradually, 
however, he realizes that those frameworks are insufficient and adjusts them so that he has a new 
set of a beliefs that correspond to and accommodate what he’s witnessed in Kahani. Likewise, 
we enter the storyworld of Haroun with an expectation of minimal departure, and after that 
expectation is sufficiently contradicted by the “earth” of Alifbay, our authorial consciousness 
dispenses with its commitments to actual-world parameters in favor of the beliefs that the 
narrative consciousness has developed through observation of the extraordinary storyworld. 
 It becomes important for Haroun as well as for us to have achieved this state by the time 
of the two-pronged, climactic mission to rescue Batcheat, Princess of Gup, from captivity in 
Chup City and to stop the pollution and plugging of the Story Stream that’s occurring in Chup’s 
“Old Zone.” The head of the land of Chup and thus the one responsible for Batcheat’s 
kidnapping and the ruination of the Story Stream is Khattam-Shud, whose name means 
“completely finished” in Hindustani (according to the novel’s glossary) and who is, according to 
Rashid, “the Arch-Enemy of all Stories” (39). He poses so great a threat and challenge to Haroun 
and the Guppees because he’s able to be present in both Chup City and the Old Zone at once, 
which means he can oversee and operate both assaults simultaneously. This violation of perhaps 
our most fundamental law is possible because Khattam-Shud has managed to separate from his 
own shadow, permitting one entity to handle the plug and the pollution while the other maintains 
Batcheat’s captivity. And the entities are nearly identical after the split––upright, three-
dimensional, and like-countenanced––so it’s unknown to the Guppees which entity handles 
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which enterprise; that’s one more (essential) thing they must figure out as they go. A degree-one 
extraordinary phenomenon is thus the foundation, the source, of the novel’s final and most 
momentous episodes. 
 That theme persists as the episodes progress so that, in contrast to the inseparability of 
White Teeth’s final scenes from the actual world, Haroun’s climactic scenes depend at every step 
on the extraordinary. Haroun volunteers to lead the charge in one prong of the mission, and he 
and his crew (including Iff, Butt, and Mali the Floating Gardner) are assigned the salvation of the 
Story Stream. Their race to the Old Zone is intertwined with a number of extraordinary 
phenomena, some of which directly invert reality and realist techniques. For example, upon his 
initial arrival in Chup he finds a “warrior,” Mudra, whose eyes have black scleras, grey irises, 
and white pupils––our ophthalmological opposite (124). This feature is a function of Chup’s 
illumination, which is to say its darkness: “They must be blind as bats in the sunlight,” Haroun 
reasons, “because their eyes are the wrong way round” (124). The Chups accommodate this 
visual predicament by actually manufacturing darkness in “dark bulbs,” clearly flipping our 
actual-world convention on its head and turning a lack (of light) into a material substance in the 
process. The “pollution” of the stories becomes apparent as they near the Old Zone and the 
colorful stream turns to indistinguishable dark. In those black-water areas the “poison . . . 
behaves like a powerful acid,” eating away Iff’s slipper that falls “from, to be precise, his left 
foot.” There, again, Rushdie reverses the mechanical realism of Smith, using the rhetoric of 
precision to make clearer an impossible phenomenon. Finally, as Haroun and his troop approach 
the Old Zone, a “Web of Night” physically binds them with a kind of material darkness; once 
trapped, Haroun and company are “drawn along by invisible but powerful super-strings of some 
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sort” (142-150). This impossible web makes the crew captives of a kind, and they’re pulled 
against their will to the “dark ship” that houses the plug and pollution operations. There they are, 
in effect, captured enemies. 
 Like the well-timed realism in Smith’s primary world, that these extraordinary 
phenomena enable, complicate, catalyze, or otherwise affect Haroun’s culminating episode does 
enhance the storyworld’s secondary-ness, but what’s more important is that the extraordinary has 
ceased to be shocking or disruptive. Haroun is quite literally on a mission, and for the sake of his 
effectiveness as a captain he must work with, through, and around these extraordinary 
phenomena, rather than meddle in puzzlement at their violational nature. Free of his commitment 
to “earthly” reality, Haroun can interpret Kahani in terms of its laws and act in response to those 
interpretations. In that vein consider this, from Haroun’s face-to-face meeting with Khattam-
Shud:
  ‘I have never in my life seen such a shadow,’ Haroun had to admit; but his
  conviction that it was, indeed, the Cultmaster’s shadow-self that had come 
  to the Old Zone in this dark ship continued to grow. (154)
Haroun of course means never in his life on “earth” has he seen such a shadow. But his 
“conviction” persists that he’s dealing with “the Cultmaster’s shadow-self” despite the 
impossibility of fitting this figure within an “earthly” understanding of shadows. By explicitly 
articulating that persistence Rushdie outlines exactly the abandonment of “reality” that I’m 
talking about. Moreover, and most importantly, Haroun’s recognition that this Khattam-Shud is 
the shadow-half––a recognition enabled by cognitive repositioning outside “earthly” 
parameters––facilitates the reasoned decision that initiates the narrative’s (literally) global 
resolution. That decision and the resolution that follows depend on two extraordinary substances, 
and they unfold in the following episode. To properly delineate it I must backtrack slightly. 
Martello 72
 The “dark ship” is a sort of “factory ship” in which Khattam-Shud and his minions 
concoct the poison they release into the Story Stream and engineer the plug they plan to shove 
into the Stream’s “Wellspring.” As Haroun and his crew, forced along by Khattam-Shud’s men, 
board the ship, Iff pushes into Haroun’s hand “A little emergency something, courtesy of the 
P2C2E House.” “Maybe you’ll get a chance to use it,” he says (148-9). We might consider this 
moment parallel to the scene in White Teeth that presages Millat’s uprising: Iff anticipates an 
emergency, an extreme action, and because he (a Kahani native) knows the storyworld better 
than we do, we adopt that anticipation, thus charging this pre-climactic moment with suspense. 
However, the difference of this strategy, its opposite-directionality, from a world-building 
perspective is equally clear: Millat is motivated by actual-world ideology, cognitively impaired 
by a prevalent actual-world substance, and nestled among the actual-world statues in Trafalgar 
Square; Iff and Haroun, on the other hand, are boarding a nonexistent ship on “earth’s second 
moon” whereon shadows brew poison to ruin an impossible stream, and the “emergency” 
substance responsible for the suspense is attributed to a manufacturer named for its remoteness 
from articulation and understanding (P2C2E House). One weaves together the narrative action 
and the actual world, while the other redoubles the impossibility of the action taking place in any  
realistic context. Eventually the captors take Haroun and company to the Chup leader, Khattam-
Shud, who decides he’ll let the captives “see what [they] came to see” before he disposes of 
them. Khattam-Shud leads them thus into the “cavern” beneath the ship, which he lights in a 
“dim twilight” for the captives’ sake, and begins to explain the operation. He explains the 
poisons (love stories are shot through with hate, et cetera), reveals his plan to “Plug the 
Wellspring itself,” and arrives finally at the “Generator,” which supplies power to the entire 
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operation. This final information he relays too loudly, I take it, because it triggers a reaction from 
without the ship. Mali, having escaped captivity by “reassuming the appearance of a bunch of 
lifeless roots,” contorts himself to squeeze through a porthole and starts for the Generator; before 
Khattam-Shud’s men can stop him, he flings “roots and tendrils all over the Generator, getting 
into every nook and cranny of the machine.” This attack ruins the Generator “beyond hope of a 
quick repair,” cuts off the power supply to the entire ship, and brings the whole operation to a 
standstill. Haroun here senses his chance (160-4). The “emergency something” from Iff, a “Bite-
A-Lite,” is still under his tongue, and he quickly puts it to use.
       The light that poured out from his mouth was as bright as the sun! The 
  Chupwalas all around him were blinded . . . 
       Haroun moved as fast as he’d ever moved in his life. He took the Bite-a-
  Lite out of his mouth and held it over his head; now the light poured in every
  direction, illuminating the entire vast interior of the ship. (166)
The extraordinary Bite-a-Lite––a degree-two extension of the break-to-light glow stick––allows 
Haroun to retrieve unbothered a diving suit that will protect him from the poisoned, acidic waters 
on his escape, and it facilitates a realization that compounds his previous recognition of 
Khattam-Shud’s shadow: 
  [Haroun] also noticed that none of the Chupwalas had shadows! That could only mean
  one thing: Khattam-Shud had shown his most trusted devotees . . . how to detach 
  themselves from their shadows, just like himself. ‘So they are all shadows here,’
  he understood. (166)
This realization then expands to cover the whole setting: “The whole vessel seemed to quiver for 
a moment, to become a little less solid.” The entire poison-and-plug prong of the Chup purpose 
is made of shadows. Thus Haroun concludes, “If only the sun would come out . . . they’d all melt 
away, they’d become flat and shapeless, like the shadows they really are!” (166).
 It’s this logic that motivates Haroun’s final decision which, with the help of another 
extraordinary substance, accomplishes the mission in favor of the Guppees. Under the cover of 
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his bitten light Haroun escapes to the water, and on his ascent to the surface, “seemingly by 
chance,” his hand brushes his thigh-pocket and feels a bulge. After brief confusion, he 
remembers what’s there: 
  The bottle was still half-full of the magical golden liquid which Iff the Water
  Genie had offered him what seemed like years earlier. Wishwater. ‘The harder
  you wish, the better it works,’ Iff had told him. ‘Do serious business, and the
  Wishwater will do serious business for you.’ (170)
Urged on by his interpretation of the Old Zone as shadow-run, Haroun gulps every drop of the 
Wishwater and wishes that “this Moon, Kahani” would “turn, this very instant, in such a way that 
the sun shines down on the Dark Ship, the full, hot, noonday sun” (170). Residue evidently 
remains from actual-world physics, for when Haroun’s wish comes true the shadows dominating 
the Old Zone begin to fade, gradually disappearing as shadows really do when high noon comes. 
The plug-and-poison operation cannot sustain itself in sunlight and, what’s more, its ruination in 
this instant is irreversible, because each shadow, willfully severed from its flesh-and-blood 
counterpart, has no empirical body to be the shadow of in the future. Haroun and his crew have 
saved the Stream of Story. Meanwhile in Chup City, the other half of the Guppee troop is 
engaged in a classic sort of city-liberation when Haroun raises the sun that destroys the town. 
Chup City does not disappear, for it’s made of material and not shadows, but the “Black Ice” 
covering the city melts, as do the buildings and other structures, all of which are unsuitable for 
the heat of sunlight; the Guppees there, of course, are quite used to the heat. The retrieval of 
Princess Batcheat is therefore a painless enterprise that completes, perhaps simultaneously with 
the first, the second prong of the Guppee mission. 
 The important point here is this one: just as Khattam-Shud’s separation from his shadow 
creates the instability that drives the latter portion of the narrative, so do the Bite-a-Lite and the 
Martello 75
Wishwater beget the resolution of that same instability. In other words, it’s extraordinary 
phenomena all the way down. A comparison with Smith is again useful: whereas White Teeth 
forces us to revisit the referential frame of World War II to reach the narrative’s resolution, 
Haroun, running opposite, gives us no choice but to consent to the power of Wishwater (and all 
the other extraordinary phenomena) if we wish to reach the narrative’s conclusion. The 
secondary-world narrative is as dependent on the unreal, the cannot be, as the primary-world 
narrative is on the real, the can be, the is. Furthermore, if the purpose of Smith’s primary world is 
to shuttle the story directly to the authorial consciousness, encouraging us to apply our actual-
world understanding to every element of the narrative, the purpose of Rushdie’s secondary world 
is to curtail or at least delay the understanding of our authorial consciousness, rendering its 
categorization of phenomena as impossible unimportant to the progression of the narrative itself. 
It would be counterproductive to our experience of the secondary world if we stopped to 
interrogate its extraordinary phenomena. We’ve already concluded that they’re Too Different To 
Explain, and probing them merely distracts from what Rushdie wants us to heed: in the case of 
the Wishwater, it’s the sea-change bestowed upon the storyworld by sunrise; in other cases, it’s 
other things equally apart from the laws of the actual world. 
 We can once again look to Haroun’s experience for a parallel to ours. After the adventure 
the Walrus at the P2C2E House offers Haroun a gift: “We grant you the right to ask of us 
whatever favour you desire,” the Walrus says, “and we promise to grant it if we possibly can, 
even if it means inventing a brand-new Process Too Complicated to Explain.” When it becomes 
clear that Haroun wants “a happy ending,” the Walrus excitedly reveals, overriding the 
skepticism of Haroun, that such a wish will be no problem at all. 
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       ‘It is precisely because happy endings are so rare,’ the Walrus continued, ‘that
  we at P2C2E House have learnt how to synthesize them artificially. In plain
  language: we can make them up.’
       ‘That’s impossible,’ Haroun protested. ‘They aren’t things you can put it bottles.’
  but then he added, uncertainly, ‘Are they?’
       ‘If Khattam-Shud could synthesize anti-stories,’ said the Walrus with just 
  a hint of injured pride, ‘I should think you’d accept that we can synthesize things,
  too. As for “impossible,”’ he went on, ‘most people would say that everything 
  that’s happened to you lately is quite, quite impossible. Why make a fuss about this 
  particular thing?’ (201-2)
This final question is quite a good one, and it’s rhetorically effective in the exchange. “Very well, 
then,” Haroun replies after a pause, and he goes on to unpack the particular happy ending for 
which he wishes: a restoration of happiness to his sad, forgetful hometown in Alifbay. In other 
words, noticing, on the basis of the extraordinary context in which he finds himself, that it would 
be silly to object, Haroun surrenders his conception of possible and impossible and assents to the 
offering at hand. So, too, do we in the secondary world. 
 Yet we must still consider why Rushdie might have chosen to build the secondary world 
of Haroun and the Sea of Stories; “children’s book” or not, I don’t think imagination is a 
sufficient explanation. In talk about this book Rushdie himself has hinted that a significance far 
greater than whims and fancies lies beneath the fantastical surface. “This tiny little book could 
end up being the thing that I get remembered by,” he told The New York Times in 2009, referring 
to the afterlife Haroun has enjoyed as a play at London’s National Theatre and an opera at New 
York’s Lincoln Center. From the same interview: “There’s a great pleasure in writing for 
children. And then, of course, you find out that you’ve written for everyone else” (my emphasis). 
The reception of the novel, in other words, transcends its designation as children’s literature. But 
what about its construction, Rushdie’s rhetorical purpose and design? Haroun was published in 
1990, and Rushdie claims that he wrote it for his young son, his only intended “audience of one.” 
There was, however, an issue looming rather large in Rushdie’s life in 1990, one I’ve 
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conveniently had the chance to survey already this chapter: the 1989 Fatwa ordering his murder 
and the maximum-security life he would lead for a decade following. And Rushdie has indeed 
spoken about Haroun and the Sea of Stories as a sort of response to that situation: he wrote it, he 
says, “at the height of the troubles surrounding The Satanic Verses,” and it struck him as “the 
most useful way of approaching that very big matter in [his] life” (WGBH). The implicit claim 
here would seem to be that an argument about those “troubles” backs the rhetorical construction 
of the novel. When he tells TIME magazine, then, that “a young person can read [Haroun] and 
get one kind of pleasure, and an adult can read it and get a slightly different kind of pleasure,” he 
likely means by this latter pleasure the comprehension of (and, ideally, agreement with) his 
argument about the fatwa and its surrounding issues––namely, religious extremism, ideological 
tyranny, and freedom of expression. 
 We cannot always perfectly tailor our interpretation or experience of a text to the remarks 
of its flesh-and-blood author, but it’s not difficult to find in Haroun the argument that Rushdie 
implies extra-textually. For example, the binary opposition that governs the entire storyworld is 
speech and silence; this is apparent not only in the topography of Kahani, which is divided into 
silent Chup and gregarious Gup, but also in Rashid’s loss of storytelling and more generally in 
the notion of “Story Water” that can be ruined or discontinued. Throughout the narrative there 
are riffs on this binary that more explicitly suggest the particular brand of speech-silence battling 
that Rushdie endured. Khattam-Shud, as we know, “opposes Speech for any reason,” so he 
imposes “Silence Laws” on the Chupwalas; that he is often referred to as “the Cultmaster” 
indicates that he is not a solo silencer but the head of a community with agnate disdain for verbal 
expression (101). That community has a figurehead called Bezeban, a silence god of sorts to 
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worship. However, Mudra the shadow warrior warns Haroun and company, “Don’t think all 
Chupwalas follow Khattam-Shud or worship his Bezeban.” Rather, most are “simply terrified of 
the Cultmaster’s great powers of sorcery” (132). This information shifts blame from the large 
community to the individual leader, which, for Rushdie, appropriately excuses ordinary and 
innocent religious people and ensures that his argument heads only for the tyrannical Ayatollah 
and his fundamentalist endorsers. The severity with which the novel’s fundamentalists, Khattam-
Shud’s devotees, will defend the Cultmaster’s principles further aligns the Chupwala 
arrangement with religious extremism. For example, in Chup City the Guppees are met by an 
“ambassador” who is to entertain them; he begins to juggle, and among the airborne objects 
Blabbermouth, the Guppee page, spots a bomb. She intercepts it, throws it over the hillside, and 
exclaims: “He was ready to commit suicide, to get blown up right alongside us” (183). We’re 
familiar with this absolute apogee of ideological conviction, devotion to the point of murderous 
self-sacrifice, as it manifests in actual-world suicide-bombings. As for the leader himself, on 
multiple occasions Rushdie has described Ayatollah Khomeini in very unthreatening terms of 
brittleness and decrepitude (Khomeini was eighty-six and already severely ill when he issued the 
fatwa, and he died only four months later).15 Accordingly, the narrator of Haroun describes 
Khattam-Shud as “unimpressive,” a “skinny, scrawny, measly, weaselly, snivelling clerical type,” 
and Haroun himself wonders, “That’s him? . . . This little minging fellow?” (153). Such 
likenesses considered, it’s difficult to deny that Khattam-Shud is a stand-in for Khomeini. A 
fuller portrait of Rushdie’s take on Khomeini is thus revealed by Khattam-Shud’s explanation of 
his motive to Haroun. 
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15 See especially Joseph Anton: A Memoir
       ‘Why do you hate stories so much?’ Haroun blurted . . . ‘Stories are
  fun.’
       ‘The world, however, is not for Fun,’ Khattam-Shud replied. ‘The World 
  is for Controlling’
       ‘Which world?’ Haroun made himself ask. 
       ‘Your world, my world, all worlds,’ came the reply. ‘They are all there to 
  be Ruled. And inside every single story inside every single Stream in the 
  Ocean, there lies a world, a story-world, that I cannot Rule at all. And that is 
  the reason why.’ (161)
It is indeed one of the foundational functions of literature to, as the Russian Formalists would 
have it, estrange us from our preconceptions about the world, and in this sense Khattam-Shud is 
quite right: how could he establish ideological homogeneity, how could he Control the World, if 
stories continually challenge and even change the beliefs of individuals? Of course he never 
could, so he plots the ruination of narrative. Therein, too, lies Rushdie’s argument about the 
fatwa: Islamist extremists condemned him to death because he told a story that disrupts the 
ideology they wish to impose on the rest of the world, and both the desire to control in this 
manner and the silencing strategy used to achieve it are reprehensible. Furthermore, silencing 
itself violates not only a legal right (which we all know) but also a fundamental human pleasure, 
communicative tool, affective engagement, and cognitive exercise. At a 2015 reading of Haroun 
Rushdie said, “We are storytelling creatures, you know, we're the only species on the planet that 
does this very weird thing of telling itself stories in order to understand what kind of a creature it 
is” (VermontReads). Thus to eradicate stories is in some significant sense to eradicate the human. 
Ultimately, Haroun and the Sea of Stories is a narrative that communicates the necessity of 
freedom of expression while warning against the dangers of religious extremism and ideological 
tyranny. When the freethinking, storytelling Guppes prevail, then, we have the triumph of bardic 
liberty. And when every instability in the storyworld is resolved into a “happy ending”––Soraya 
comes back, peace in Kahani is restored, Haroun’s town remembers its name––we have an 
optimistic bid for the indestructibility of speech, the eternity of personal expression. 
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 But the important question remains: why build a secondary world for this purpose? Why 
not simply tell the fatwa story as it happened, as Rushdie would indeed do twenty-three years 
later in Joseph Anton: A Memoir? There are trite answers that are nonetheless likely valid: 
Salman had promised his young son a book, and writing a formal candid chastisement of 
Khomeini a mere year after the fatwa would only have stoked the fire from which he was already 
hiding. But, appropriate as Haroun must have been for the boy and safely evasive as it is with 
actual-world references, I do not think these factors make up the full story. When Haroun 
initially enters the Dark Ship and observes the Chupwala operation, he says to Iff, “‘How 
weird . . . that the worst things of all can look so normal and, well, dull” (152). In this remark 
there is something, I believe, of Rushdie’s assessment of his situation. His life in “hiding”––
which he describes as more heavy-guarding than stealth-crawling––was probably a bit dull: he 
could no longer be the socialite he once was, a public London intellectual, at least not to the 
same enjoyable extent; and the very purpose of security is to preclude any of the encounters we 
might consider entertaining in the action-film fashion. So it’s not difficult to imagine how and 
why Haroun and the Sea of Stories might be an antidote to that dullness, a “useful way of writing 
about that very big matter.” The little novel is full of magic and children’s fantasies in manners 
manyfold––anti-dullness––and the world that contains it all is incontestably different from the 
actual world, the mundane, in almost every way. Such a frame creates a separation between the 
storyworld and the actual world that frees the former from any particular obligation to the 
latter––an obligation that includes historical and geographical accuracy, biological and 
anatomical properties, physical and logical laws, and so forth. As a result, Rushdie can render his 
commentary on the fatwa situation entertainingly and excitingly, with the aesthetic, affective, and 
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cognitive effects of imaginative literature, rather than with the informative and truth-constrained 
journalistic form into which his subject has so often been squeezed to reductive effect. The 
extraordinary norms of Haroun’s storyworld are a radical refusal of the potentially bland 
journalistic nature of the situation and its record. Such is the first and most obvious affordance of 
the secondary world. 
 The second and more important affordance is tied up with the differentiating effects I’ve 
delineated throughout this chapter. Freedom from the constraints of reality, while it allows 
Rushdie to treat the fatwa more entertainingly, also allows him to cut through that subject to the 
more general issues that lie behind it. We’re discouraged by the secondary world to apply our 
actual-world understanding to individual extraordinary phenomena, so when we seek to 
understand the communicative act that is the text we must consider the narrative in broader 
terms. The purpose of this nudge toward the broad is to clear our path to locating conceptual 
equivalence between the observations of the narrative consciousness and the world of the 
authorial consciousness. In White Teeth Smith and her characters interact with actual-world 
figures, artifacts, ideas, places, and so forth, and these interactions contend with our authorial 
consciousness’s parallel interactions so that part of our assessment of the text involves its 
treatment of actual-world particulars. By contrast, Haroun contains none of these particulars; 
extraordinary phenomena push us into secondary belief, which is the surrender of the laws that 
comprise the actual-world’s foundation. There is therefore nothing for our interpretive action to 
snag on, no impossibility to resolve nor particular opinion with which to contend, as it moves 
toward the general concepts or ideas dealt with in the text. In Haroun this means that we see not 
Rushdie versus Khomeini but storytellers versus silencers, expression versus censorship, 
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freedom versus totalitarianism. Primary worlds can of course suggest the general or conceptual 
too, but they do so with less immediacy; in the secondary world of Haroun we consider the 
characters’ conflicts not as an individual instances that might represent a grander issue (like we 
would in a primary world) but as the concepts themselves in conflict. The novel’s ungrammatical 
capitalization of words such as Story, Rule, and Control seems only to support this reading: not 
common nouns but proper ones, not particular but general. Like the difference between a truth 
and Truth. 
 A language has existed for this notion in literary criticism for quite a long time, namely in 
the tenor and vehicle of metaphor. But I do not think the conceptual equivalence of secondary 
worlds is limited to metaphor, nor to metaphor’s bigger and broader brother, allegory. Metaphor 
and allegory depend to some degree on the figurative meaning eclipsing the literal one––the 
vehicle is a way to the tenor but not the thing itself, and if we don’t notice the tenor we’ve failed 
to heed the text as designed. In Haroun, however, the vehicle in some places contains the tenor 
within it, which makes the difference between them barely noticeable. The concern about 
freedom of expression, for example, is discussed on many occasions by Haroun, Rashid, and 
Khattam-Shud; likewise, the debate over the value of narrative is explicit in the question that sets 
it all in motion, “‘What’s the use of stories that aren’t even true?’” Haroun forthrightly answers 
this question (stories are fun) and Khattam-Shud implies an answer by saying that stories shirk 
his shot at full control. Even the characteristics of Khattam-Shud that liken him to Khomeini are 
the same in both worlds: to be “clerical” is to be clerical, to lead a cultic group of extremists is to 
be the “Cultmaster.” The overt presence of these concepts within the storyworld complicates an 
equation of the secondary world with metaphor and allegory by rendering less-than-necessary the 
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interpretive journey from vehicle to tenor. Rushdie’s comments about Haroun and the fatwa are 
convenient for us, but couldn’t we imagine knowing nothing of Rushdie’s fatwa––or, indeed, 
nothing of any actual-world speech-stifling––and still arriving at the same conclusions about 
freedom, storytelling, and tyrannical ideology by Haroun’s end? My answer is yes, because the 
concepts transcend the particulars. To retain them explicitly in a storyworld so remote from us is 
only to underscore this transcendence, which is, of course, an intentional consequence of 
building the world.
 To be clear: many secondary worlds will be built in the service of allegory, just as others 
will be built in the service of something apart from anything discussed here. Some (such as 
Haroun) will have actual-world scenarios for analogues, but many will not. I could never 
perform a rhetorical reading of every secondary-world narrative; they make up most of hard 
fantasy, much of other speculative modes such as science fiction, many children’s stories, and 
even some literary fiction, especially in the particularly experimental corners of postmodernism. 
I can, however, outline the baseline status of the secondary world and the path thereto, as I’ve 
attempted to do in this chapter. Extraordinary phenomena mark the storyworld as fundamentally 
different from the actual world; these differences compile, and a significant and salient degree of 
difference signals to the authorial consciousness that its understanding of the (actual) world is 
not sufficient for understanding the storyworld. As a result, the authorial consciousness backs off, 
as it were, allowing the extraordinary observations of the narrative consciousness to pass 
unchallenged, on the basis of the storyworld’s difference. This is a kind of passive belief, which I 
call secondary belief. The effect of secondary belief is first to allow us to follow, enjoy, and 
interpret the narrative progression free of our authorial consciousness’s commitments to actual-
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world norms. Ultimately, secondary belief compels a broadened interpretive view, encourages us 
toward the general: we move through what could have been filled with stops related to the actual 
world straight to the concepts behind the narrative construction. This arrangement is both 
permitted by and supportive of the generality of the concepts. In the case of Haroun and the Sea 
of Stories, Rushdie builds a secondary world in an effort to excitingly and entertainingly 
communicate the universal importance of freedom of expression and the universal danger of 
forced, homogenous ideology. 
 In the following chapter, I turn to the hybrid world, the combination of realism and 





III. The Halfway Point: Hybrid Worlds
           How now, Horatio! You tremble and look pale.
     Is not this something more than fantasy?
     What think you on’t?
            Before my God, I might not believe 
     Without the sensible and true avouch
     Of mine own eyes. 
      ––– Bernardo & Horatio, Hamlet (I.i)
     I don’t try to make you believe something you won’t 
     believe, but to make you do something you won’t do. 
      ––– Wittgenstein, Culture and Value 
The plot is well-known in contemporary America due mainly to the blockbuster Brad Pitt / Cate 
Blanchett film, but almost ninety years before the screen “The Curious Case of Benjamin 
Button” was a short tale by a budding F. Scott Fitzgerald, one that differs significantly from the 
longer-form fictions for which Fitzgerald has become so imperative in secondary schools and 
universities. “Curious” is one way to put it: Benjamin Button is born an old man and “ages” in 
reverse to infancy, and he is the only person in history (his or ours) afflicted with such a 
condition. This latter fact gestures already toward the topic of this chapter, namely the territory 
between primary-world realism and secondary-world fantasy, for which “Benjamin Button” is 
my test case. In the analysis to come I delineate the hybrid world, beginning with a survey of 
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how Fitzgerald grounds his narrative in a realist world and moving to the arrival of Benjamin, 
the storyworld’s sole extraordinary phenomenon; then comes a discussion of the narrative and 
authorial consciousnesses’ reactions to the world’s arrangement. During these first moves I beg a 
long memory from my reader, for the principles laid out in relation to White Teeth and Haroun 
and the Sea of Stories are useful here too, either by analogy or by contrast. I argue first that the 
hybrid world’s realism bolsters the authorial consciousness, encouraging the reader to apply 
actual-world understanding to the storyworld, while the extraordinary phenomenon cannot be 
accommodated by that understanding. A sort of tension results between the consciousnesses, and, 
unable both to naturalize the extraordinary phenomenon and to retreat to secondary belief, the 
reader is forced to make meaning out of a violation of reality. I survey a number of possible 
interpretive maneuvers only to conclude that each of them ultimately neglects the narrative’s 
undeniable feature: its hybridity. The solution, I argue, is to foreground the experience over the 
argument: in a hybrid-world narrative such as “Benjamin Button,” we experience a collision of 
ordinary parameters and extraordinary phenomena, a collision that destabilizes our most basic 
assumptions and in turn forces us to (consciously or unconsciously) reexamine those 
assumptions in relation to the actual world. By building a hybrid world Fitzgerald makes us see 
freshly and even reevaluate our preconceptions about youth, age, and the actual-world processes 
that link the former to the latter. To boot, experiencing these uncomfortable confrontations with 
the our foundational precepts, as it perhaps yields a refined perspective, simultaneously trains us 
for undergoing such challenges in the actual world. Thus we’re dealing, I think, with a pertinent 
form indeed. 
 i. Ordinary World / Extraordinary Phenomenon 
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Like Smith in White Teeth, Fitzgerald uses the opening of “Benjamin Button” to introduce us to a 
realist storyworld.16 
  As long ago as 1860 it was the proper thing to be born at home. At present, so I 
  am told, the high gods of medicine have decreed that the first cries of the young 
  shall be uttered upon the anesthetic air of a hospital, preferably a fashionable one. 
  So young Mr. and Mrs. Roger Button were fifty years ahead of style when they 
  decided, one day in the summer of 1860, that their first baby should be born in a 
  hospital. (159)
In ordinary circumstances we might consider “1860” only minimally realist in effect, but 
emerging as we are from Rushdie’s secondary world even this casually imprecise and distant 
(“As long ago as”) temporal marker feels like a surge of familiarity. Assuming the narrator 
speaks from sometime around 1922, the year of this story’s publication, his historical assessment 
of birth practice is an accurate one. Thus the Buttons’ choosing to have their child in a hospital in 
1860 constitutes an “anachronism,” which confirms the applicability of our cultural (birthing) 
norm to the storyworld even as the characters violate it. To close the first paragraph the narrator 
suggests that this violation is perhaps essential to the forthcoming tale: “Whether this 
anachronism had any bearing upon the astonishing history I am about to set down will never be 
known.” I doubt it did, and the remark might even strike us as borderline silly; nonetheless, if it’s 
possible that the Buttons’ anachronistic birthing facilitates the “astonishing” phenomenon that 
comprises “Benjamin Button,” then the actual-world norms that serve as the anachronism’s 
backdrop must be fixed in the storyworld. So the worlds overlap cultural-historically. It’s worth 
noting that the narrator refers to the story here as a “history,” the same rhetorical move Cervantes 
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16 A great many Fitzgerald stories begin with a grounding in the real. Tender Is the Night: “On the pleasant shore of 
the French Riviera, about halfway between Marseilles and the Italian border, stands a large, proud, rose-colored 
hotel.” “Head and Shoulders”: “In 1915 Horace Tarbox was thirteen years old. In that year he took the examinations 
for entrance to Princeton University and received the Grade A––excellent––in Caesar, Cicero, Vergil, Xenophon, 
Homer, Algebra, Plane Geometry, Solid Geometry, and Chemistry.” The list could go on. If nothing else this 
recurring strategy shows that Fitzgerald is as aware of the first-impression, world-building importance of beginnings 
as we theorists are. 
pulled three centuries earlier in order to foreground Don Quixote’s thematic concern with  blurry 
boundary between fiction and reality. Fitzgerald’s expository realism here is less obvious than 
Smith’s in White Teeth; we have to dig into the implications in places to elucidate the overlap. 
But the outcome is akin: our first impression is of a realistic storyworld, indeed a primary world, 
and our authorial consciousness finds validation in this recognition. 
 True referentiality does make more overt realism elsewhere in “Benjamin Button,” both 
in the straightforward forms that Smith employs and in slightly altered ones. Since I’ve already 
unpacked and sorted the details of referentiality in chapter two, I will examine only a few 
instances of the technique here. A particularly rich passage of referentiality comes immediately 
following the opening paragraph in what is still expository material. 
  The Roger Buttons held an enviable position, both social and financial, in ante-
  bellum Baltimore. They were related to the This Family and the That Family, 
  which, as every Southerner knew, entitled them to membership in that enormous
  peerage which largely populated the Confederacy . . . [Mr. Button] hoped [the
  child] would be a boy so that he could be sent to Yale College in Connecticut, 
  at which institution Mr. Button himself had been known for years by the some-
  what obvious nickname of “Cuff.” (160)
“Antebellum” and “Confederacy” evoke not only an actual-world time, which “1860” does just 
fine, but more importantly the cultural milieu associated therewith, and as a result we see the 
Buttons embedded in a genteel Baltimore that runs on the same values as did its referent in the 
actual world. The more excusable of those values are evident in the Buttons’ perhaps superficial 
preoccupation with familial connection, acquaintance, or “peerage”; “Southerner,” capitalized, 
evokes a type into which these values and others can be squeezed. Types, whether stereo-, arche-, 
or otherwise, are preformed, prepackaged sets of characteristics used as shorthand to denote a 
certain sort of person or thing. Hence, referential types show that the characters function using 
the same cognitive frameworks as we do––the worlds’ consequent overlap is cultural, 
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intellectual, and something deeper, more automatic or intuitive. Yale, like Princeton, is a favorite 
referent of Fitzgerald’s––Eddie goes to Yale in “A Short Trip Home,” another hybrid-world 
narrative––and here it establishes both the history of one character and the anticipated future of 
another. That Roger attended the actual-world college and earned a nickname there indicates 
extensive interaction with the place and its people, which thereby solidifies the referent’s 
empirical existence in the storyworld. And in case we might suspect this Yale of being a fictional 
analogue to our own, Fitzgerald tacks on the adjectival “in Connecticut” to assure us it isn’t. 
 In the last chapter I discussed the inversion of referentiality that Rushdie uses to signal 
otherness; Fitzgerald likewise skews or manipulates some references, but the end toward which 
his maneuver works in “Benjamin Button” is, rather than estrangement, a mildly diminished 
realism. Take, for starters, the impressive mundaneness of the story’s fictional establishments. 
For a living Roger runs “Roger Button & Co., Wholesale Hardware,” doubtless the most generic 
formulation Fitzgerald could manage, and can we conjure a more commonplace occupation? 
Sustenance from the nuts and bolts of the developed world, perhaps even humble enough that it 
clashes with Roger’s Yale education (has Fitzgerald left a seam un-smoothed?). Similarly, the 
aforementioned birth takes place at “Maryland Private Hospital for Ladies and Gentlemen.” 
Research shows nothing of the name in the actual world, but I’m less than confident in those 
findings: it seems almost inevitable that a “Maryland Private Hospital” has operated at some 
point, and that they admitted as patients both ladies and gentlemen. The hospital and the 
hardware store are, in other words, very plausible fictions, a combination Fitzgerald pulls off by 
exploiting nomenclatural templates tried for truth by the actual world. A more playful version of 
this strategy is what we might call synonymous referentiality, the replacement of a referential 
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term with something that fictionalizes the reference but simultaneously invokes the actual-world 
referent with synonymity or similarity. For example, in “Benjamin Button” the characters read 
the “Baltimore Blaze”; Fitzgerald arrives at this fictional newspaper through a very slight 
alteration to the actual-world Baltimore Sun, and the path isn’t foggy or veiled: the sun blazes, or 
the fire in a blaze is fully realized on the sun, or however we choose to articulate the obvious 
connection. With no differentiating information, one aware of the Sun cannot not recall it when 
reading of the Blaze. That is, our authorial consciousness senses synonymous referentiality as 
realist despite the minor divergence from the actual world. This realism is, of course, less 
forceful than forthright referentiality; indeed, Fitzgerald could’ve simply used the Sun to signal a 
greater overlap between the worlds, and it’s not immediately clear why he would instead choose 
the next-best-thing. Perhaps he feared sending readers to the annals to check the documented 
validity of his “astonishing history”? In any case, that he stays so near reality even as he departs 
from it suggests the extent to which Fitzgerald’s aims are realist and therefore the extent to which 
the storyworld of “Benjamin Button” is primary. 
 The designation of Fitzgerald’s world as primary includes the major effects delineated in 
my discussion of White Teeth: we recognize a multifaceted likeness between the storyworld and 
the actual world, which aligns the beliefs of the narrative and authorial consciousnesses; in turn, 
we apply our authorial consciousness’s understanding of the actual world to every element of the 
narrative. 
 Then Benjamin is born a snivelly, jaded septuagenarian, and the story is launched. 
      “Well,” gasped Mr. Button, “which is mine?”
       “There!” said the nurse. 
       Mr. Button’s eyes followed her pointing finger, and this is what he saw. Wrapped
  in a voluminous white blanket, and partially crammed into one of the cribs, there sat
  an old man apparently about seventy years of age. His sparse hair was almost white,
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  and from his chin dripped a long smoke-colored beard, which waved absurdly back 
  and forth . . . (162)
We sense that the narrator is aware of the extraordinariness here. “This is what he saw” followed 
by a full stop forces a pause to gather, as if preparing us for the sight to come. Perhaps, per the 
principle of minimal departure, we hesitate to take the figure at face value. Is it merely a hideous 
baby? Did a disoriented elderly man wander into the infant wing? Alternatively, we might 
wonder along with Roger, “Am I mad? . . . Is this some kind of ghastly hospital joke?” But the 
answer is no across the board. When Benjamin speaks he foils the naturalizing hypotheses. 
  “Are you my father?” he demanded . . . 
       “Because if you are,” went on the old man querulously, “I wish you’d get me 
  out of this place––or, at least, get them to put a comfortable rocker in here.”
       “Where in God’s name did you come from? Who are you?” burst out Mr. Button
  frantically. 
       “I can’t tell you exactly who I am,” replied the querulous whine, “because I’ve 
  only been born a few hours––but my last name is certainly Button.” (163)
The perfect English renders the ugly-infant hypothesis impossible, and the “querulous” or “fault-
finding” (OED 1a) self-awareness, in addition to being hilarious, makes implausible Benjamin’s 
being a confused old man. What we have, then, is “a baby of threescore and ten,” an impossible 
formulation that’s true despite its paradox. If we need third-party support, we get it; Roger calls 
Benjamin an “impostor,” the latter begs the nurse to vouch, and she does: “You’re wrong, Mr. 
Button . . . This is your child.” So there it is: an inversion of what is perhaps our safest 
assumption––to be sure, a degree-one extraordinary phenomenon, and, most importantly, one 
that transpires in an otherwise primary-world context.
  This arrangement, a realist storyworld that includes one or few extraordinary 
phenomena, is the definition of the hybrid world. The immediate product of the hybrid-world 
form is a kind of tension that, at least initially, infiltrates our cognitive experience of the 
narrative. As we’ve seen, the apparent primary world constructed through realist techniques such 
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as deep referentiality bolsters the beliefs of our authorial consciousness, but then the narrative 
accosts us with an extraordinary phenomenon that violates the actual-world, authorial-
consciousness parameters we’ve been encouraged to apply. In other words, we’re validated by 
the storyworld in our expectation of minimal departure, but, concurrently, those expectations are 
radically unmet by (in this case) the narrative’s governing instability. In primary worlds the 
beliefs of the narrative and authorial consciousnesses are so alike that the authorial 
consciousness applies its understanding directly to the storyworld; in secondary worlds the 
beliefs of the narrative and authorial consciousnesses are so different that the authorial 
consciousness does not apply its understanding to the storyworld until it performs a macro 
interpretation of the narrative as designed. Somewhere between, in hybrid worlds the beliefs of 
the narrative and authorial consciousnesses are alike except for the narrative consciousness’s 
observation of the single or few extraordinary phenomena; thus, we’re urged to apply frames of 
understanding or interpretation to something that refuses to fit within them. Fitzgerald’s narrator 
is in-tune when he calls his story an “astonishing history”: history insists upon applicability in an 
actual-world context, while astonishing denotes “shock” or “wonder by the presentation of 
something unaccountable” (OED 4, my emphasis). I have more to say about the affordance of 
this conflict below. 
 But the first question we should answer about the hybrid world runs parallel to the 
concept of secondary belief. Matthew Bruccoli, sultan of Fitzgerald scholarship, writes in a 
headnote to “Benjamin Button,” “The challenge of fantasy is to make impossible events 
convincing” (159). Secondary worlds meet this challenge with an extreme otherness that incites 
belief on the premise that the storyworld is governed by different, perhaps inscrutable laws. I 
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would quarrel with calling hybrid worlds “fantasy,” but Bruccoli’s challenge applies to them 
nonetheless, and the consequent question is vital: in a world so like ours, why should we believe 
in such an extraordinary phenomenon? 
 ii. The X / Y Format & The Rhetoric of Veracity
Because hybrid worlds involve intrusive, anomalous, or otherwise deviant contraventions of 
reality, it stands to reason that they would share some rhetorical principles with purported 
nonfictional accounts of the extraordinary. Thus the work of scholars outside literary studies 
could provide insight that enhances our understanding of hybrid-world purposes and effects. A 
short list of such texts includes folklorist Gillian Bennett’s Alas, Poor Ghost!, psychologist 
Jonathan Potter’s Representing Reality, and sociologist Robin Wooffitt’s Telling Tales of the 
Unexpected; this latter study benefits us immediately here. Wooffitt analyzes paranormal reports 
(written and oral) in an effort to locate and unpack a variety of the strategies that tellers’ use to 
establish veracity. This veracity relies on the teller being “normal” (or sane) and the reported 
phenomena being “factual” (or existent in the world); the rhetorical maneuvers that Wooffitt 
delineates are therefore attempts at convincing a “recipient” of the normality and the factuality of 
the teller and the told. The way of doing so that’s relevant for us is what Wooffitt calls the X/Y 
Format, or the “‘I was just doing X . . . when Y’” formulation, where X is some “mundane” or 
ordinary thing and Y is the supernatural event. For example, I was just (X) folding the laundry 
when I (Y) saw the ghostly figure pass through the hall. According to Wooffitt, the “X” part of 
the format is a “state formulation,” a construction of a context that houses the focal Y, and 
speakers “design” the X as mundane in order to root their “unreal” story in the real (117-130). 
That is, the speaker constructs an everyday context to verify and emphasize the reality of the tale. 
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The paranormal Y, then, comes in discursive continuity with the constructed reality, and it seems 
normal and factual and thus believable on account of the insistent ordinariness of the prefatory 
X. 
 It’s this contrast that ultimately provides the rhetorical potency of the X/Y format. 
Wooffitt subsumes the X/Y into a larger category of “contrast pairs” that speakers employ as 
“persuasive devices” in stories both natural and supernatural (143). The implication is that such 
devices are as effective as the severity of their contrasts. 
  The juxtaposition of these images furnishes the basis for inferential work by which
  the character of each component is affirmed in relation to the other. Thus the everyday
  character of the state formulation is inferentially available by virtue of the contrast to 
  what happened next, while the strangeness of the phenomenon is made inferentially 
  available through its juxtaposition to the everyday and routine. (143)
Prince Hal illustrates the notion less turgidly in I Henry IV: “My reformation, glitt’ring o’er my 
fault, / shall show more goodly and attract more eyes / than that which hath no foil to set it 
off” (I.ii). Hal’s contention is that honor and valor seem truest and most intense when juxtaposed 
with Eastcheap debauchery, and vice versa. Wooffitt offers a kindred claim about X and Y: the 
ordinary context is the “foil” that “sets off” the extraordinary event, while the extraordinary 
event does likewise to the context. We should underscore that latter half––not only does the X 
affirm and intensify the extraordinariness of the Y, but the extraordinary Y, “by virtue of the 
contrast,” affirms and intensifies the ordinariness of the X (my emphasis). In other words, each 
depends on the other for its fullest existence in the story; as Woofitt puts it, the X/Y format 
“implicates the contingency of one event upon another” (138). The tight juxtaposition makes 
inseparable the supernatural event and the domain of normality and factuality, and as a result the 
extraordinary phenomenon is rendered believable and extraordinary. 
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 It might well be clear by now where I’m heading. I want to suggest that it’s the sharpness 
of the contrast between realist world and extraordinary phenomenon that incites belief in a 
hybrid world––and it does so in much the same way as Wooffitt outlines. Quite literally 
everything about the storyworld of “Benjamin Button” is realist apart from Benjamin himself. 
I’ve surveyed here only the opening scenes and still discovered cultural, temporal, topographical, 
institutional, and historical overlap between the worlds. Yes, only the opening: X first, then Y; 
the sole extraordinary phenomenon transpires among the extreme realism, which “implicates 
contingency” of each upon the other, and we believe “by virtue of the contrast” in Benjamin as 
an exceptional transgression of the actual-world laws we’ve assumed to be applicable to the 
storyworld. In other words, rather than an ordinary phenomenon in an ordinary world (as in the 
primary) or an extraordinary phenomenon in an extraordinary world (as in the secondary), 
Benjamin’s reverse aging is an extraordinary phenomenon in spite of the ordinary world. 
Moreover, that extraordinary phenomenon is the narrative’s global instability, which is to say that 
it itself mobilizes the story. Thus insofar as its juxtaposition with the realist storyworld enacts, as 
Wooffitt argues, a mutual dependence between ordinary and extraordinary, we might say that the 
narrative progression guarantees the world’s realism, which in turn guarantees the narrative 
progression. Indeed, we would have no tale if Benjamin was born an ordinary, wailing infant and 
quite a different tale if all “babies” were born leathery and articulate and advanced thence to 
infancy. “The Curious Case of Benjamin Button” is, then, a sort of scaled-up, story-size X/Y 
formulation, with all that entails in the way of belief and cognition. 
 I will return to the idea of a story-size X/Y shortly, but I want to linger longer over belief 
to show how Fitzgerald maintains the tightness and thereby the effectiveness of his contrast pair. 
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After the narrator closes the opening expository paragraph by calling the coming story an 
“astonishing history,” he says, “I shall tell you what occurred, and let you judge for yourself.” 
Yet letting us decide for ourselves does not stop Fitzgerald from employing various local 
rhetorical tools to influence our decision. Two such tools we can find explicated in Gillian 
Bennett’s Alas, Poor Ghost!, a study that frequently overlaps with Wooffitt’s while considering 
folkloric and other (quasi-)literary sources that elude Wooffitt’s social-scientific orientation. 
Bennett likens supernatural storytelling to an exchange with a judge and a jury, whereby the 
audience needs to be convinced, as Woofitt contends, of the report’s factuality. Implicit 
recognition of this situation leads tellers to appeal to an imaginary judge and jury without 
external prompt or question, embedding responses to potential objections within the design of 
their discourse. Anticipatory argument of this sort Bennett calls the “Accusing I”: a teller 
foresees, for example, an accusation of drunken delusion and so preempts that objection by 
saying, “We’d not had a lot to drink” (128). Literary storytellers can’t be so forthright, but we 
can often detect the Accusing I in moments of character interaction and focalized narration. 
Some of the interpretations I’ve already given of the story’s first episodes (which are lightly 
focalized through Roger) appeal to an imaginary judge and jury. Following Benjamin’s birth the 
narrator insists “There was no mistake,” as if to preempt any number of objections based on 
“joke,” misperception, or incorrect location; Roger’s immediately asking the nurses “Am I 
mad?” appeals to that hypothesis with an awareness that simultaneously belies it (see: Catch-22). 
Similarly, Benjamin’s initial articulate, humorous, and situationally-aware speech overrides the 
two possible naturalizations, namely that he is either an extraordinarily defective [ed] infant or 
an extraordinarily disoriented old man––Fitzgerald knows of these routes out and precludes 
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them. A little later, twelve years on in story-time, Benjamin makes an “astonishing 
discovery” (that adjective again): “Did his eyes deceive him, or had his hair turned in the dozen 
years of his life from white to iron-grey under its concealing dye?” (167). The dye itself is 
important insofar as it emphasizes the need to artificially assimilate, but the main point here is 
that first interrogative clause, “Did his eyes deceive him,” which shows through focalization 
Benjamin’s battle with an Accusing I objecting to the “astonishing” observation. Benjamin really  
wonders thus, and our narrative consciousness takes note and maybe joins him in his wonder, but 
for our authorial consciousness the question is again Fitzgerald’s acknowledgement of 
naturalizing possibilities; and because by this point in the progression Benjamin’s condition is 
clear, this acknowledgement works simultaneously as a negation. The list of these moments is 
long and, needless to say, not exhausted by this paragraph. 
 Bennett’s second strategy for dealing with the imaginary judge and jury is what she terms 
“Calling to Witness,” which is, just like it sounds, “the reframing of the argument by the 
reporting of another person’s experiences.” Tellers can call to witness not only in overt “She was 
there, ask her!” sorts of formulations but also with subtler maneuvers such as first-person-plural 
noun phrases and “side stories” that, by implying contingency, involve a third party in the main 
tale. Rhetorically, the purpose of that involvement is to “double” the “number of voices arrayed 
to speak in defense of the [teller’s] case” and thus to double the veracity of the claim (128-130). 
Calls to witness in fiction likewise take various forms––characters to character, character to 
audience, narrator to audience, author to reader; here I want to consider Fitzgerald’s rhetorical 
call to witness through his characters’ reactions to Benjamin. Prior to the astonished fit that I’ve 
already discussed, Roger encounters the doctor who delivered Benjamin. “Oh, Doctor Keene!” 
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Roger cries excitedly, to which the doctor responds with a silent “curious expression” on a 
“harsh, medicinal face.” After some unproductively evasive back-and-forth, the doctor has a 
revealing outburst. 
      “Is it a boy or a girl?” [Roger asked]. 
       “Here now!” cried Doctor Keene in a perfect passion of irritation. “I’ll ask you
  to go and see for yourself. Outrageous!” He snapped the last word out in almost one
  syllable, then he turned away muttering: “Do you imagine a case like this will help
  my professional reputation? One more would ruin me––ruin anybody.” (160)
Passionate irritation, outrageousness, ruined reputations, an inability to come out with it: the 
expert’s expertise can’t accommodate Benjamin. That Keene fears a career hit at the hands of 
this birth indicates how anomalous the phenomenon is and reveals his relatable instinct to 
naturalize it, as if Benjamin’s extraordinariness were merely from mutilative malpractice. But 
Keene doesn’t explain the problem to Roger. Nor does the nurse at the hospital’s front desk, who, 
upon learning Roger’s identity, assumes “a look of utter terror” and a squirrelly resolve to rid 
herself of him: “Oh––of course! . . . Up stairs. Right up-stairs. Go––up!” He goes up, tells 
another nurse his name, and she too starts, dropping a basin that sounds “Clank! Clank!” across 
the floor and the page. Under her breath she reiterates Keene’s conception of the event as 
“outrageous” and scales up his fear for his reputation to the hospital as a whole. Eventually she 
assents, leads Roger to Benjamin, and what follows is the first-contact scene I discussed above. 
 It’s especially useful to consider characters’ early contacts with extraordinary phenomena 
because they exhibit a thinking mind struck as ours is and in the process of coming to terms. 
There’s a range of possible reactions that can expose phenomena as anything from one-off, 
entirely anomalous to quotidian in terms of the storyworld, and such exposure can in turn 
indicate something about the makeup of the storyworld as a whole. Naturally, the more instances 
of the same reaction we can identify, the more confidently we can depend on that reaction’s 
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implications. Fitzgerald makes this process pretty innocuous: every character upon first 
encountering Benjamin reacts in shock or confusion or disgust or some other signal of severe 
abnormality. The home-nurse, arranged by the Buttons ahead of time, “[leaves] the house after 
one look” at Benjamin. Around Baltimore the man/child creates “a sensation,” but, hilariously, 
some of the Buttons’ “unfailingly polite” acquaintances show concern for social etiquette rather 
than ontological crisis: searching for the obligatory “how cute!” but unable (given the aesthetic 
circumstance) to use that mold, they “hit upon the ingenious device of declaring that the baby 
resembled his grandfather,” which “could not be denied” (164-166). While it’s true that to spend 
time sorting out the etiquette is in a sense to downplay the much bigger complication of the 
backwards birth, Fitzgerald’s attribution of these social concerns to the Baltimore townspeople 
actually works well with the values he’s already ascribed to them. Instead of surrendering their 
beliefs and conceding to uproar, the characters maintain their preexisting modes of being and 
respond to Benjamin just as they might, in their own unique mode of acknowledging the 
extraordinary. Savvily, Fitzgerald uses this arrangement to reinforce both the extraordinariness of 
Benjamin (he looks like his grandfather) and the realism of the townspeople’s referential 
upperclass, antebellum behavior (they cared to formulate that “compliment”). To enhance the 
comedy of the scenario, Benjamin’s grandfather is “furiously insulted” by the “ingenious 
device,” for he, too, is disgusted by the child. Roger and Mrs. Button remain “somewhat in awe” 
of Benjamin and even “frequently address him as ‘Mr.’”; it’s unclear whether such addresses are 
slip-ups or purposeful, but in any case they lay bare the complication that Benjamin provides to 
his parents’ understanding. Or, for that matter, to his own: “[Benjamin] was as puzzled as any 
one else at the apparently advanced age of his mind and body,” Fitzgerald writes, so “He read up 
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on it in the medical journal but found that no such case had been previously recorded” (167). 
This research confirms the utmost deviance of the phenomenon. So, not only do the referenced 
characters react in shock, disgust, or confusion, but presumably everyone would, and rightly –– 
“no such case” in the storyworld’s history acts as primer. 
 The proliferation of these reactions complicates Kim Sasser’s classification of “Benjamin 
Button” as “magical realism,” a tempting reading indeed but ultimately one that the persistent 
extraordinariness of Benjamin discourages us from performing. “Magical realism” refers to the 
(predominantly) Latin-American phenomenon, beginning in the 1940s and blooming throughout 
the postmodernist period,17 of assimilating miracles and impossibilities into seemingly realistic 
settings. There are variations on the theme, but, as practiced by such founding figures as Alejo 
Carpentier, Julio Cortázar, and Gabriel García Márquez, magic realism is generally characterized 
by what Brian McHale calls a “banalization of the fantastic,” or the treatment of extraordinary 
phenomena as if they were totally, even exceedingly ordinary. And this effect is usually achieved 
at least in part by the “characters’ failure to be amazed by paranormal happenings” (PF 76-77). 
Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children is a later example of magic realism; in it miracles of telepathy and 
other impossibilities occur so frequently that they “appear,” in McHale’s words, “routine.” 
Márquez’s One Hundred Years of Solitude is often considered the seminal magic-realist novel; its 
world not only normalizes impossibilities but, as McHale argues, its characters’ reactions are 
“inverted”––ascension to heaven is considered prosaic, whereas ice is a wild miracle. “Benjamin 
Button” obviously never reaches an inverted reality wherein all humans are born septuagenarians 
and only the anomalies are born infants. Nor, however, does it reach a “banalization of the 
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17 Sasser is aware of the quasi-anachronistic nature of her classification; she calls her magical-realist reading 
“retrospective,” meaning that “Benjamin Button” exhibits the tenets of magical realism despite appearing decades 
before both the term’s coinage and the solidification of any definite list of characteristics. 
fantastic” at all: Benjamin remains an isolated incident, and, in direct contrast to magic-realist 
conventions, the characters respond to the extraordinary phenomenon like it is indeed 
extraordinary. This is, of course, quite difficult to miss, and Sasser displays knowledge of the 
character responses that I delineate above. But she apparently does not consider them departures 
from magic realism; rather, she spins them into buttresses for her case. Sasser zeroes in on such 
reactions as Keene’s anxiety about disrepute and the house-nurse’s “indignation” to argue that 
the characters feel “not fear” or “dismay,” which would be the appropriate responses, “but scorn” 
and “insult,” sentiments that grant Benjamin an assumed empirical validity that, for his 
“aberrance,” he doesn’t deserve. The ultimate point is seemingly that “Benjamin and most of the 
characters accept his existence . . . all too readily” to not banalize the extraordinary phenomenon 
(184-186). I grant that some characters’ reactions are ethically or logically confused, but 
nonetheless in every case they signal abnormality. Moreover, there is in fact a degree of 
hesitation implicit in reactions such as Keene’s, which display an instinct to naturalize Benjamin 
into defection or mutilation, and likewise for the nurse’s indignation: there’s something wrong 
about Benjamin, and some characters, reluctant as people are to entertain supernatural 
possibilities, respond to that wrongness how they’d respond to other worldly wrongnesses. It 
does no good to point out that characters accept Benjamin’s existence. Charles Simic usefully 
aphorizes, “People rarely doubt that they see,” and, indeed, how could Keene or Roger or the 
nurses sanely deny Benjamin’s actuality when he stands, five-foot-eight and bearded, before their 
eyes? Of course they accept his existence. The readiness to which Sasser refers should pertain to 
the characters’ acceptance of Benjamin’s true extraordinariness, and for this we have a range of 
results––Roger’s “Am I mad? . . . Is this some kind of ghastly hospital joke?” contrasted with the 
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nurses’ resignation to the circumstance, and so forth. But even in the most forthright suggestion 
of normality
  By the time he was twelve years old his parents had grown used to him. 
  Indeed, so strong is the force of custom that they no longer felt he was 
  different from any other child––except when some curious anomaly 
  reminded them of the fact. (167)
the point is ultimately the Buttons’ impressive ability to accept then overlook Benjamin’s 
extraordinariness and “raise” him anyway, rather than the dissolution of that extraordinariness. 
What’s more, Fitzgerald links this ability to the actual world. Notice the brief shift out of the 
narrative-past tense to the present tense in “so strong is the force of custom”; this statement 
tethers the Buttons’ getting-accustomed, which Sasser would argue banalizes, to the actual-world 
human capacity to adapt and/or ignore, given time. The curious anomalies then serve as 
reminders of the extraordinary that drop the parents out of their adaptation. It boils down to this: 
as the medical journals show, Benjamin’s total aberrance is a fact of the storyworld, but then so 
is Benjamin. The characters (and we) respond to both of these matters, and while eventual 
acceptance is inevitable, the extraordinary remains exactly that; or, closer to Wooffitt’s terms, Y 
never fades into X. So a magic-realist reading of the story can’t check off magic realism’s vital 
tenet. 
 What’s important here, however, is not just that calling “Benjamin Button” magic realism 
is not apt but also that the character reactions serve a greater world-building purpose––namely, to 
maintain the tightness of the X/Y juxtaposition. The rhetorical strategy, Wooffitt says, works by 
virtue of the contrast. We can infer, then, that any space inserted between X and Y, between 
ordinary and extraordinary, would loosen the contrast and diminish the veracity and therefore the 
poignancy of the tale. It’s perhaps useful to return to the law for illustration. In order for her 
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testimony to be taken as trustworthy and valuable, a witness needs her perception (her senses and 
her ability to process sensory stimuli) to be considered functional, unimpeded, and certain––or, 
the world she reports perceiving must unquestionably have been the actual world in its 
“objective” (true and normal) form. Hence, interrogations such as “You wear prescription 
eyeglasses; were you wearing them that night?” and “You’d just been woken up; are you sure 
you weren’t delirious?” are attempts to separate perception from reality, to forge a wrench to 
drive between X and Y. Similarly, consider what would happen to my first X/Y example, “I was 
just folding the laundry when I saw the ghostly figure pass through the hall,” if its speaker had 
said instead, “I was just folding the laundry when I decided to take the psilocybin and then I saw 
the ghostly figure pass through the hall.” The hallucinogen is an extra step, an X-and-a-half that 
is now the immediate potential cause of perception Y; or, at the least, it taints the contingency of 
Y upon X by admitting an additional element into the sequence. Drugs, drowsiness, and bad 
eyesight are extreme and obvious examples, but any material at all between X and Y would have 
the same effect (to varying degrees) of driving the extraordinary perception away from its root in 
reality and thus damaging the veracity of the report. In our world-building terms, such 
intermediary material would include any indication that the storyworld is unlike the actual world 
in any way beyond its one or few extraordinary phenomena. If additional extraordinary 
phenomena transpire, if a part of the storyworld is unrecognizable, if characters suggest that 
what’s happening is normal, then the narrative (at least partially) loses the sense that the 
extraordinary phenomena are occurring in a fictive version of the actual world. In other words, 
the farther Y is driven from X, the closer the storyworld is to secondary. Fitzgerald’s consistent 
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representation of character outrage, shock, confusion, and disgust serves the purpose of keeping 
as tight as possible the juxtaposition of realist world and extraordinary phenomenon. 
 iii. The X/Y Format and/as Narrative Progression 
It would be easier to concede to Sasser’s contention if so much of the narrative progression 
weren’t made up of characters’ attempts to restore normality to the situation, reactions-turned-
actions that, by failing to work, simply magnify Benjamin’s resilient abnormality and the 
difficulty of dealing therewith. Roger attempts a sequence of normality restorations in the 
beginning of Benjamin’s life, a sequence for which we’re given his motivation outright: “Mr. 
Button persisted in his unwavering purpose. Benjamin was a baby, and a baby he should 
remain.” To achieve this purpose Roger initially refuses the “repugnant notion” of dressing his 
son in the men’s clothes for which Benjamin is built. But babies’ clothes obviously won’t do, so 
Roger searches for “a very large boy’s suit,” and what he finds is a comical getup “for fancy 
dress” that includes “dotted socks, pink pants, and a belted blouse with a wide white collar.” 
Needless to say, “The effect [is] not good,” and, naturally, the fix is to “amputate” Benjamin’s 
long white beard (164-165). These attempts become only more farcical when they extend beyond 
the aesthetic. 
  At first [Roger] declared that if Benjamin didn’t like warm milk he could go 
  without food altogether, but he was finally prevailed upon to allow his son 
  bread and butter, and even oatmeal by way of compromise. One day he brought
  home a rattle and, giving it to Benjamin, insisted in no uncertain terms that he 
  should “play with it” . . . (166)
Compromise here previews Roger’s path toward acceptance and also reveals Benjamin’s 
willingness to stand his ground or, in other words, assert his abnormality. Nevertheless, the 
agreement only grants Benjamin what sound like cliché prison rations, an absolute-minimum 
diminishment of the declaration’s absurdity. Interestingly, Roger’s initial rule is not only that 
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Benjamin must drink the warm milk but that he must like it. With this subtle difference 
Fitzgerald reveals the depth of Roger’s desired control: acting like a baby is too shallow; 
Benjamin must literally have the taste of an actual newborn, lest he starve. Roger wants to 
reinstate a reality that does not contain an infant-septuagenarian, a realist world without the 
extraordinary phenomenon, an X without a disruptive Y, a regular old primary world. The 
meagre terms of the compromise thus reveal the minutiae of Roger’s concession to the 
extraordinary. Beyond diet, with the rattle and command to play with it Roger uses his parental 
power to force childish and therefore normal behavior to manifest, and in a way it works; 
Benjamin, wanting to please his father, “obediently” jingles the rattle “at intervals throughout the 
day.” But it bores him nonetheless as it would indeed, and on the sneakier frequencies Benjamin 
gives in to his own desires, smoking Roger’s Cuban cigars with regularity and often “steal[ing] 
down the back stairs” to fetch an Encyclopedia Britannica “over which he would pore over an 
afternoon.” Such info-packed afternoons necessitate a disregard of the baby toys Roger had 
purchased (lead soldiers, toy trains, and “large pleasant animals made of cotton” on top of the 
rattle) in an effort “to perfect the illusion which he was creating.” For the same purpose, the 
narrator tells us, Roger had “passionately demanded of the clerk in the toy-store whether ‘the 
paint would come off the pink duck if the baby put it in his mouth’” (164, 166-167). There is no 
reason for this demand: Benjamin isn’t present, the clerk doesn’t know of him, and Roger knows 
Benjamin won’t be putting the painted duck in his mouth. Only for his own sake could Roger 
pose such a question, for the reinforcement of that “illusion” of normality. Again this response 
might border on absurd, but still it works toward the established end; that is, Fitzgerald plants the 
absurdity to emphasize or insist upon Benjamin’s utter extraordinariness in the contexts of both 
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the storyworld and the actual world. (In turn, the accordance of the worlds grows tighter.) I have 
not exhausted Roger’s attempts to correct Benjamin’s aberrance. With their humor, the 
hyperbolic realism of their outrage, and the pathos of this strained relationship, these scenes of 
Roger’s struggle with his son comprise in effect––if not in word count––a significant portion of 
the narrative’s force. In other words, much of the progression’s design is contingent upon 
Roger’s initial refusal to banalize, to accept and let flourish, his son’s transgressive gerontology. 
 As I’ve suggested, Roger does eventually accept and (for a time) raise Benjamin in 
something close to proper manner, but what hole that resolution patches is re-poked by 
Benjamin’s unstable efforts to lead a normal life in spite of his abnormality. At eighteen, which 
means something like fifty in physiology and -ognomy, Benjamin attempts to enroll at Yale, a 
fulfillment of Roger’s dream. In an implicit admission of his strangeness, Benjamin thinks when 
he arrives in New Haven to freshen the brown hair-dye that masks his natural salt-and-pepper, 
but his dye bottle he’d emptied and disposed of a day previous. Due at the college registrar in 
five minutes, Benjamin is forced “to go as he [is]” (as if, we think, brown dye would’ve closed 
the thirty-year aesthetic gap enough for passing), and the ensuing exchange frustrates his hope 
for normality. 
       “Good morning,” said the registrar politely. “You’ve come to inquire about your
  son.”
       “Why, as a matter of fact, my name’s Button––” began Benjamin, but Mr. Hart 
  cut him off. 
       “I’m very glad to meet you, Mr. Button. I’m expecting your son here any minute.”
       “That’s me!” burst out Benjamin. “I’m a freshman.”
       “What!”
       “I’m a freshman.”
       “Surely you’re joking.”
       “Not at all.”
       The registrar frowned and glanced at the card before him. “Why, I have Mr. Benjamin
  Button’s age down here as eighteen.”
       “That’s my age,” asserted Benjamin, flushing slightly.
       The registrar eyed him wearily. “Now surely, Mr. Button, you don’t expect me to 
  believe that.”
       Benjamin smiled wearily. “I am eighteen,” he repeated. 
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       The registrar pointed sternly to the door. “Get out,” he said. “Get out of college and 
  get out of town. You are a dangerous lunatic.” (169)
I quote at such length because the registrar so fully exemplifies a “sane” processual reaction to 
the extraordinary phenomenon. Inferring that this apparent fifty-year-old is a student’s father is 
wholly reasonable to begin; like Roger, when Hart is first informed of the situation he assumes 
it’s a joke––a level, even charitable attempt at rationalization; then, as Benjamin becomes not 
only a freshman but a freshman of eighteen Hart jumps to madness because rational, correct 
understandings of reality can’t accommodate the purported circumstance. Ordering Benjamin out 
of his sight is Hart’s way of steadying his disrupted preconceptions; ordering Benjamin out of 
not only Yale but college in general is Hart’s way of maintaining the collegiate system’s 
demographic order that Benjamin threatens; and ordering Benjamin “out of town” (that classic 
maxim) is Hart’s way of “protecting” his world from the “danger” that such cognitive and 
societal subversions tend to pose. Fitzgerald’s commentary here is multileveled and various, 
running from a satirization of elite administrative types to a critique of human preoccupation 
with appearance to a global discussion of how we deal with difference, and that plurality is a 
testament to his subtlety and skill. But I want to highlight the world-building implications of this 
density’s presentation. Benjamin is trying to attain normality by going to university, but Hart, 
frontline representative of Yale and thereby the gatekeeper of normality, emphatically turns 
Benjamin away. This situation supports the hybrid world in four ways simultaneously: [1] 
Benjamin’s goal affirms that, like in the actual world, it’s custom to attend college at eighteen; 
[2] that Benjamin goes for his goal despite knowing he’s abnormal suggests that there is no 
alternative track carved out in the storyworld for backwards people like him; [3] that he’s turned 
away confirms our conviction that Benjamin, though having been born eighteen years prior, is 
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not an ordinary college-age kid; and [4] Hart’s behavior indicates that Benjamin’s 
extraordinariness is an outrage, an anomalous freak-phenomenon that he (a storyworld resident) 
has never before seen. One and two help to build the realist context, while three and four sharpen 
the extraordinariness of the extraordinary phenomenon. Taken together, then, these four elements 
act as push-pull, an interaction between the X and the Y in which each, rather than yield ground 
to the other, reaffirms and insists upon the qualities of itself. 
 In keeping with the logic of the arrangement, Benjamin’s reverse aging does provide a 
window of advantage––between the prime years of 20 (50) and 50 (20)––during which he 
achieves quite a distinguished and pleasurable normality; but while this period seems to 
Benjamin to counter the misfortune of the bookends, the inescapability of his extraordinariness 
makes us unable to see his midlife success as anything more than a doomed, quasi-dishonest 
enterprise, even as we feel some sympathetic satisfaction at his temporary happiness. Benjamin’s 
accomplishments, piled on hyperbolically, include being the first man in Baltimore to own and 
run an automobile, devising a “famous business coup” that subsequently became a federal statute 
and saved the family hardware business loads of money, financing a twenty-volume “History of 
the Civil War,” providing medaled service in the Spanish-American War, dominating for the 
Harvard football team, and for a short time becoming “the most celebrated man in college.” 
Some of these accomplishments, however, are forthrightly the consequences of an advantage 
bestowed upon Benjamin by his condition. At Harvard, for instance, he’s fifty but “apparently 
about twenty,” and it’s his worldly experience and his two-year bodily advantage over other 
freshmen that facilitate his social and athletic success––for corroboration consider that in his 
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third and fourth years, the physical asymmetry reversed, Benjamin’s dominance turns to failure 
to make the football roster at all. 
Perhaps the fullest representation of this advantage’s nature is Benjamin’s romantic 
relationship. Around twenty years after his birth Benjamin becomes roughly his father’s “peer,” 
and, the pair attends together various fashionable parties around Baltimore. At one such 
gathering Benjamin spots a girl, Hildegarde Moncrief, and requests that Roger introduce him to 
her; upon introduction Benjamin asks for a dance, Hildegarde assents, and after an envious 
period of waiting his turn the couple performs the common young-love Fitzgerald scene, but 
with a twist. 
      But when his own time came, and he drifted with her out upon the changing
  floor to the music of the latest waltz from Paris, his jealousies and anxieties 
  melted from him like a mantle of snow. Blind with enchantment, he felt that
  life was just beginning. 
        “You and your brother got here just as we did, didn’t you?” asked Hildegarde, 
  looking up at him with eyes that were like bright blue enamel. 
       Benjamin hesitated. If she took him for his father’s brother, would it be best to 
  enlighten her? He remembered his experience at Yale, so he decided against it. It
  would be rude to contradict a lady; it would be criminal to mar this exquisite occasion 
  with the grotesque story of his origin. Later, perhaps. So he nodded, smiled, listened, 
  was happy. 
       “I like men of your age,” Hildegarde told him . . . (171)
Despite appearing middle-aged, Benjamin is only around twenty, and so he’s not wrong to feel 
that “life [is] just beginning.” It’s the prototypical sentiment expressed by young people who’ve 
just had their first exposure to “society,” and, indeed, it’s the feeling Fitzgerald has spent much 
ink paying tribute to with characters (Gatsby, Blaine, Diver, Dexter Green) who seek in vain to 
recover it. But the devastating irony in Benjamin’s statement is obvious––his bright-eyed gaze 
toward life’s unwritten horizon is undermined by his actual position in this societal dynamic, 
which, based on his physical presentation, places him two-thirds of the way to the finish line. 
However, it’s exactly that position that’s appealing to Hildegarde; “young boys are so idiotic,” 
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she says, but men of fifty are just right. So Benjamin benefits here, for the first time, from his 
extraordinariness: he gets the girl because he looks and acts like he’s fifty. Yet in the fundamental 
sense of lived-years he isn’t, a reality we’re reminded of as Hildegarde’s remarks make Benjamin 
“[long] passionately to be fifty,” and when he chooses not to correct Hildegarde’s assumptions he 
gives way to the driving instability I mentioned above. Benjamin’s decorated normality is 
rattletrap, built on unnatural, sometimes deceitful benefits of his extraordinary condition, and as 
a result we’re constantly aware of that normality’s inevitable impermanence. 
 More specifically, we’re constantly aware of this impermanence because it’s clear, to us 
and often to Benjamin, where this thing is going. His life is bell-curved. So much is apparent in 
miniature form in that progression from star player to excluded-from-roster at Harvard. The 
reverse is proper; sound the refrain: Michael Jordan was cut from his high school basketball team 
as a sophomore. But Benjamin, developing opposite Jordan, is rejected after stardom. Benjamin 
and Hildegarde marry, and their ensuing relationship exhibits a similar but more complex 
progression over a longer period, as the inexplicable stroke of luck that was “fifty-year old” 
Benjamin scoring belle Hildegarde literally flips, urging the townspeople to gossip, “What a 
pity! . . . He must be twenty years younger than his wife.” Indeed, it’s a pity for Benjamin, whose 
gravest worry by this point is his diminishing sexual and emotional attraction to Hildegarde. Via 
his successes he acquires the energetic arrogance of a celebrated man, into which focalized 
narration grants us insight: Hildegarde has become “too placid, too content, too anemic,” and the 
“faint skirmish line of gray hairs in her head . . . depress[es] him.” A “chasm” (social, aesthetic, 
temperamental) thus opens between the couple and widens as they progress toward obverse poles 
of existence (174-175). Though he here seems in the more fortunate position, at least within 
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Fitzgerald’s usual frame of idealized youth, Benjamin’s awareness of his aging’s implications 
never fully wanes, and during especially consequential recognitions his anxiety shows blatantly 
in the narration. One such recognition intercepts the discussion of his displeasure with 
Hildegarde. 
  “Good Lord!” he said aloud. The process was continuing. There was no doubt 
  of it––he looked now like a man of thirty. Instead of being delighted he was 
  uneasy––he was growing younger. He had hitherto hoped that once he reached
  a bodily age equivalent to his age in years, the grotesque phenomenon which
  had marked his birth would cease to function. He shuddered. His destiny seemed
  to him awful, incredible. (174)
Obviously the phenomenon was not going to reverse, but that Benjamin hoped it might simply 
underlines the awareness he’s never shed of the process itself. Unease now overcomes him 
because the override, the proving-false, of his reversal hope crystallizes the suspected end as 
imminent and guaranteed. 
 And what, precisely, is that “awful, incredible” destiny? Need we ask? (If yes, answer: 
nothingness.) After Harvard Benjamin moves in with his son, Roscoe, who, because he’s 
“prominent in Baltimore life” and wants “no scandal” to be associated with him, urges Benjamin 
first to “wear eye-glasses and imitation whiskers” then (giving up on physical disguise) to call 
him “Uncle” when guests are around. Benjamin mentions going to “St. Midas,” a fictive 
preparatory school Fitzgerald uses in multiple stories (see “Diamond as Big as the Ritz”), but 
needs Roscoe to enroll him, and the latter has no time. Sulking purposelessly with appropriate 
teenage angst, Benjamin receives a redemptive request from the United States Army for his 
services as “brigadier-general” in the newly-joined Great War. With a distinguished air carried 
over from his earlier service, Benjamin travels by train to “Camp Mosby, in South Carolina, 
where he [is] to command an infantry brigade.” But he’s greeted as a child would be, with 
assumptions that he wants to “play soldier” and that he is the “little boy” of someone at the 
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camp; the official request letter he presents is of no use, and he’s sent home. After a section break 
the narration picks up three years later, following the birth of Roscoe’s son, with whom “ten-
year-old” Benjamin plays using “lead soldiers and a miniature circus” (177-178). This scene 
gives way to Roscoe’s concurrent enrollment of his father and his son in kindergarten; a year 
later his son progresses to first grade, but Benjamin stays put. Benjamin loses his hold on 
language, is pulled from the school, centers his world on his nurse. In quite earnest and affecting 
final paragraphs Fitzgerald delineates the fall into infant ignorance and out, ultimately, of the 
waking world altogether. For its pathos I quote one here. 
  The past––the wild charge at the head of his men up San Juan Hill; the first
  years of his marriage when he worked late into the summer dusk down in the
  busy city for young Hildegarde whom he loved; the days before that when he 
  sat smoking far into the night in the gloomy old Button house on Monroe
  Street with his grandfather––all these had faded like unsubstantial dreams from
  his mind as though they had never been. (180)
This passage is an example of perhaps Fitzgerald’s foremost virtue, that combination of lyrical 
style and benedictive sentimentality for which he remains so rhetorically powerful, and with 
great effort do I restrain from devoting any assessment of his stories to those terms.18 At this end 
the tone and style intensify what’s being told, namely that Benjamin’s destiny is a sort of erasure 
of the happy normality he achieved in his middle years. Fitzgerald reminds us of these feats in a 
warm, nostalgic manner only to tear down their relevance by narrating their disappearance from 
the mind of the curious man whose life they’ve been. A number of parallels with Benjamin’s 
early life––university rejection turns to military rejection, companionship with grandfather turns 
to companionship with grandson––ensure the neatness of the bell curve, with a(n) (d)evolved but  
equivalent lowliness at either end. The equivalence represents precisely the fate toward which 
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18 “And as I sat there brooding on the unknown world . . . “ in Gatsby; “For the first time in years the tears were 
streaming . . . “ in “Winter Dreams.” The long list could go on and on. 
Benjamin felt himself heading and that which provided the experiential instability during his 
success by promising impermanence; remember you are aberrant and to aberrance you shall 
return. But that instability is exacerbated by the difference of Benjamin’s end from his 
beginning: an ordinary elderly man who has experienced such decoration would likely bask in its 
wake or, in less fortunate circumstances, either lament its superficiality or regret its termination; 
but Benjamin, doomed to oblivious babyhood, can participate in none of these legitimizing 
acknowledgments of his past. In ordinary circumstances (again) one’s acquaintances might 
acknowledge and thereby maintain the legitimacy of one’s deeds, but Benjamin’s complicated 
(impossible, really) relationship to peerage renders that solution moot. The normal middle years 
are therefore devoid of any post to which to tether their empirical validity, so their fading “as if 
they had never been” is in some sense a fading to never having been. Hence “erasure” above, 
rather than simply “forgetting.” All along Benjamin’s destiny was death by infancy, for all that 
entails in the way of purity and blankness. 
 As soon as we recognize this inevitable outcome––that is, once we grasp the story’s 
conceit––the extent to which Benjamin will engage in a losing fight for a “normal” place in the 
world, not the hope for a totally successful normalization, becomes our guiding interest in the 
narrative. It doesn’t take long for us to realize that the realism of the storyworld isn’t budging; in 
other words, this world will not turn out to be secondary. But nor, however, is Benjamin to 
outgrow his extraordinariness and recreate primary-world order––this we know based on his 
“awful, incredible” destiny. In place of these possibilities step up the duration and particular 
circumstances of Benjamin’s doomed struggle for normality. How long can he keep up the 
success? How high will his achievements pile before they’re scrapped? Will he make and 
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maintain relationships? Will anyone understand? Will he make it all the way or perish before he 
reaches infancy? If we’re aware of the conceit’s end-time implication, it should be these 
questions and others like them that stimulate our interest in the progression. 
 The important point here is not merely the direction of our attention but that the tension 
between micro achievements of normality and ultimately inevitable abnormality represents a 
greater, governing force of the story’s construction. I talked above about Benjamin’s rejection 
from Yale contributing to the architecture of the hybrid world by simultaneously fortifying both 
the X and the Y, making the ordinary contingent upon the extraordinary and vice versa. This 
interplay is likewise at work on the grander scale of global instability and resolution. 
Experientially, “Benjamin Button” is primarily about Benjamin’s struggle for a place in a 
world––not a family, not a society, but an entire world––that renders him perpetually out of 
place. At the risk of stating the obvious I point out that this design has at least a twofold 
requirement: a protagonist who is extraordinary in terms of his storyworld and a storyworld that 
is unyielding in its marking of the protagonist as extraordinary. The latter half of the requirement 
implies that the storyworld is ordinary in relation to its protagonist’s extraordinariness, or, put 
differently, that a realist context houses the extraordinary phenomenon. (While we could imagine 
a mirror-image conceit that had a realist protagonist fighting for a place in a secondary world, it 
would make quite a different story.) If the foremost element of “Benjamin Button” is Benjamin’s 
struggle for normality, then it’s obvious that the progression here depends upon the hybrid world. 
But in fact I don’t think that statement goes far enough. Because we’re aware both of the truth 
when Benjamin masquerades and of where it all must end, neither realism nor extraordinariness 
ever really surrenders territory to the other. There is a sphere or target of realist normality for 
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which Benjamin aims, and he hits it a number of times, thus partially assimilating into the X of 
the storyworld; but those assimilations are chronically nagged by the Y and (in particular) the 
erasure of fortune it places on the horizon. And our interest, as I’ve claimed, operates within 
exactly this dynamic. In some significant sense, then, the hybrid world goes beyond being just 
the context for its content and a method for its veracity and becomes the engine for the narrative 
itself, at least in experiential terms. If we prefer to conceive this more conservatively, the 
storyworld is such an essential part of Fitzgerald’s design that we can neither experience nor talk 
about “Benjamin Button” without confronting the hybrid world and its implications. 
 iv. Experiential Affordances 
Thus the question: for what purpose has Fitzgerald built his world? The hybrid world differs 
from the secondary world in that its realism precludes our experiencing secondary belief––in 
other words, it just is is not an option for explaining the extraordinary phenomenon. We have to 
deal with the violation as a violation, then, but how? We’ll find, I think, a number of possible 
partial solutions, but they don’t quite satisfy our needs. 
 Collecting “Benjamin Button” in Tales of the Jazz Age, Fitzgerald delineated the 
narrative’s conceptual provenance:
       This story was inspired by a remark of Mark Twain’s to the effect that it 
  was a pity that the best part of life came at the beginning and the worst part
  at the end. By trying the experiment upon only one man in a perfectly normal
  world I have scarcely given the idea a fair trial. (Bruccoli 159)
There’s some close-reading to be done even here. “Only one man in a perfectly normal world” 
has the author almost defining the hybrid world for us, which is nice, but to what extent does the 
story actually exercise Twain’s contention? As we’ve seen, Benjamin’s beginning is unpleasant 
as his end and his best middle years are a losing battle with his extraordinariness; therefore the 
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life presented here, rather than supporting or negating, engages Twain’s idea only obliquely, if at 
all. The implication of “scarcely giving the idea a fair trial” by trying it on “only one man in a 
perfectly ordinary world” is that it’d be more productive to try it in various other contexts too, 
for instance one man in an extraordinary world or many men in an ordinary world. And indeed, if 
Fitzgerald’s sole goal were to illustrate the principle that life starts better than it ends, he 
might’ve done better to build a secondary world that urges us toward the general. But he doesn’t; 
he designs a story that is inseparable from its hybrid-world arrangement. This, as well as the fact 
that he hardly stays on the track of Twain’s remark, suggests that while actual Fitzgerald might 
be truthfully relaying his inspiration for writing, the rhetorical objective of “Benjamin Button” is 
more complex than a reiteration or a test of the inspiring notion. 
 Fitzgerald gets double mileage out of some of the character reactions I’ve already 
discussed by layering social satire atop their world-building implications, and it’s this satire that 
critics have often cited as the story’s communicative content. In reference to “the way it mocks 
the pursuit of pleasure and status by the upper class,” Sasser confidently writes, “‘Benjamin 
Button’ is clearly satirical in genre” (196). She outlines how, for instance, Doctor Keene, the 
nurses, Roger, and Roscoe all worry about their reputations being damaged by Benjamin, which 
she says satirizes their superficial preoccupation with image. I agree that satire is one of the 
effects Fitzgerald hopes we’ll heed, but it isn’t the whole of the design, and to read it as the 
central feature of the narrative is, I think, to naturalize the extraordinary in a manner that fails to 
do justice to the hybrid world. In other words, satirization here is primary-world work, gotten at 
through the referentiality of antebellum Baltimore and upperclass America, so reducing the story 
to satire at least partially neglects the structural complexity of the storyworld. This complexity is 
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evident in and inseparable from even the most obviously satirical moments such as the reactions 
Sasser cites, and we can locate it by examining their world-building effects alongside their social 
commentary. For example, above I read Keene’s reaction as revealing his impulse to naturalize, 
but, as Sasser shows, it is simultaneously a satire of upperclass careerism: Keene must (at least 
subconsciously) believe there is a natural explanation for Benjamin if he fears blame, and to fear 
blame in the face of this extraordinary phenomenon is to expose values deserving of scorn. We 
can make a kindred claim about the townspeople’s “ingenious” remark that Benjamin resembles 
his grandfather. Their initial puzzlement and the content of their decided compliment reinforce 
Benjamin’s extraordinariness while the effort they expend on the way reveals their humorously 
superficial concern. Implied Fitzgerald permits and intends these multilayered effects, and, most 
importantly, neither is to undermine the other. Satire, then, is partly apt; it, like Fitzgerald’s 
introductory reference to Twain, articulates something of the narrative’s thematic or ideational 
concerns, but it doesn’t do justice to the textual design in full. 
 There are a number of additional methods we could employ to discern thematic content in 
“Benjamin Button.” Again unnatural narratology places a bid for its relevance, and it’s perhaps 
true that Jan Alber’s bin of reading strategies, from which we pulled in chapter two, contains 
tools of use to us here. Satire is there, as are allegory and “foregrounding the thematic,” all 
reasonable interpretive options to test out––Fitzgerald purports to foreground Twain’s theme, and 
it’s plausible to find allegory in Benjamin’s experience as a marked other in a world that resists, 
indeed forbids, his permanent success. I tend toward pluralism, and I would not object to a critic 
highlighting these features as salient parts of Fitzgerald’s rhetorical objective. But allegorical and 
thematic reading are nonetheless exclusive in the way that Sasser’s satirical reading is, partial 
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neglects of the extraordinary as extraordinary in a storyworld whose realism would seem to 
forbid it. For us the most responsible Alber strategy is the most subtle, what he calls “frame 
blending,” which entails “recombining, extending, or otherwise altering preexisting cognitive 
parameters” (UN 48). To interpret talking trees with frame blending, for example, we might pit 
our understanding of trees against our understanding of communicative species or speech acts 
more generally in hopes of producing a new “frame” or “schemata” that in turn refines our 
understanding of both. This sounds like the language I’ve been using to talk about the hybrid 
world, and in theory it seems a clever stance to adopt. Yet in practice what exactly does it yield? 
We could blend our frames for youth and age, imagining what it might mean to, for instance, 
start out jaded and progress to naive, and try to find light to throw on the concepts themselves. If 
successful such efforts could provide ideational insight like that of satire and allegory, and, 
moreover, frame blending at least acknowledges that there are seemingly disparate ontologies 
interacting in the storyworld. But that acknowledgment almost inevitably turns to diminution 
once we conduct a deliberate blending of frames that reduces the extraordinary to a combination 
of ordinary characteristics. Once again we’d lose sight of the world’s hybridity. The implication 
here is that there is a degree of frame blending that does and indeed should occur in hybrid-world 
reading as the inevitable result of the X/Y contrast––the extraordinary meets the ordinary and we 
witness the interaction of their features––and that it’s the extension of this process to the level of 
careful hermeneutic judgment that distorts it to reductiveness. In other words, we must 
intuitively blend frames in order to follow, understand, and enjoy a narrative like “Benjamin 
Button” to begin with, but adopting that process as a way to make the extraordinary scrutable is 
unsatisfactory because it tends toward betrayal of the ontological circumstances that incited the 
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intuitive frame-blend at the start. (To reiterate, I don’t mean to imply that it’s wrong to employ 
any of these strategies at various points in interpretation but only that they cannot suffice for a 
full assessment of the text.) 
 That reading a hybrid-world narrative entails intuitive frame-blending, however, brings 
me to precisely the point I wish to make. In terms of their default features, hybrid worlds, more 
than primary and secondary worlds, require that we shift our consideration from what the author 
is trying to say to what the author is trying to do––what experience, in short, he or she is putting 
us through. Authors of course build primary and secondary worlds to provide particular 
experiences too, but (clear in Smith and Rushdie) these experiences are likely to be steps toward 
ends, forces to encourage certain orientations toward the claims made in/by the text. It is the case 
that hybrid worlds likewise encourage certain orientations insofar as their realism urges us to 
apply actual-world parameters to an extraordinary phenomenon the actual world can’t 
accommodate; but it is also the case that this arrangement creates a sort of stubbornness, first in 
our actual-world understanding’s inability to understand and thence in the incompleteness of any 
interpretation that eludes that inability by reducing the extraordinary to purely thematic material. 
So we’re stuck, having reached this hermeneutic impasse, with the experience of being there 
itself. In this way, hybrid-world narratives naturally grant the experience of the storyworld a 
rhetorical prominence, suggesting that it’s less a means to an end than the site of an end itself. I 
don’t mean that all we have is experience but that it’s to the experience we must look for the 
author’s purpose, rather than to where the experience points us (e.g. the general, the particular). 
To phrase it in the form of a question, what are we being asked to take away from this stubborn 
hermeneutic situation and our endurance of it? In answering this question some hybrid-world 
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narratives might ultimately resolve into a claim, but many others will not; in any case, though, 
the experience is an indispensable aspect of our evaluation. 
 Above, where I initially define the hybrid world, I briefly sketch the default qualities of 
its experience, and it’d probably be useful to reiterate them as I summarize the subsequent 
additions and complete the delineation here. The central experiential condition of the hybrid-
world form is that an otherwise realist context forces us to apply our authorial consciousness’s 
actual-world understanding to a phenomenon that violates that understanding. A tension surfaces 
between the consciousnesses stemming from the puzzling discordance between what we witness 
and what we believe is possible in the storyworld. Neither the realism nor the extraordinary 
phenomenon resolves into the other, that is, the world turns out to be neither primary nor 
secondary but remains in between. We’re troubled. Needing to address how and why such an 
extraordinary phenomenon could transpire in such an ordinary world, we may make some sense 
by attributing it to satire, metaphor, or another figurative device––in Landy’s terms, what we 
glean here is taught content. This is good work, the necessity of which too is an important 
condition of the hybrid world; but a perceptive reading can’t be fully satisfied by it because it 
leaves untended and unresolved the extraordinariness of the phenomenon. Yet, as I’ve said, the 
X/Y precludes the extraordinary’s full resolution by both refusing a natural explanation (primary) 
and prohibiting the positing of alternate laws (secondary). What we’re left with is the conflict 
itself, the sensation of throwing our authorial consciousness’s actual-world parameters at 
something they can’t accommodate and noticing the nature of the collision (the intuitive frame-
blending I referenced before). The hybrid-world story places us in a destabilized reality whereby 
one of the données of our world is transgressed before our reading eyes, indeed in a kind of trial. 
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The choice to build a hybrid world is thus the choice to give the reader an experience during 
which she will feel her basic assumptions called into question and be unable to retreat to either of 
the more comfortable sides, the primary or the secondary world. And as assumptions are called 
into question there comes an opportunity to see them more clearly for what they really are. So, 
Fitzgerald chooses a hybrid world––as opposed to, say, a secondary world in which reverse aging 
is the norm––less to make a claim about aging than to force us to look at our fundamental 
assumptions about age and youth through the illuminating microscope of transgression. 
 Stimulation and provocation, then, are built into the very fabric of the arrangement––
though it will not unanimously be the case, the rhetorical purposes of hybrid-world narratives 
tend to be situated within the defamiliarization inherent in their hybridity. We might usefully 
consider the defamiliarization that results from ontological transgression in relation to 
ostranenie, or “enstrangment,” in Viktor Shklovsky’s sense. According to Shklovsky, art is a 
“device” that “exists in order to restore the sensation of life . . . in order to make a stone 
stony” (162, my emphasis). By casting in a new light or simply by paying new attention to the 
world, art makes us “see as if for the first time” elements of reality that we tend otherwise to 
overlook or to (erroneously) take for granted as long mastered and understood. When a poet 
renders a spoon in verse it’s plausible we’ll notice something about spoons that lay dormant 
beforehand; thus, in a modest way, reading the poem better acquaints us with what our world 
really is. Shklovksky is speaking generally about art and, likewise, rhetorical theorists such as 
Phelan frequently argue for narrative’s general capacity to (if skillfully executed) challenge what 
we think we know about the world. To be sure, Zadie Smith’s realism makes us see anew the 
West’s racial and ethnic history, and Salman Rushdie’s fantasy illuminates the massive 
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operational scale of the principles violated by the fatwa. But amidst the general applicability of 
the concept the hybrid world has a uniquely acute and salient relation to “enstrangement,” albeit 
one that flips, so to speak, the original direction of the light it throws. I want to suggest that the 
hybrid world’s violation of our laws actually forces us to “see as if for the first time” those 
violated laws for what they are––to “restore the sensation of life” governed by precisely the 
parameter(s) that the extraordinary phenomenon transgresses. What we experience in a hybrid 
world are the consequences of a fundamental law’s lapse in an otherwise controlled, realist 
context, and enduring this experience all but guarantees to reveal via contrast a clearer picture of 
the living condition effected by the law in the actual world. In other words, these Christina V. 
Bruns’s, “When a process that seems natural or automatic appears to fail, an examination of that 
failure can disclose elements of the process that usually remain invisible” (354). Obviously the 
takeaways will vary by text, but at the very least hybrid-world narratives subject us to an 
interaction between an extraordinary phenomenon and our ordinary modes of understanding the 
world. Such narratives thus exercise an inherent, very nearly inevitable tendency to challenge, 
reform, or reinforce what we think, value, and believe––and they do so not by telling us but by 
letting us feel our way through the hybridity. I’ll forego trying to articulate a particular revelation 
that issues from “Benjamin Button” in favor of underscoring the more important point: 
Fitzgerald builds a hybrid world to “enstrange” his reader from the laws of aging and thereby to 
force that reader to reevaluate, consciously or unconsciously, his or her perception of age, youth, 
and the bridge between them in the actual world. Generally speaking, it’s via this process of 
defamiliarization or “enstrangement” that hybrid worlds influence our understanding of the 
actual world. 
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 But there is an additional benefit of this experience that we might say goes on beneath the 
acquisition of a newfound perspective. In How to Do Things with Fictions, theorist Joshua Landy 
locates a class of texts––The Canterbury Tales, the Gospel of Mark, Plato’s dialogues, 
Mallarmé’s lyrics, Beckett’s trilogy––that he argues “don’t teach by means of their content” but 
“train by means of their form.” The affordances of such texts are structural and experiential and 
can only be articulated in terms of the capacities they hone. For instance, with Molloy, Malone 
Dies, and The Unnamable, Beckett offers us “not a reservoir of information but a spiritual 
exercise,” a “formal model for the dissolution of philosophical questions” that, through repeated 
pairings of assertion-and-negation (“je ne peux pas continuer, je vais continuer”), eventually lets 
“peace enter in” as we “grasp, of the unknowable, that it can never be known” (138-144). Or, 
less abstractly, in Plato it’s often less important to glean the wisdom of the lesson than to have 
undergone the processual, dialogical journey thereto. I’d like to think that all quality literature 
exercises us to some degree, but Landy’s point is that “a finite set” of texts, particularly ones as 
recalcitrant as Beckett’s novels, Mallarmé’s poems, and the parables of Mark’s Jesus, foreground 
their “training” and background their “teaching”; their dominant quality and foremost virtue is 
their experience rather than their argument. I don’t want to conflate my theoretical model with 
his, and I want to claim neither that all hybrid worlds are training-dominant nor that all training-
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dominant texts are hybrid worlds. But I do propose that for a moment we consider the experience 
of hybrid worlds in these terms of Landy’s.19 
 A study beyond the present scope, one that surveyed, say, dozens of hybrid-world 
narratives, would doubtless reveal that many authors take obvious positions in regard to the 
assumptions their storyworlds destabilize. However, in some cases (“Benjamin Button,” I think, 
being one of them), the ultimate verdict or argument might be inconclusive––we’ll have our 
destabilization and what it forces us to notice, and that will seem to be the limit of the rhetorical 
objective. I want to suggest, with the help of Landy, that even in the most unproductive of such 
cases––those either inscrutable, agnostic, or uninteresting in their apparent proposition––the 
hybridity of the storyworld contains within it the potential to offer us, on a subterranean level, a 
profitable encounter. (The realization of that potential is of course not guaranteed but depends on 
various other factors such as aesthetic execution.) What I mean, ultimately, is that hybrid worlds 
do have a uniquely poignant ability to influence what we believe and value, but even if that 
influence nets no articulable gain (if we can discern no proposition being made about the world), 
a well-constructed hybrid-world narrative can still provide us the valuable experience of our 
assumptions being destabilized. Valuable: as we go through what I’ve called the “hermeneutic 
impasse,” the discomfiting intrusion of the impossible into realism, the collision of actual-world 
understandings and extraordinary phenomena, the “enstragement” from and “first sight” of the 
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19 To talk about Beckett, Mallarmé, Plato, Chaucer, and Mark in terms of world-building is far, far outside the scope 
of this study, because they raise a number of useful but difficult questions about world-building in general. We’d 
have to attend, for instance, to the common belief that lyric poems do not project fictional worlds (Mallarmé), the 
possibility that Beckett at his most inscrutable projects no world at all, the absolute realism required for a 
philosophical dialogue (Plato), the conventions of medieval poetry that loosen our ontological laws (Chaucer), and 
the controversial and complicated nature of belief in scripture in general (Mark). My point is that Landy hits on an 
important principle, and it’s equivalence with that principle I’m after, not an equation of our enterprises. 
Nevertheless, the problems that Landy’s five writers pose to storyworld study can and should be addressed in world-
building terms eventually. 
transgressed law, the conscious or unconscious reevaluation of our preconceptions, and all else 
that comprises the challenge of the hybrid-world form, we simultaneously sharpen our capacity 
to undergo such challenges. Or, hybrid worlds are unrelenting challenges that train us for 
instances of being challenged––”uniquely propitious training-grounds,” as Landy puts it (12). 
This paragraph is my pitch for including hybrid-world narratives in that “finite set of texts” 
whose processes whet our cognitive or intellectual dexterity in practical ways, even as we remain 
aware of what they’re potentially leading us to recognize about our world. 
 I use the word “practical” in the sense of “relating to practice or action, as opposed to 
speculation or theory” (OED 1) deliberately to signal what I believe to be the relevance of the 
hybrid-world experience to our active lives in the actual world. In some ways that relevance 
might be obvious, banal or cliché even (“think outside the box!”), but a glance at two seminal 
renderings of historical progress will elucidate the stakes’ immensity. If we take Hegel’s view, 
the ideological drives the material so that history is the idea in its ever-evolving form; as literary 
scholars well know, for dominant ideas to evolve they must be tested, pressured, seen for what 
they are with their deficiencies. Then we can revise or swap them for better ones and progress. 
While hybrid-world narratives won’t necessarily pressure any particular idea, the experience 
they provide will always simulate the process whereby held convictions are challenged and 
reformed. Alternatively, the Marxian view flips Hegel on his head, arguing that ideology is 
determined by a culture’s materiality; thus, for Marx, history is the progression of technology, 
working and domestic conditions, and other concrete realities that in turn mould the ideas of the 
people. This philosophy would seem to undermine the importance of any regimental 
interrogation of our assumptions: the material formed our ideology from without anyway, and 
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our ideas will change when the world does. I’m oversimplifying, but I’m doing so intentionally 
in order to say that even if Marxian materialism saps the idea of its historical agency, the 
destabilization of reality is still a relevant and valuable experience. For if ideology is a product of 
materiality then, in a sense, our ideas play catchup, or they’re left responding and adjusting to 
the conditions we’ve been accosted with ahead of our understanding. Therefore, historical 
change, essential tenet of long-term existence, places us in precisely the destabilized reality I’ve 
been carrying on about. Again the hybrid-experience simulates a crucial actual-world experience, 
this time on the responsive or defensive against the evolution of the material. Yes, we can 
conceive it thus: if we follow Hegel, hybrid worlds help us on our offensive progression through 
time, while if we follow Marx, hybrid worlds help us fortify our defensive stance against the 
changes time bestows upon us. 
    . . . 
What is literature supposed to do to us? And what are supposed to do with literature? As Landy 
puts it, “Rather a lot, it turns out” (4). I’ve examined in this chapter what I consider to be a 
prototypical hybrid-world specimen, with a resiliently realist world and a single unresolvable 
extraordinary phenomenon. I’ve tried to elucidate the experience and rhetorical effect of the 
hybrid world in its pure form: an extraordinary phenomenon cuts across an otherwise realist 
world, bolstering the authorial consciousness then violating its understanding, which stirs up a 
tension in the reading mind; interpretive action is necessary to parse how and why an 
extraordinary phenomenon has occurred in an ordinary world, but that action cannot fully resolve 
the phenomenon, and the reader is left confronting destabilized presumptions and undergoing the 
challenge of destabilization. But I want to make a concluding note about complexity and 
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variation. There is, as I see it, no reason to avoid mining hybrid-world narratives for their 
“teachable content.” Indeed, many examples are sure to be filled to the brim with claims and 
lessons, and it’s doubtless their authors’ hope that we’d heed them. My point in turning attention 
away from content toward process is that the challenging experience hybrid worlds provide is 
inherent in the form of the construction itself––if it seems absent, it’s likely due to aesthetic 
failure or to the hybridity leaning toward the primary or secondary side. Hence, the experiential 
characteristics explicated here are the invariables, the defining features of the hybrid world in 
default form, and any content-based reading that doesn’t account for them cannot be considered 
complete. At the same time, defaults exist to be inventively subverted; different authors have 
different goals and different texts place different demands on us, and any study of hybrid-world 
building that doesn’t account for that variation cannot be considered complete. Of course, 
endless as the inventory is, a study of fictional worlds is never complete. Nonetheless, there is a 
plethora of texts just before or just beyond Fitzgerald’s hybrid world, ones that tweak the 
prototype to different experiential effects, and we should look, if briefly, at some examples 
thereof. In my conclusion I’ll discuss how the model I’ve put forth so far can help us to 
understand three such texts. 
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Conclusion: Onward and Outward
     Strangenesses, yeah. It’s just that idea that the world, 
     the things that we have always thought of as the rules
     of the world––you know, the way things are and how 
     things work––don’t seem to operate anymore. And 
     all this crazy stuff has come in. And how do we 
     understand it? How do we deal with it? And how 
     do we live with that?
       –––Salman Rushdie in 2015 interview 
        with PBS NewsHour
In the words of David Herman, “Prototypical instances of a given category will be good (= easily 
recognized and named) examples of it, whereas more peripheral instances will display less 
goodness-of-fit” (9). In this essay I’ve assayed prototypical instances of the primary world, the 
secondary world, and the hybrid world in an effort to elucidate the baseline experiential offerings 
of those arrangements and to build atop that baseline readings of my particular test cases that 
illuminate the sorts of rhetorical objectives that lend themselves most naturally to each kind of 
world. But there are many of what Herman calls “peripheral instances,” texts that “display less 
goodness-of-fit” with the default categorical features exemplified in White Teeth, Haroun and the 
Sea of Stories, and “The Curious Case of Benjamin Button.” Each peripheral instance, moreover, 
is built with a kind of peripheral purpose: any degree of hybridity, for example, will provide 
some destabilization of our assumptions, even if, in order to stress the universality of its 
thematics, its author abandons realism more than Fitzgerald does in “Benjamin Button.” There 
are, we can safely presume, nearly endless possibilities for building a world, endless such 
adjustments to the principles I’ve laid out in this thesis. 
 And therein lies what I believe to be the thesis’s value. The foundation of my theoretical 
model is a continuum on which, I posit, every narrative that evokes a world can be fixed. It 
extends infinitely in either direction so that storyworlds can become less and less or more and 
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more like the actual world both as we think about more texts (and more media) in terms of their 
worlds and as creators continue to push the limits of world-building procedures (though it’s 
possible that at some point a world would cease to be fictional on the primary end and cease to 
be a world at all on the secondary end). Thus what I’ve tried to do is outline a framework for 
talking about storyworlds, how and why they’re built, what they’re like to inhabit for a time, and 
how they affect what we do with and take away from literary narrative itself. It’s plausible that a 
given study’s worth is best measured not by the definitiveness of its conclusions but by the 
quality and quantity of the questions it provokes for further study. My hope is that, by 
articulating what happens toward the poles and the center, the readings I’ve conducted will 
encourage attention to other parts of the storyworld continuum; furthermore, I hope that the 
theoretical apparatus I use for such articulations provides a useful approach with which to begin. 
 Such a moving-forth might start with those genres, such as ghost, vampire, or zombie 
stories, whose very premises entail manipulated ontologies but which by convention maintain a 
forthright connection to the actual world. Glen Duncan has said of Colson Whitehead’s zombie-
dystopia Zone One, for instance, that it forces the reader to “see the strangeness of the familiar 
and the familiarity of the strange”––undoubtedly, if implicitly, a claim about the novel’s world. 
Zone One begins after a nebulous “plague” has afflicted most of the world’s population and 
turned them to zombies. The “Zone” of the title refers to Manhattan island below Canal Street, 
and the story follows protagonist-survivor Mark Spitz and his crew through a three-day effort to 
clear the Zone of straggler zombies (or “skels”) left behind by the military’s more extensive 
cleanup operation. As the setting suggests, Whitehead retains realism, employing referentiality, 
extra-representational statements, and various other strategies to establish a connection to the 
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actual world. But that realism is severely complicated by the plague and the zombies, which are 
the narrative’s central instability and which, by violating the finality of death, count as degree-
one extraordinary phenomena. A sort of hybridity, then. The world’s extraordinariness is 
compounded by the temporal distance typical of dystopian fiction; this distance estranges us 
epistemologically by engaging a swath of storyworld time over which our authorial 
consciousness cannot claim authority, and we therefore lose some confidence in our actual-world 
parameters. At the same time, however, the rhetorical power of dystopia often depends on our 
understanding the dystopian future as having developed out of our authorial present. Indeed, as 
Adam Stock has argued, a significant portion of our interest in such narratives surrounds our 
effort to connect the storyworld’s present to an actual-world present, to explain “how the 
dystopian state came to be”––in effect, to bridge the gap between the narrative and authorial 
consciousnesses. Nonetheless, it seems the extraordinary prevails: the first line of Zone One is 
the referential “He’d always wanted to live in New York,” but by the end it has metamorphosed 
into, “He’d also wanted to live in New York but that city didn’t exist anymore” (320, my 
emphasis). “Let the cracks between things widen,” Mark Spitz decides, “things” of course 
meaning the pre- and post-plague worlds. By arriving at this conclusion Whitehead partially 
releases his hold on realism and places his storyworld somewhere between the hybrid and 
secondary points on the continuum. What is it like to read a narrative that exercises so complexly  
the relation of present to future, ordinary to extraordinary? What rhetorical purpose might that 
exercise serve?
 Also especially relevant are those storyworlds that remain perched, for one reason or 
another, between natural and supernatural explanations for extraordinary phenomena––or, 
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Todorov’s fantastic. A number of critics, for example Brian McHale and James Phelan, have 
cited Thomas Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49 as one such narrative. The narration in Lot 49 
“represents,” in McHale’s words, “the mediating consciousness of [protagonist] Oedipa and 
through her the happenings of the fictional world,” which means that only through the subjective 
filter of Oedipa do we readers have access to the storyworld (PF 24). First Pynchon establishes a 
significant connection to the actual world by deploying early and consistent expository 
references such as California, Cornell, Jay Gould, and Perry Mason, showing Oedipa in touch 
with what Phelan calls “a generally recognizable mimetic world” (“Mimetic Protagonist” 197). 
But throughout the story Oedipa has “all manner of revelations” about Tristero, the underground 
postal system that suggests itself at every turn, which progressively destabilizes her sense of 
reality so that the innocuous confusion and curiosity she begins with ultimately develop into an 
overall hallucinatory paranoia. At times it approaches pure solipsism: “Oedipa, to retaliate, 
stopped believing in them” (96). Hence, because our access to the narrative is mediated through 
Oedipa’s consciousness, we too lose track of what’s real and what’s imagined and therefore what 
is and is not an empirical feature of the storyworld. In this way Pynchon places us, along with 
Oedipa, atop the story’s governing binary: “Either Tristero did exist, in its own right, or it was 
being presumed, perhaps fantasied by Oedipa” (88). That we can’t confidently decide which is 
true drives McHale to call Lot 49 an instance of the fantastic. In this paper’s terms, however, 
there’s a problem with treating Pynchon’s novel as if it approaches what McHale calls an 
“alternative reality,” a problem that critics seem often to ignore––namely that Tristero, even if it 
is real, isn’t an extraordinary phenomenon. It’s a mail service, and while it’s understandable that 
it bemuses Oedipa so, it’s no more a violation of reality than are fictive but possible persons and 
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locations. Nor, indeed, do either of the novel’s oft-quoted lines take us any closer to 
extraordinariness: “Shall I project a world?” merely underlines Oedipa’s penchant for solipsism, 
and in context “another world’s intrusion into this one” seems more about revolution, a 
subversive idea’s infiltration of hegemonic structure, than any actual “miracle” in the empirical 
sense. This is true even of Oedipa’s most intense moments of anxiety, which, though sometimes 
cased in secondary-world language or sentiment, still center on less-than-extraordinary 
hypotheticals: “For here were God knew how many citizens, deliberately choosing not to 
communicate by US Mail . . . there had to exist the separate, silent, unsuspected world” (101). 
The mundaneness of this distressing prospect and the breadth of the leap from avoiding US Mail 
to multiple worlds suggest that we’re approaching satire of this paranoia; indeed, even Oedipa 
herself wonders “why the chance of [Tristero] being real should menace her so” (107). In any 
case, then, the confirmed and potential phenomena of Lot 49 transgress no actual-world laws, 
and in this light the storyworld belongs between the hybrid and primary points of the continuum. 
This placement is beneficial because it accounts for or even foregrounds the actual world to 
which Lot 49 accords––that is, 1960s America, troubled as it is by (in Phelan’s words) “a general 
and growing suspicion of authority and a growing uncertainty about the relation between what 
government officials and other powerful people told their publics and the truth” (193). Pynchon 
builds an ultimately realist world with an unsettled presentation to portray Oedipa as a function 
of and contributor to this referential paranoid climate. 
 Some texts make it explicit that human action initiated extraordinary phenomena and thus 
turned the storyworld hybrid, and some, such as Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, even represent 
that process in the narrative. The first half of Shelley’s novel is about Doctor Frankenstein’s 
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effort to assert his power over nature and make life in a lab out of raw materials; the second half 
is about the repercussions of Frankenstein’s success, as his “monster” is mentally and physically 
far beyond humans and goes on to wreak terrible havoc because Frankenstein can neither control 
the monster nor honor its requests. Before Frankenstein creates the monster the storyworld is by 
all signs primary, after the monster is alive the world is hybrid, and the creation itself is the hinge 
between the designations: Frankenstein’s success transgresses actual-world reality.20 Narratives 
that represent humans willfully altering the nature of the world (and to bad effect) are especially 
poignant because, with their resultant hybrid-world powers of destabilization and 
defamiliarization, they force us to notice our role in the world’s construction and our power to 
manipulate it for better or worse. Articulating Frankenstein as progressing via human agency 
from one point of the storyworld continuum to another helps us to understand how it pertains to a 
very real and pressing aspect of our condition. 
 Pressing, yes. Consider this sentence from MIT physicist Max Tegmark: “This makes it 
absolutely crucial that human AI controllers develop good governance to avoid disastrous 
pitfalls” (181). What did Doctor Frankenstein do but fail to “develop good governance” and thus 
enable “disastrous pitfalls”? What do we glean from that fictive failure but exactly what Tegmark 
demands that we heed? Of course Tegmark’s nonfiction book on artificial intelligence, Life 3.0, 
resonates in talk of Frankenstein, but I think that correlation also gestures toward a greater 
germaneness of a world-building study to our lives in the actual world. Considering the rate at 
which technology develops and the particular projects underway,21 it’s plausible that reality in 
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20 This assessment is complicated by the frame-narrative structure of the novel as a whole. I’m referring to the world 
as represented in Frankenstein’s tale to Captain Walton. 
21 See, in addition to Tegmark’s book, Daugherty and Wilson’s Human + Machine, Bostrum’s Superintelligence, 
Barrat’s Our Final Invention, Husain’s The Sentient Machine.
the coming decade(s) will be infiltrated by phenomena that now or a decade ago or a decade 
before that we (or at least laypeople, nonscientists) would have considered impossible or 
extraordinary. For some people that might already be the case: in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for 
instance, one can catch a ride to work in an unmanned Uber car. I won’t at this farewell be so 
fanciful as to fully equate the experience of reading about a fictive AI to the experience of 
confronting one in the actual world. But great literature does have the capacity to influence what 
we think, believe, and value about our lives, and if (as in this study) that influence pertains to our 
world itself––destabilizing it, reinforcing it, illuminating its most fundamental and universal 
features––then we inevitably emerge better equipped to confront what’s ordinary or 
extraordinary to come. Indeed, the start of making meaning out of a new reality might be 
learning to make meaning out of the motley lot of worlds lying around us––on our shelves, in our 
libraries, and (let it remain) before our reading eyes. 
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